ASEAN ROLE IN MYANMAR

ASEAN ROLE IN MYANMAR

By David Raja Marpaung S.Ip M.Def

CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

I.  BACKGROUND

           

Burma has the largest number of armed ethnic insurgencies of all the member states in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), as well as a well-established civil opposition to the ruling military regime. The ethnic insurgencies began in 1948 while civil opposition has grown more open during the last decade. There are seven officially recognised ethnic groups in Burma apart from the Burman majority: the Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni (Kayah), Mon, Rakhine (Arakanese) and Shan. This, however, fails to take into account a bewildering number of subgroups speaking over 100 languages. This ethnic diversity and these ethno-nationalist aspirations, combined with the communist movement, composed alarming problems.

Independence on 4 January 1948, named the Union of Burma, with Sao Shwe Thaik as its first President and U Nu as its first Prime Minister. Democratic rule ended in 1962 when General Ne Win led a military coup d'état. He ruled for nearly 26 years and pursued policies under the rubric of the Burmese Way to Socialism. Between 1962 and 1974, Burma was ruled by a revolutionary council headed by the general, and almost all aspects of society (business, media, production) were nationalized or brought under government control (including the Boy Scouts). In an effort to consolidate power, General Ne Win and many top generals resigned from the military and took civilian posts and, from 1974, instituted elections in a one party system. Between 1974 and 1988, Burma was effectively ruled by General Ne Win through the Burma Socialist Programme Party (BSPP).

            In 1988, unrest over economic mismanagement and political oppression by the government led to widespread pro-democracy demonstrations throughout the country known as the 8888 Uprising. Security forces killed thousands of demonstrators, and General Saw Maung staged a coup d'état and formed the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC). In 1989, SLORC declared martial law after widespread protests. The military government finalized plans for People's Assembly elections on 31 May 1989. SLORC changed the country's official English name from the "Union of Burma" to the "Union of Myanmar" in 1989.

            In May 1990, the government held free elections for the first time in almost 30 years. The National League for Democracy (NLD), the party of Aung San Suu Kyi, won 392 out of a total 489 seats, but the election results were annulled by SLORC, which refused to step down. Led by Than Shwe since 1992, the military regime has made cease-fire agreements with most ethnic guerilla groups. In 1992, SLORC unveiled plans to create a new constitution through the National Convention, which began 9 January 1993. In 1997, the State Law and Order Restoration Council was renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). On 23 June 1997, Myanmar was admitted into the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).

PESTEL Analysis of Myanmar SItuation

            To describe the current situation in the Myanmar, this analysis is using PESTEL analysis, consists of politic, economy, social, technology, environment, and legal aspect of the country, as follow:

• Politic and Legal

◦      Governed by military junta (1962-now), with full of coercion and no democracy

◦      Many pro-democracy activists, civil societies, and opposition elements have been suppressed, detained, and jailed without fair judiciary process (including monks), and some of them were killed

◦      Criticised and pressed by Western countries, as well as UN (and ASEAN for some extends), but relatively close with India, China, and Russia (in 2007, the SC draft resolution about human rights violation was vetoed by Russia and China)

◦      Extremely corrupt state (rank 178 of 180 countries in 2008 Transparency Internationals CPI)

◦      Junta using anti-subversive and internal security constitution to destruct the democratisation process

◦      2008 constitution referendum promised to held Election in 2010 and perform “democracy” in the future^[1]

• Economy

◦      Until 1960’s, Myanmar was the wealthiest country in Southeast Asia and the world’s largest exporter of rice

◦      Since governed by junta regime, average rate of annual GDP growth only 2,9%, GDP per capita USD 233 and inflation rate reach 30-60%

◦      Banned investment and trading from US and other Western countries

◦      Foreign investment comes primarily from China, Singapore, South Korea, India, and Thailand (India is the biggest investor in natural resources and industry).

◦      Lack of infrastructures, except in Thai border, trough which the main illegal drugs are exported

◦      World’s 2nd largest producer of opium, and gaining national income through illegal drugs (some banks received 40% commission from money laundry)—some of them collaborated with MOGE (national oil company)^[2]

• Social

◦      55 million population, with over 295,800 refugees exist along Indian, Bangladeshi and Thai borders while several thousand are in Malaysia.

◦      135 distinct ethnic groups, with 108 languages. Bamar is the biggest ethnic, with 68% of population and Buddhist is the biggest religion.

◦      Human Development Index 0,583 (rank 132)

◦      Minority ethnic and religious persecution to join the army or get government jobs, the main route to success in the country.

◦      UN identified large human rights violation, including massive rape and killing of Karen minority ethnic by military .

◦      Military junta restrict the international humanitarian assistances to keep the people’s dependence from government.

◦      There are 101 universities, 12 institutes, 9 degree colleges and 24 colleges in Burma, a total of 146 higher education institutions^[3].

• Technology

◦      Technological advanced is very low, as well as the economic growth

◦      Importing most of its weapons from Russia, Ukraine, China and India.

◦      Technological investment from India include oil and gas exploration, IT, hydropower, and construction of ports and buildings.

◦      The country is building a research nuclear reactor near May Myo (Pyin Oo Lwin) with help from Russia^[4].

• Environment

◦      Cyclone Nargis disaster in May 2008 was used by the regime to performed referendum (as barter of the humanitarian aid) to support government’s constitution^[5].

I.2. PROBLEMS

What are the ASEAN’s roles in implementing political stability in Myanmar?  And what are the obstacles for the ASEAN to solve the problem in Myanmar?

I.3. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

International Organization

Before we analyze and discuss the ASEAN role in Myanmar regarding the human rights issue. The international organization theory will be very relevant to help us to explain the issue. Clive Archer, quoted the Maurice Duverger – a politics expert – and Philip Selznick – an American sociologist – in his book International Organizations, mentioned that an international organization represents a form of institution that refers to a formal system and rules and objectives, a rationalized administrative instrument and which has ‘a formal technical and material organization: constitutions, local chapters, physical equipment, machines, emblems, letterhead stationary, a staff, an administrative hierarchy and so forth’.[6]

            International organization does not usually refer to an organization which has members from different regions. This we give an example to help you to understand the meaning. United Nations (UN) is absolutely an international organization. Beside it represents the definition as we mentioned before, it also has so many members from any regions. But Association of South East Asian Nation (ASEAN) can be called as an international also even though it’s also a regional organization. The member of ASEAN is not from any regions, it’s only from the South East Asian region, like the name.

            But the most important elements that any organizations must have are membership, aim, and structure.[7] Those are the requirement to typifying the international organization. Wallace and Singer, the politics experts, stated that an international organization should draw its membership from two or more sovereign states. It is acceptable [the amount of member] in preference to the Yearbook of International Organizations. But Grigorii Morozov – an author of the Soviet period – had his own choice and it’s three. The second element is aim. The organization is established with the aim of pursuing the common interests of the members. And the last element is structure. The organization should have its own formal structure of a continuous nature established by an agreement such as a treaty or constituent document.

            So, from the explanations of those elements, we can define an international organization as a formal, continuous structure established by agreement between members (governmental and/or non governmental) from two or more sovereign states with the aim of pursuing the common interest of the membership.[8]

            Another important thing in the international organization theory is the role of it. There are three major roles can be indentified. Instrument is the first one. Perhaps the most usual image of the role of international organizations is that of an instrument being used by its members for particular ends. This is particularly the case with Intergovernmental Organizations, where the members are sovereign states with power to limit independent action by international organizations.[9] This is absolutely the role that international organizations can play depends on the interests of their member states. States establish and develop international organizations to achieve objectives that they cannot achieve on their own. But on the other hand, states will not permit international organizations to do things that constitute, in the eyes of these states, interference in their internal affairs.[10]

            A second image of the role of international organizations is that of their being arenas or forums within which actions take place. In this case, the organizations provide meeting places for member to come together to discuss, argue, cooperate or disagree. Arenas in themselves are neutral. They can be used for a play, a circus, or even a fight.

            The last role is as an actor. The crucial word here is independent. In this case, the organizations can act on the world scene without significantly affected by outside forces. They [organizations] can make decisions, can act contrary to the wishes of some members and can affect the action of other members.[11] Usually, this role is played by the international non-governmental organizations.

Regionalism

Regionalism itself can be simply defined as the formation of interstate groupings on the basis of regions. There are so many definitions of regionalism, but related to the ASEAN, the definition from Joseph Nye which said that a limited number of states that linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence^[12] is more understandable. Furthermore, there are so many varieties in terms of regionalism, and focusing on ASEAN as believed as successful regionalism in Southeast Asia, we only concern on one appropriate theory which is constructivism. The key concern of constructivist is the relationship between ideas, identities and material interests, which change through interaction of agents (states) and structure. Identities and interests are socially and politically constructed^[13].

National Interest

To analyze the international behavior or state’s and an organization’s behavior, a national interest concept will be very helpful. Every state will produce and do their policies to achieve their national interests. It can be said that national interest is the aim of every state’s and organization’s actions. As Professor Banyu Perwita said in his book, Pengantar Ilmu Hubungan Internasional, national interest also can be explained as a fundamental aim and determining factor which guides the decision makers in a state to formulate the foreign policy.

A state usually has more than one national interest. Its national interest includes military realm, economic realm, political realm, and also cultural realm. But the primary (generally) is state’s survival and its national security. In this globalization era, not only states survival and national security, economic growth is also another national interest which can be included to the primary of national interest/

National interests are not static. They can change depending on time, place and circumstances. The national interest of almost any country in this world may be learned from their foreign policy.  So, the national interest and foreign policy influence each other.

CHAPTER II

ANALYSIS

II.1. ASEAN & Myanmar

As we know from the earliest time, Myanmar’s joining of ASEAN was not a smooth process. Many judgments against the admission Myanmar into ASEAN came not only from the external but also from internal ASEAN itself regarding the undemocratic system by the military junta and human rights violations issue. Despite that situation, Myanmar realized that in the age of regionalism and globalization, it’s not possible to Myanmar to isolate itself. Therefore seeking to become a member of regional group which won’t exploit Myanmar’s weak situation through The ASEAN way and non interference principal become a priority for Myanmar at that time. Indeed, become a member of ASEAN still not able to deal with political change and peaceful democratic transition in Myanmar. ASEAN has been obliged for years of its regional and international implications regarding Myanmar’s Junta refusal to work in a peaceful way democratic transition and also several human violations that done by the repressive Junta, but up until now, there’s no much actions that have been done by ASEAN in order to resolve this problem.

The traditional respect for the principle of non-interference in the affairs of states, have come to the fore in Southeast Asia's politics^[14]. Moreover, despite the legal character of the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) in Southeast Asia, ASEAN prefers an informal approach to resolve conflicts, placing an emphasis on relationships rather than formal structures, and these soft approaches called the ASEAN way. Related to the Myanmar’s issue, ASEAN still avoid sanction mechanism towards Myanmar. According to the 42^nd ASEAN Ministerial Meeting in Thailand, Abhisit, Prime Minister of Thailand said that soft way (ASEAN Way) approach is more productive rather than sanction mechanism that will make Myanmar become more isolated^[15]. Also noted in the media, the Junta said that Myanmar condemns any interventions in the domestic politics in Myanmar and that’s not appropriate with the ASEAN values^[16]. Unfortunately, the human rights abuses in Myanmar has made this kind of principles needs to be looked up since it has not produce any results so far. Non interference principle limits the ASEAN’s actions; meanwhile to solve Myanmar’s problem through Summit Diplomacy and consensus building is not enough realizing that Myanmar itself refused to discuss its problems with ASEAN.

Expressing full support and urged Myanmar’s Government to give Ibrahim Gambari full access^[17], is not the only way to solve this problem. Furthermore, this mechanism needs continuity in terms of what actions that ASEAN could take. However, in this point, non-interference principle limits the actions and the collective actions are hard to be done since there’s still lack of common vision in the members itself. So, it’s sadly to say that, since the admission of Myanmar as a part of ASEAN members, there’s not much that ASEAN can do. It’s not only because the non interference principle but also there’s lack of commitment from the members regarding concern on human rights issue and democracy. The key of change in Myanmar is ASEAN; because United Nations, US, and European Union have shown strong impose towards Myanmar. ASEAN should move beyond its traditional non-intervention policy, as we can see in the making of ASEAN charter which has reconsidered the ASEAN way and the formation of Human Rights body should be put as a prominent concern of ASEAN members. If ASEAN is unable to prove any relevance action related to the efforts to reconsider the non interference principle in Myanmar case, then the only hope is to wait for the appearance of changing from Myanmar itself.

            The role that ASEAN plays in Myanmar is clearly not as an actor. It’s proved by no resolution or any other concrete actions ASEAN did. In this issue, we can conclude that ASEAN is playing the arena / forum role. There are many meetings and many forums that ASEAN did to discuss the problem. The ASEAN meeting in Hua Hin, Thailand, last February is an example. There were two main agendas, human right issue and the impact of global financial crisis. From the ASEAN Secreatry General Surin Pitsuwan to ASEAN head person, Thailand Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, from Indonesia Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda to Malaysia Foreign Minister were talking about Myanmar issue and its human rights violation.^[18]

In 1998, the grouping agreed to use “enhanced interaction,” which calls for countries to comment on domestic issues that portrayed the ASEAN grouping in a negative light^[19]. Again in 1998, the ASEAN Vision 2020 paper confirmed that the group sought an equilibrium between national sovereignty and regional resilience. Where regional resilience is undermined by a rigid interpretation of national sovereignty, compromise in the interests of regional stability should be taken under consideration^[20]. In 2000, ASEAN established the “ASEAN troika” as a mechanism to implement “enhanced interaction” and address issues “…likely to disturb regional peace and harmony, with the potential to affect ASEAN in political or security terms.” Then, in 2003, ASEAN proposed the ASEAN Security Community, which directly stated that “ASEAN Member Countries shall promote political development…to achieve peace, stability, democracy and prosperity in the region.^[21]” Thus, those who express caution over engaging critically on Myanmar, citing the “ASEAN norm of non-interference prohibits it” are overlooking fundamental ASEAN documents, as well as changes that have taken place in the region since 1967.

Last year, Singapore Foreign Affair Minister, George Yeo also suggested keeping Myanmar within ASEAN’s table.^[22] It’s definitely a strong evidence that ASEAN is playing its role as an arena / forum to discuss the problem in Myanmar.  But not only as a forum, is ASEAN playing its role as an instrument. The question is whose instrument? It’s Myanmar’s. Myanmar can use the ASEAN’s basic principle, non-interference principle, to avoid ASEAN’s participation. It clearly shows us that Myanmar doesn’t like if its domestic problem is interfered by any other parties, ASEAN in particular. So, here is the example of Myanmar’s rejection on ASEAN’s participation. Last May, there was 17^th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in Pnom Penh, Cambodia. U Maung Myint, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Myanmar stated, “Each and every nation has its own internal problems. Taking action against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi……is a matter of internal legal proceedings. As Myanmar is a sovereign nation, it is not fair and proper to interfere in its internal affairs”.^[23]

We also get an evident of this role from a journal on Pasific review. Burma failed to respond to the ‘ASEAN way’ and rather instrumentalized the organization for its own purposes: to reduce dependency on China, gain a more respectable stature in international relations, and win ASEAN over as an advocate for the resumption of Western and multilateral development aid which was frozen after the bloody repression of the popular uprising in August and September 1988.^[24]

II.2. Regionalism in Southeast Asia

The states cooperation more or less based on the formation of collective identities shared principles, values and traditions, and related to ASEAN case, we can see that The ASEAN Way as the norms of ASEAN has become the core values of ASEAN political behavior. This is proven by the policy pursued by ASEAN called ‘constructive engagement ‘towards Myanmar which is a non conferential strategy to embrace a reclusive country such Myanmar. ASEAN believed through that constructive approach such as a policy dialogue and persuasion also without any threat or sanction, the political change could be stimulated. This non conferential strategy as mentioned before proved that ASEAN is consistent with its shared principles, values and traditions, as the same with constructivist way. Yet, the subsequent debate over ASEAN’s collective identity is the principle of non interference. Moreover, the constructive approach through the ASEAN way failed to produce political change in Myanmar. ASEAN expectations to induce gradual political change in Burma through ‘peer group pressure’ did not materialize. Even after admission to ASEAN, Burma failed to respond to the ‘ASEAN way’ and rather instrumental zed the organization for its own purposes^[25]

The role that ASEAN plays in Myanmar is clearly not as an actor. It’s proved by no resolution or any other concrete actions ASEAN did. In this issue, we can conclude that ASEAN is playing the arena / forum role. There are many meetings and many forums that ASEAN did to discuss the problem. The ASEAN meeting in Hua Hin, Thailand, last February is an example. There were 2 main agendas, human right issue and the impact of global financial crisis. From the ASEAN Secreatry General Surin Pitsuwan to ASEAN head person, Thailand Prime Minister Abhisit Vejjajiva, from Indonesia Foreign Minister Hassan Wirajuda to Malaysia Foreign Minister were talking about Myanmar issue and its human rights violation.^[26]

Last year, Singapore Foreign Affair Minister, George Yeo also suggested keeping Myanmar within ASEAN’s table.^[27] It’s definitely a strong evidence that ASEAN is playing its role as an arena / forum to discuss the problem in Myanmar.

But not only as a forum, is ASEAN playing its role as an instrument. The question is whose instrument? It’s Myanmar’s. Myanmar can use the ASEAN’s basic principle, non-interference principle, to avoid ASEAN’s participation. It clearly shows us that Myanmar doesn’t like if its domestic problem is interfered by any other parties, ASEAN in particular. So, here is the example of Myanmar’s rejection on ASEAN’s participation. Last May, there was 17^th ASEAN-EU Ministerial Meeting in Pnom Penh, Cambodia. U Maung Myint, the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs of Myanmar stated, “Each and every nation has its own internal problems. Taking action against Daw Aung San Suu Kyi……is a matter of internal legal proceedings. As Myanmar is a sovereign nation, it is not fair and proper to interfere in its internal affairs”.^[28]

We also get an evident of this role from a journal on Pasific review. Burma failed to respond to the ‘ASEAN way’ and rather instrumentalized the organization for its own purposes: to reduce dependency on China, gain a more respectable stature in international relations, and win ASEAN over as an advocate for the resumption of Western and multilateral development aid which was frozen after the bloody repression of the popular uprising in August and September 1988.^[29]

II.3. Myanmar National Interest

Foreign policy of Myanmar toward ASEAN become more communicative, but in the end Myanmar still reject any political intervention in terms of Aung San Suu Kyi’case , human rights violation , and democratization process. National interests of Myanmar take large part on economic side, as its country try to open cooperation with ASEAN member countries and also China and India. But other national interests such community building also took part in in its national interest.

The State Peace and Development Council (SPDC) is the most important actors in Myanmar’s political economy. The SPDC has been trying to improve its popularity among the people, through enhanced publicity for its state-building activities and an anti-corruption drive among civil servants. This latter initiative, however—together with attempts to raise revenue by clamping down on tax evasion, the sudden move of the administrative capital to Naypyitaw and a lack of transparent, predictable or sound economic policies—is currently further slowing the nation’s economy. Besides that, these are some SPDC Policy to take interest from Myanmar people^[30].

1. Reconvening of the National Convention that has been adjourned since 1996
2.  After the successful holding of the National Convention, step-by-step implementation of the process necessary for the emergence of a genuine and disciplined democratic system
3. Drafting of a new constitution in accordance with detailed basic principles laid down by the National Convention
4. Adoption of the constitution through a national referendum.
5. Holding of free and fair elections for pyithu hluttaws [legislative bodies] according to the new constitution.
6. Convening of hluttaws [assemblies] attended by hluttaw members in accordance with the new constitution.
7. Building a modern, developed and democratic nation by the state leaders elected by the hluttaw, and the government and other central organs formed by the hluttaw

Stakeholder Analysis

A stakeholder analysis is a technique you can use to identify and assess the importance of key people, groups of people, or institutions that may significantly influence the success of your activity or project^[31].

Recent Condition

Oversight Actors	Government	Military	Civilian	Impacts
1. No function of parliament 2.No press freedom 3. Civil society are in limited access and under-intimidated	1.Corruption 2.Authoritarian 3.Power supremacy 4.Military as super power has dual function	1.Using violence 2. Dual-function 3.Running business	1.Frustrated by law and politics 2. Under coercion and injustice 3.Race conflict	1.No law supremacy 2.Social and security unrest 3.Destructing economic development

Transformation The Stakeholders

Oversight Actors	Government	Military	Civilian	Impacts
Objective Cover both side Pressure to government Research & suggestion Law supremacy endorsement	Law enforcement Controlling military Security protection Give education and guidelines Eradicate corruption Increase military welfare	No violent Obeying law Professional Hand over the case to government	Obeying law No anarchy Using legal and political channel	Law supremacy Social and political order Public trust SSR Human security Supporting economic development/sustainability

Position, Interest, and Needs

This analysis is one of classical ideas in conflict resolution to distinguish between position held by parties and their lying interest a needs^[32]. Analyzing interest and needs can be a way to achieve consensus.

Interest Analysis

Needs Analysis

Benefit Management

Benefits Management in is concerned with the beginning and end of project management and surrounds each project. Every change project and program should at least end with a measurable contribution to a specific benefit. In Myanmar we offer 4 projects, that can be do with Military, Politic and Legal, Socio Cultural, and economy approach.

            The Projects are build democracy and good governance, Redesign vision also concept of military position and function in government, Strengthening Regional and International Diplomacy Lobby in Myanmar, and strengthening the social society.

CHAPTER III

CONCLUSION

The Southeast Asian leaders promise to step up the fight against terrorism, but they failed to denounce the State-Sponsored Terrorism in the region. The region will never be secure while one of its members ( the notorious Burmese military regime) is holding the 50 millions hostages , while a few live in the penthouse and do as they please. The ASEAN should not harbor the terrorist regime in the region. The ASEAN should seek to pressure and isolate state sponsors so they will renounce the use of terrorism, end support to terrorists, and bring terrorists to justice for past crimes. Likewise, the ASEAN establishes an ASEAN community of "three pillars" – the ASEAN Security Community, ASEAN Economic Community and ASEAN Socio-cultural Community -- "for the purpose of ensuring durable peace, stability and shared prosperity in the region. Without political stability in one of its nations because of State-Sponsored Terrorism, the economic development in the region is impossible and so do prosperity in the region. The ASEAN must reconsider their actions in the face of the mounting international demands regarding on the Burma's issue. In retrospect of the past regime changes in the region ( ie Philippine, Indonesia, East Timor, Cambodia ), the whole world has witnessed the ineffectual approaches of ASEAN and its hypocritical policy. Despite that, building pressure on Burma must be indeed intense. We must continuously urge international communities, governments and institutions to keep up the pressure and to use their power and influence to stop the ongoing political oppression, violation of human rights inside Burma, and waging war against the people. The political intervention from the

U.N Security Council is an urgent need to resolve the Burma's political impasse. The pressure is the only language the regime's thugs understand and hear. The language may be too strong for Asian leaders who want to sit on the fence in the Burma's issue, but we must push them to stand up for what is right and wrong in the Burma's conflict. We must urge the ASEAN to continue pressing for democratic reforms in Burma.

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http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/mdtmanila/speeches/miworker.htm

Fawcett, Louise and Andrew Hurrell ( 1995). Regionalism in World Politics. New York : Oxford University Press

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[1]              Burma. https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/bm.html (last accessed on 5:19 PM 7/28/2009)

[2]              Ibid.

[3]  Ibid.

[4]              Ibid.

[5]              Ibid.

[6] Archer, Clive. 2003. International Organizations. 3^rd Edition. New York: Routledge, p. 2

[7] Ibid, p.33

[8] Ibid.

[9] Ibid, p.68

[10] W.R. Bohning. The Role and Functions of International Organizations in the Field of Migrant Workers. In the Regional Workshop on the International Labour Organization (ILO) and International Labour Migration by the Canadian Human Rights Foundation, the Ateneo Human Rights Centre, and the Lawasia Human Rights Committee. January 1999.

http://www.ilo.org/public/english/region/asro/mdtmanila/speeches/miworker.htm. Accessed at July 27, 2009. 8.25 pm.

[11] Op Cit, p.73-80

[12] Fawcett, Louise and Andrew Hurrell ( 1995). Regionalism in World Politics. New York : Oxford University Press. Page 11

[13] Rulan, Jurgen ( 2000). ASEAN and the Asian crisis: theoretical implications and practical consequences for Southeast Asian regionalism.  The Pacific Review, Vol. 13 No. 3 2000: 421–451

[14] Forty Years of ASEAN -- What To Do With Myanmar? http://www.mysinchew.com/node/3194

[15] http://www.republika.co.id/berita/63553/ASEAN_Tak_Ada_Sanksi_untuk_Myanmar

[16] http://beritasore.com/2007/11/23/menanti-ratifikasi-asean-charter/ 

[17] Haacke, Jurgen (2008) ASEAN and Political Change in Myanmar: Towards A Regional Initiative. Contemporary Southeast Asia Vol 30, No 3 (2008)

[18] http://www.antara.co.id/view/?i=1235801759&c=ART&s=. Accessed at July 29, 2009. 1.34 pm

[19] Royal Thai Embassy, Thailand and Human Rights, Washington, DC, available from http://www.thaiembdc.org/socials/hr0200.html

[20] ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, ASEAN Vision 2020, Hanoi, Vietnam, 16 Dec 1998

[21] ASEAN Ministerial Meeting, ASEAN Security Community Plan of Action, Bali, Indonesia, 7 Oct 2003

[22] http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/331796/1/.html. Accessed at July 29, 2009. 1.44 pm

[23] http://www.asiaobserver.com/component/option,com_fireboard/Itemid,453/func,view/catid,2/id,10024/. Accessed at July 29, 2009. 1.57 pm

[24] Rulan, Jurgen (2000). ASEAN and the Asian crisis: theoretical implications and practical consequences for Southeast Asian regionalism.  The Pacific Review, Vol. 13 No. 3 2000: 421–451

[25] Ibid.

[26] http://www.antara.co.id/view/?i=1235801759&c=ART&s=. Accessed at July 29, 2009. 1.34 pm

[27] http://www.channelnewsasia.com/stories/singaporelocalnews/view/331796/1/.html. Accessed at July 29, 2009. 1.44 pm

[28] http://www.asiaobserver.com/component/option,com_fireboard/Itemid,453/func,view/catid,2/id,10024/. Accessed at July 29, 2009. 1.57 pm

[29] Rulan, Jurgen (2000). ASEAN and the Asian crisis: theoretical implications and practical consequences for Southeast Asian regionalism.  The Pacific Review, Vol. 13 No. 3 2000: 421–451

[30] Monique Skidmore and Trevor Wilson, Myanmar, The State, Community, and Environment.  Canbera: Australia National University, 2007

[31] Stakeholder Analysis. http://erc.msh.org/quality/ittools/itstkan.cfm

[32] Oliver Ramsbotham, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Cambridge: Polity Press , 2005

[33] Bozeman, B., and J. Melkers, eds. 1993. Evaluating R&D impacts: Methods and

practice. Boston, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers.

LINK : http://indonesiadefenseanalysis.blogspot.com/2011/03/asean-role-in-myanmar.html

MYANMAR: Draft Constitution by the Military- An Analysis

Paper no. 2667

10-Apr.-2008

Guest column by Dr. Tint Swe (The views expressed are those of the author) Burma is a country which has been ruled by Burmese Army without constitution for 30 years: from 1962 to 1974 and from 1988 to 2008. The military regime can do everything in Burma: crackdown, arrest and kill the students, the Members of Parliament and the monks. But it is impossible to kill the results of 1990 election because it was voted by the people. To kill the election results they twisted the Roadmap. The referendum like the election is where the people have opportunity to be involved. “Boycott” has no legitimacy. So to deny the constitution for perpetual military despotism the people have to vote “No”. The Burmese Army and the Constitution The Burmese Army was established as an ultra-constitutional authority and it will continue to be above the constitution and above the law and forever The Burmese Army is the institution which abandoned both constitutions by coups, 1947 and 1974 and it is the Burmese Army that drafted the new constitution of 2008 But in the draft it is said, “The Tatmadaw[1] is mainly responsible for safeguarding the State Constitution.” The Burmese Army held the election in 1990 and prevented the convening the parliament. The regime has announced that new election would be held in 2010 after this constitution was approved by the referendum on May 10th. The authorities are compelled to explain how they view the 1990 election result and the reason why they refuse to honor its results The drafting of the constitution 2008 The drafting of this constitution took 14 years 11 months and 12 days as the national convention was held off and on from 9-1-1993 to 17-12-2007 while 1974 constitution took only 7 months. When the NLD[2] and the ethnic parties surprisingly won the 1990 election, the regime announced that those elected representatives were to write a new constitution.[3] However when the national convention was practically held, in the beginning, only 15.24% of delegates were elected MPs. In the later sessions it was reduced to 1.38% Except political party representatives almost all delegates were hand-picked The procedures of the National Convention are utterly undemocratic as freedom of speech of the delegates to the Convention was strictly prohibited by order and through the intelligence officers monitoring all sessions All proposals submitted by NLD and the ethnic delegates were turned down One of the six objectives for the formulation of the constitution as stipulated in the SLORC[4] order 13/92 said the Tatmadaw (Army) was to be able to participate in the national political leadership role of the future State The largest election winners, the NLD and the SNLD[5] walked out of the national convention in 1995[6] as their legitimate demands were ignored On the Constitution Although it is written, “Sovereign power of the State is derived from the citizens” and “the Union is constituted by Pyidaungsu (Union) systems”, the SPDC[7] constitution is to establish an “Authoritarian Centralist” government. In many respects the constitution is blurred and puzzling and open to conflicting interpretations[8]. The proposed system is essentially a presidential system, with extensive powers vested in the President who will have to be an army officer. The military is to be entrenched in every institution of State, including the Presidency, the Parliaments, the Central and the local Governments. The President of the State shall have the right to appoint the Hluttaw representatives[9] or non-Hluttaw representatives as the Union Ministers and the Union Deputy Ministers. There will be virtually no opposition party or the Leader of Opposition which is characteristic of the multi-party democracy. The Chief Ministers will be nominated by the President and he or she may or may not be the same nationality of the people of the State while all States in Burma are formed on ethnic nationality basis. There is no guarantee for the rule of law or for the independence of the judiciary from interference from the military. ·        The State judiciary has no jurisdiction over the military ·        The Judges of the Supreme Court are to be nominated by the President ·        It is uncertain if the Supreme Court can even interpret the constitution ·        It is uncertain who can initiate laws and whether laws must be passed through the one House or both Houses ·        It is uncertain if the President can veto or ignore laws passed by the Union Assembly ·        These discrepancies are deliberate and are designed to give the military flexibility to control the administration. Aung San Suu Kyi or any woman or any non-military man cannot be the president The President of the Union shall be well acquainted with affairs of State such as political, administrative, economic and military affairs The President of the Union shall be a person who has been residing continuously in the country for at least 20 years up to the time of the election The President of the Union himself, parents, spouse, children and their spouses shall not owe allegiance to a foreign power, shall not be subject of a foreign power or citizen of a foreign country. They shall not be persons entitled to the rights and privileges of a subject or citizen of a foreign country Everywhere is Army (Tatmadaw) The Tatmadaw has the right to independently administer all affairs concerning the armed forces The Tatmadaw has the right to administer for participation of the entire people in State security and defense i.e. all citizen can be made soldiers If civil servants are elected in the elections, they are required to retire from their occupations and give up the facilities, provided by the state. However, military officials, who are to sit in the Parliament, can keep their military positions and state facilities like house, car etc. The Army which has approximately 400,000 and which is 1/8th of the approximately 32,000,000 voters will have 1/4th of all Parliamentary seats (110 out of 440 Lower House seats and 56 out of 224 Upper House seats) and all are nominated The Defense Services Commander-in-Chief is the most powerful person under this constitution ·        His appointment and removal are not referred to in the constitution ·        He will appoint army officers as the security and the border affair ministers in the State/Region and in the Self-Administered Division and Zones governments ·        He is entitled to nominate 25% of all members of the Union Assembly[10], the People's Assembly[11] and the State Assemblies and Regional Assemblies and the self-administered areas and district executive organs [12] ·        He is also entitled to nominate the Ministers of Defense, Security/ Home affairs and Border affairs ·        He can appoint 6 out of 11 members of the National Defense and Security Council which can declare a state of emergency[13] ·        He will administer all military affairs, including recruitment and expansion of troops, promotion, troop positioning, budget, procurement and manufacturing of weapons, military-owned businesses, etc, Amending the constitution – no easy matter Any amendment will have to be submitted to the Union Parliament[14] with a sponsorship of at least 20% of the Parliament Representatives Although the other chapters can be amended with over 75% of the support of the Parliament, to amend the main Chapters, including State Fundamental Principles, Formation of the State, Formation of Legislative Power, Formation of Administrative Power, Formation of Judiciary Power, State of Emergency, in addition to over 75% of the support of the Parliament, over 50% of support in a national referendum is required In the official version of the draft constitution received by political parties, there is intentionally-made typing error which said the constitution be approved by all voters at the referendum. Only when NLD pointed out, the correction was added as it required simple majority at the referendum The Referendum – No freedom to vote without fear: with its strong aim methods to intensify The military regime continues exacerbating the climate of fear and intimidation leading up to the constitutional referendum on 10-5-08. ·        On 29 February, SPDC Special Branch police arrested three Rangoon residents for making comments about the referendum ·        The SPDC also ordered civil servants to vote “Yes” ·        SPDC local authorities appointed poll booth officers and instructed them to get “Yes” votes ·        In Townships across Burma the regime set up sub-commissions staffed mainly with local SPDC officials and USDA members ·        The SPDC charged about 20 detained pro-democracy activists, including 88 Generations Students under Decree 5/96 Other Flaws: The Law carries a three-year prison term and a fine of 100,000 Kyat for anyone who makes speeches or distributes leaflets to disrupt the voting process, tampering with ballot boxes, distributing leaflets or makes speeches against referendum Decree 5/96 punishes criticism of the regime’s “roadmap to democracy” with up to 20 years in prison The Law does not set the timing when to declare the vote results The Law also allows for voting to be postponed or cancelled in places affected by a “natural disaster, security breach or other harm that could endanger the holding of a free and fair referendum” Chief Justice U Aung Toe who was Chairman of the National Convention Convening Work Committee as well as the chairman of the State Constitution Drafting Commission is also chairman of the National Referendum Commission Only 21 days in advance, the date for referendum was announced and on that day copies of constitution are sold at 1,000 Kyat per copy No observers are allowed to oversee voting or ballot counting ·        The Burmese regime has firmly rejected the UN proposal for serious dialogue, and amendments to the draft constitution ·        The regime rejected an offer of UN technical assistance and help with providing observers at the referendum What to do with referendum?  This constitution cannot be supported because ·        It is designed to create the military as the first class elite strata and USDA as the second elite class while the people of Burma will remain a third class citizens to serve for the pleasure of the military ·        It is to perpetuate Military Despotism ·        It denies all democratic, and human rights, all rights of ethnic nationalities  The NLD has urged the entire people of Burma to stand up and reject this unacceptable constitution decisively by voting “No” in the referendum Burma Army’s constitution and a bit of help from India  It is unfortunate that during the high profile visit of Vice Senior General Maung Aye to India, there was no mention of constitution or referendum by both sides. Foreign countries may not be obliged to comment on the constitution writing in Burma. However the people of Burma will be happy if democracies speak out. Perhaps one of the numbers of India constitution experts should come up with commentaries so that Indian people will come to know what kind of Burmese President will pay the next state visit to New Delhi.   (Dr. Tin Swe is an elected member of Parliament  from Burma from the NLD now living in F-15, Vikas Puri, New Delhi and can be reached at his mobile- 981-000-3286, e-mail ncginida@vsnl.com). [1] Tatmadaw = Burma Army [2] NLD  =National League for Democracy which got 392 seats in 1990 election [3] The SLORC Announcement 1/90 on 27-7-1990 [4] SLORC = State Law and Order Restoration Council [5] SNLD = Shan National League for Democracy which got 33 seats in 1990 election [6] NLD party chairman U Aung Shwe: “The NLD has come to the conclusion that it will not benefit the nation by participating in the National Convention. Therefore it has been decided that the NLD will not attend the convention.” SNLD chairman U Khun Htun Oo: “We will not attend the NC because we know our demands will not be fulfilled.” [7] SPDC = State Peace and Development Council [8] (5) (a) the three branches of State power, namely legislative power, executive power and judicial power are separated as much as possible and exert reciprocal control, check and balance among themselves; [9] Hluttaw representatives = Members of Parliament [10] Pyidaungsu Hluttaw = Union Assembly (Upper House + Lower House) [11] Pyithu Hluttaw = People’s Assembly (Lower House) [12] The thirty Comrades who led the struggle for independence from British and Japan did not asked for reservation in the constitution [13] Members of the NDCS are: (i) President, (ii) Vice-President, (iii) Vice-President, (iv) Head of Peoples' Parliament, (v) Head of National Parliament, (vi) Commander-in-Chief, (vii) Deputy Commander-in-Chief, (viii) Minister for Defense, (ix) Minister for Home Affairs, (x) Minister for Foreign Affairs and (xi) Minister for Border Area Affairs [14] The Union Parliament = The joint session of the Peoples' Parliament and the National Parliament [15] The USDA was established in September 1993, under the patronage of Senior General Than Shwe, as an instrument for the mobilization of support for the military government. The USDA has 24 million members among 32 million voters. After the referendum, USDA is expected to become a political party to contest the 2010 election

Will the International Donors leave Kachin people of Burma in the dark?

By Zin Linn Jun 14, 2012 11:01PM UTC

Chairman of the Union Peace-making Central Committee, President of Myanmar (Burma) Thein Sein received a delegation from Peace Donor Support Group (PDSG) coordinators Norway, United Nations, Australia, Britain, the World Bank and European Union at Myanmar International Convention Centre in Naypyitaw on 12 June, the state-run New Light of Myanmar Daily said.

According to the newspaper, the President said that his government has been making efforts focusing on peace and stability and economic development. Peace and stability is the first requirement of the country whose democracy is budding with little democratic experience and practice, he said. Accordingly, his government has taken essential measures so that all can participate in political process, Thein Sein told the PDSG delegation.

In his discussion, the President said that since the government has taken the office, it has made contact with those armed group separately and made contacts and built somewhat understanding with 10 out of 11 armed groups. The government also has initiated contacts with the KIA group in Kachin State and it is believed to see the good results sooner, Thein Sein said.

However, last month, one remarkable meeting of the United Nationalities Federal Council (UNFC) was held from May 8 to 9 2012, on the Thai-Burma border.  It was attended by the UNFC central executive committee members and top leaders of the member organizations. At this meeting, serious discussion was held on Burma Army’s military offensive against the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), as the main target. The UNFC issued a statement with an ultimatum to Burma Army to stop military offensives in Kachin State by June 10, 2012 during the meeting.

 The statement said, “if the Burma Army (Government armed forces) does not stop its transgression and military offensives in Kachin State by June 10, 2012, UNFC members, who have agreed ceasefire with U Thein Sein government, have decided to review the peace process and future programs, including the preliminary ceasefire agreements reached.”

The members of the UNFC are Kachin Independence Organization (KIO), Karen National Union (KNU), Karenni National Progressive Party ( KNPP), Chin National Front (CNF), New Mon State Party (NMSP), Shan State Progress Party  (SSPP), Pa-ao National Liberation Organization (PNLO), Palaung State Liberation Front ( PSLF), Arakan National Council (ANC), Lahu Democratic Union, Wa National Organization (WNO) and Kachin National Organization (KNO).

At the start of this year, most members of UNFC agreed to a ceasefire agreement with the Burmese government. The KNU, which fought against the Burmese government for six decades, also took the ceasefire in January, which publicizes the government’s efforts of peace promise in the country.

There are many different ethnic groups in Burma. The ethic leaders said that it is essential to have ethic unity in order to have development and peace in the country. With the purpose of having this, the government needed to solve the political problems through dialogue and negotiation.

Unfortunately, the UNFC’s deadline to end military offensives in Kachin State has disregarded since riots in Rakhine State arrest public attention. Burma Army’s activities in Kachin State indicate that scenario for an ending to the warfare has died away because more government’s troops has been deployed more and more and fighting has been ongoing almost every day in Kachin and Shan State.

One noteworthy comment in the UNFC’s statement said that the objective of Burma Army’s offensives in Northern Shan State and Kachin State is to protect foreign investments’ mega business projects. The UNFC members oppose brutal military offensives and the killing of fellow citizens, for the benefit of foreign interest. UNFC members also support the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), the Kachin people’s militia and their allied forces resisting transgression of the government’s aggressive forces.

Meanwhile, the state media highlighted that the Australian Ambassador had strongly supported the reform process of Myanmar (Burma). The Australian Foreign Minister had paid a visit to Myanmar and contributed USD 5 Million for health care services. The British ambassador said the British Prime Minister recognized reforms and fully support implementing the process based on partnership. He said Britain would provide US$ 5 million assistance package for currently needed sectors and US$ 300 million for coming three years.

Besides, the EU resident envoy said to assist Euro 150 million for development programmes in 2012-2013 fiscal year. EU planned to provide technical assistances and initial cash aid package of Euro 3-4 million for clearing landmines and would provide sector-wise assistances. The World Bank is in negotiation with Myanmar officials to provide cash and technical assistances in construction of infrastructures and socioeconomic improvement as well as in paying debts. After the debts have been paid off, Myanmar would be able to borrow US$ 300 million yearly.

In contrast, HRW said in its report released on 20 March that the Burmese government has committed serious abuses and blocked humanitarian aid to tens of thousands of displaced civilians since June 2011, in fighting in Burma’s northern Kachin State. Some 75,000 ethnic Kachin displaced persons and refugees are in desperate need of food, medicine, and shelter, HRW said.

The Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) has made constant attempts to talk for a proper peace in Kachin State. However, the Thein Sein government has delayed to talk about political solutions proposed by KIO before a ceasefire.

If Western democracies truly want a satisfactory reform in Burma,   they should not neglect the ongoing war in Kachin State which may damage the whole process at any time soon. Even some analysts believe that current Rakhine unrest may not go up into such big volume if the government properly tackles it.

Despite tackling the issue acceptably, government’s media somewhat instigate the racial violence in western Burma. So, some consider the regime’s stance as shifting the people’s awareness from unjust war in Kachin State plus its domestic emergencies.  Peace Donor Support Group (PDSG) coordinators should not abandon 75,000 ethnic Kachin displaced persons in the dark.

Link: http://asiancorrespondent.com/84284/will-the-international-donors-leave-kachin-people-of-burma-in-the-dark/

Aung San Su Kyi's Nobel Lecture

Nobel Lecture by Aung San Suu Kyi, Oslo, 16 June, 2012

Your Majesties, Your Royal Highness, Excellencies, Distinguished members of the Norwegian Nobel Committee, Dear Friends,

Long years ago, sometimes it seems many lives ago, I was at Oxford listening to the radio programme Desert Island Discs with my young son Alexander. It was a well-known programme (for all I know it still continues) on which famous people from all walks of life were invited to talk about the eight discs, the one book beside the bible and the complete works of Shakespeare, and the one luxury item they would wish to have with them were they to be marooned on a desert island. At the end of the programme, which we had both enjoyed, Alexander asked me if I thought I might ever be invited to speak on Desert Island Discs. “Why not?” I responded lightly. Since he knew that in general only celebrities took part in the programme he proceeded to ask, with genuine interest, for what reason I thought I might be invited. I considered this for a moment and then answered: “Perhaps because I’d have won the Nobel Prize for literature,” and we both laughed. The prospect seemed pleasant but hardly probable.

(I cannot now remember why I gave that answer, perhaps because I had recently read a book by a Nobel Laureate or perhaps because the Desert Island celebrity of that day had been a famous writer.)

In 1989, when my late husband Michael Aris came to see me during my first term of house arrest, he told me that a friend, John Finnis, had nominated me for the Nobel Peace Prize. This time also I laughed. For an instant Michael looked amazed, then he realized why I was amused. The Nobel Peace Prize? A pleasant prospect, but quite improbable! So how did I feel when I was actually awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace? The question has been put to me many times and this is surely the most appropriate occasion on which to examine what the Nobel Prize means to me and what peace means to me.

As I have said repeatedly in many an interview, I heard the news that I had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize on the radio one evening. It did not altogether come as a surprise because I had been mentioned as one of the frontrunners for the prize in a number of broadcasts during the previous week. While drafting this lecture, I have tried very hard to remember what my immediate reaction to the announcement of the award had been. I think, I can no longer be sure, it was something like: “Oh, so they’ve decided to give it to me.” It did not seem quite real because in a sense I did not feel myself to be quite real at that time.

Often during my days of house arrest it felt as though I were no longer a part of the real world. There was the house which was my world, there was the world of others who also were not free but who were together in prison as a community, and there was the world of the free; each was a different planet pursuing its own separate course in an indifferent universe. What the Nobel Peace Prize did was to draw me once again into the world of other human beings outside the isolated area in which I lived, to restore a sense of reality to me. This did not happen instantly, of course, but as the days and months went by and news of reactions to the award came over the airwaves, I began to understand the significance of the Nobel Prize. It had made me real once again; it had drawn me back into the wider human community. And what was more important, the Nobel Prize had drawn the attention of the world to the struggle for democracy and human rights in Burma. We were not going to be forgotten.

To be forgotten. The French say that to part is to die a little. To be forgotten too is to die a little. It is to lose some of the links that anchor us to the rest of humanity. When I met Burmese migrant workers and refugees during my recent visit to Thailand, many cried out: “Don’t forget us!” They meant: “don’t forget our plight, don’t forget to do what you can to help us, don’t forget we also belong to your world.” When the Nobel Committee awarded the Peace Prize to me they were recognizing that the oppressed and the isolated in Burma were also a part of the world, they were recognizing the oneness of humanity. So for me receiving the Nobel Peace Prize means personally extending my concerns for democracy and human rights beyond national borders. The Nobel Peace Prize opened up a door in my heart.

The Burmese concept of peace can be explained as the happiness arising from the cessation of factors that militate against the harmonious and the wholesome. The word nyein-chan translates literally as the beneficial coolness that comes when a fire is extinguished. Fires of suffering and strife are raging around the world. In my own country, hostilities have not ceased in the far north; to the west, communal violence resulting in arson and murder were taking place just several days before I started out on the journey that has brought me here today. News of atrocities in other reaches of the earth abound. Reports of hunger, disease, displacement, joblessness, poverty, injustice, discrimination, prejudice, bigotry; these are our daily fare. Everywhere there are negative forces eating away at the foundations of peace. Everywhere can be found thoughtless dissipation of material and human resources that are necessary for the conservation of harmony and happiness in our world.

The First World War represented a terrifying waste of youth and potential, a cruel squandering of the positive forces of our planet. The poetry of that era has a special significance for me because I first read it at a time when I was the same age as many of those young men who had to face the prospect of withering before they had barely blossomed. A young American fighting with the French Foreign Legion wrote before he was killed in action in 1916 that he would meet his death:  “at some disputed barricade;” “on some scarred slope of battered hill;” “at midnight in some flaming town.” Youth and love and life perishing forever in senseless attempts to capture nameless, unremembered places. And for what? Nearly a century on, we have yet to find a satisfactory answer.

Are we not still guilty, if to a less violent degree, of recklessness, of improvidence with regard to our future and our humanity? War is not the only arena where peace is done to death. Wherever suffering is ignored, there will be the seeds of conflict, for suffering degrades and embitters and enrages.

A positive aspect of living in isolation was that I had ample time in which to ruminate over the meaning of words and precepts that I had known and accepted all my life. As a Buddhist, I had heard about dukha, generally translated as suffering, since I was a small child. Almost on a daily basis elderly, and sometimes not so elderly, people around me would murmur “dukha, dukha” when they suffered from aches and pains or when they met with some small, annoying mishaps. However, it was only during my years of house arrest that I got around to investigating the nature of the six great dukha. These are: to be conceived, to age, to sicken, to die, to be parted from those one loves, to be forced to live in propinquity with those one does not love. I examined each of the six great sufferings, not in a religious context but in the context of our ordinary, everyday lives. If suffering were an unavoidable part of our existence, we should try to alleviate it as far as possible in practical, earthly ways. I mulled over the effectiveness of ante- and post-natal programmes and mother and childcare; of adequate facilities for the aging population; of comprehensive health services; of compassionate nursing and hospices. I was particularly intrigued by the last two kinds of suffering: to be parted from those one loves and to be forced to live in propinquity with those one does not love. What experiences might our Lord Buddha have undergone in his own life that he had included these two states among the great sufferings? I thought of prisoners and refugees, of migrant workers and victims of human trafficking, of that great mass of the uprooted of the earth who have been torn away from their homes, parted from families and friends, forced to live out their lives among strangers who are not always welcoming.

We are fortunate to be living in an age when social welfare and humanitarian assistance are recognized not only as desirable but necessary. I am fortunate to be living in an age when the fate of prisoners of conscience anywhere has become the concern of peoples everywhere, an age when democracy and human rights are widely, even if not universally, accepted as the birthright of all. How often during my years under house arrest have I drawn strength from my favourite passages in the preamble to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights:

……. disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspirations of the common people,

…… it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law . . .

If I am asked why I am fighting for human rights in Burma the above passages will provide the answer. If I am asked why I am fighting for democracy in Burma, it is because I believe that democratic institutions and practices are necessary for the guarantee of human rights.

Over the past year there have been signs that the endeavours of those who believe in democracy and human rights are beginning to bear fruit in Burma. There have been changes in a positive direction; steps towards democratization have been taken. If I advocate cautious optimism it is not because I do not have faith in the future but because I do not want to encourage blind faith. Without faith in the future, without the conviction that democratic values and fundamental human rights are not only necessary but possible for our society, our movement could not have been sustained throughout the destroying years. Some of our warriors fell at their post, some deserted us, but a dedicated core remained strong and committed. At times when I think of the years that have passed, I am amazed that so many remained staunch under the most trying circumstances. Their faith in our cause is not blind; it is based on a clear-eyed assessment of their own powers of endurance and a profound respect for the aspirations of our people.

It is because of recent changes in my country that I am with you today; and these changes have come about because of you and other lovers of freedom and justice who contributed towards a global awareness of our situation. Before continuing to speak of my country, may I speak out for our prisoners of conscience. There still remain such prisoners in Burma. It is to be feared that because the best known detainees have been released, the remainder, the unknown ones, will be forgotten. I am standing here because I was once a prisoner of conscience. As you look at me and listen to me, please remember the often repeated truth that one prisoner of conscience is one too many. Those who have not yet been freed, those who have not yet been given access to the benefits of justice in my country number much more than one. Please remember them and do whatever is possible to effect their earliest, unconditional release.

Burma is a country of many ethnic nationalities and faith in its future can be founded only on a true spirit of union. Since we achieved independence in 1948, there never has been a time when we could claim the whole country was at peace. We have not been able to develop the trust and understanding necessary to remove causes of conflict. Hopes were raised by ceasefires that were maintained from the early 1990s until 2010 when these broke down over the course of a few months. One unconsidered move can be enough to remove long-standing ceasefires. In recent months, negotiations between the government and ethnic nationality forces have been making progress. We hope that ceasefire agreements will lead to political settlements founded on the aspirations of the peoples, and the spirit of union.

My party, the National League for Democracy, and I stand ready and willing to play any role in the process of national reconciliation. The reform measures that were put into motion by President U Thein Sein’s government can be sustained only with the intelligent cooperation of all internal forces: the military, our ethnic nationalities, political parties, the media, civil society organizations, the business community and, most important of all, the general public. We can say that reform is effective only if the lives of the people are improved and in this regard, the international community has a vital role to play. Development and humanitarian aid, bi-lateral agreements and investments should be coordinated and calibrated to ensure that these will promote social, political and economic growth that is balanced and sustainable. The potential of our country is enormous. This should be nurtured and developed to create not just a more prosperous but also a more harmonious, democratic society where our people can live in peace, security and freedom.

The peace of our world is indivisible. As long as negative forces are getting the better of positive forces anywhere, we are all at risk. It may be questioned whether all negative forces could ever be removed. The simple answer is: “No!” It is in human nature to contain both the positive and the negative. However, it is also within human capability to work to reinforce the positive and to minimize or neutralize the negative. Absolute peace in our world is an unattainable goal. But it is one towards which we must continue to journey, our eyes fixed on it as a traveller in a desert fixes his eyes on the one guiding star that will lead him to salvation. Even if we do not achieve perfect peace on earth, because perfect peace is not of this earth, common endeavours to gain peace will unite individuals and nations in trust and friendship and help to make our human community safer and kinder.

I used the word ‘kinder’ after careful deliberation; I might say the careful deliberation of many years. Of the sweets of adversity, and let me say that these are not numerous, I have found the sweetest, the most precious of all, is the lesson I learnt on the value of kindness. Every kindness I received, small or big, convinced me that there could never be enough of it in our world. To be kind is to respond with sensitivity and human warmth to the hopes and needs of others. Even the briefest touch of kindness can lighten a heavy heart. Kindness can change the lives of people. Norway has shown exemplary kindness in providing a home for the displaced of the earth, offering sanctuary to those who have been cut loose from the moorings of security and freedom in their native lands.

There are refugees in all parts of the world. When I was at the Maela refugee camp in Thailand recently, I met dedicated people who were striving daily to make the lives of the inmates as free from hardship as possible. They spoke of their concern over ‘donor fatigue,’ which could also translate as ‘compassion fatigue.’ ‘Donor fatigue’ expresses itself precisely in the reduction of funding. ‘Compassion fatigue’ expresses itself less obviously in the reduction of concern. One is the consequence of the other. Can we afford to indulge in compassion fatigue? Is the cost of meeting the needs of refugees greater than the cost that would be consequent on turning an indifferent, if not a blind, eye on their suffering? I appeal to donors the world over to fulfill the needs of these people who are in search, often it must seem to them a vain search, of refuge.

At Maela, I had valuable discussions with Thai officials responsible for the administration of Tak province where this and several other camps are situated. They acquainted me with some of the more serious problems related to refugee camps: violation of forestry laws, illegal drug use, home brewed spirits, the problems of controlling malaria, tuberculosis, dengue fever and cholera. The concerns of the administration are as legitimate as the concerns of the refugees. Host countries also deserve consideration and practical help in coping with the difficulties related to their responsibilities.

Ultimately our aim should be to create a world free from the displaced, the homeless and the hopeless, a world of which each and every corner is a true sanctuary where the inhabitants will have the freedom and the capacity to live in peace. Every thought, every word, and every action that adds to the positive and the wholesome is a contribution to peace. Each and every one of us is capable of making such a contribution. Let us join hands to try to create a peaceful world where we can sleep in security and wake in happiness.

The Nobel Committee concluded its statement of 14 October 1991 with the words: “In awarding the Nobel Peace Prize ... to Aung San Suu Kyi, the Norwegian Nobel Committee wishes to honour this woman for her unflagging efforts and to show its support for the many people throughout the world who are striving to attain democracy, human rights and ethnic conciliation by peaceful means.” When I joined the democracy movement in Burma it never occurred to me that I might ever be the recipient of any prize or honour. The prize we were working for was a free, secure and just society where our people might be able to realize their full potential. The honour lay in our endeavour. History had given us the opportunity to give of our best for a cause in which we believed. When the Nobel Committee chose to honour me, the road I had chosen of my own free will became a less lonely path to follow. For this I thank the Committee, the people of Norway and peoples all over the world whose support has strengthened my faith in the common quest for peace. Thank you.

Copyright © The Nobel Foundation 2012

2012 Vimeo Award Winners

Vimeo announced the winners of this year’s Vimeo Festival + Awards at a packed house at NYU’s Skirball Center. The 2012 Vimeo Festival + Awards show celebrated the world’s most creative online film and video.
This year, the Awards received 14,567 entries from 147 countries around the world! The 13 winners – from categories ranging from animation, fashion, extreme sports, advertising and more – each won grants of $5,000.
Then, the one grand prize winner, directing collective Everynone received an additional $25,000 for its film, Symmetry.
Vimeo presented the awards in New York City with a one-of-a kind sound and motion-responsive, projection-mapped awards show set designed by arts and technology collective Seeper, with live performances from Reggie Watts and Beardyman and presenters such as Oscar nominated documentary director, Lucy Walker.
The documentary winner is a little 9 min doc called Amar (All Great Achievements Require Time). Here it is below.

Amar (all great achievements require time) from Pilgrim Films on Vimeo.
The 2012 Vimeo Awards category winners are:

1. Action Sports: Dark Side of the Lens
2. Advertising: K-Swiss Kenny Powers – MFCEO
3. Animation: Umbra
4. Captured: Sweatshoppe Video Painting Europe
5. Documentary: Amar (All Great Achievements Require Time)
6. Experimental: Prie Dieu
7. Fashion: Skirt
8. Lyrical: Symmetry
9. Motion Graphics: A History of the Title Sequence
10. Music Video: Manchester Orchestra: Simple Math
11. Narrative: BLINKY™
12. Series: Often Awesome The Series
13. Remix: Rear Window Timelapse

The winners were selected by panels of three judges per category. Judges included actor and director James Franco; Parks and Recreation star Aziz Ansari; 2012 Oscar Nominee Lucy Walker; Radiohead’s Colin Greenwood; Scott Pilgrim vs. the World director Edgar Wright; snowboard superstar Travis Rice; Thierry Mugler and UNIQLO creative director Nicola Formichetti; Shelley Page of DreamWorks Animation; Barbara London of The Museum of Modern Art; advertising legend David Droga; and many more.

Getting real about Burma’s development

Wednesday, 06 June 2012 12:41 Ko Ko Thett 

(Commentary) – In December 2011, President Thein Sein urged his government to rebuild the beaten-up former capital of Yangon (Rangoon), a city of an estimated population of seven million, into a modern city like Singapore.  When it comes to traffic congestion and squalid slums, Yangon has come to resemble Manila or Bangkok in recent years.

In response the Minister of Industry, Soe Thein, promised flyovers at four busy intersections in the city in four months.  Yangon would emulate Singapore’s infrastructure, from railway and road networks and mass transportation to sewage system and parking lots. 

He said that his government should apologise to the public if they cannot deliver the bridges in four months.  Four months on, in April 2012, the city officials were seen taking part in the ground-breaking ceremony for the first flyover at Hledan junction.

At the same time, the Ministry of Commerce has been trying to keep up with the Joneses in terms of vehicles per capita. 

There are 7 cars for every 1,000 Burmese citizens, compared to 270 for 1,000 Thais and 14 for 1,000 Vietnamese.  It is not only that the number of cars in the country must be increased — they must look new or, at least like good second-hand cars.  In September last year, the government introduced a scheme that required the owners of 20 to 40 years old vehicles to trade their cars in for newer models.

The speed of car import license reform has been almost breakneck — by early May 2012 ‘every citizen with a foreign bank account’ can now import cars.  The government’s decision to allow the import of over 300,000 this year is likely to make Myanmar, already one of the biggest dumping grounds for Chinese goods, the biggest dumping ground for used cars from Japan and Thailand.

This is quite telling on several counts.  First, just as they were in the old days, Burmese officials remain prepossessed with the appearance of development rather than actual development.  In the past they have been known to have whitewashed walls, fences, trees and their account books whenever there were inspections by higher authorities.  These days they want Myanmar’s image to be seen in a different light overnight, inasmuch as they want to leave the stench of their soldier socks behind.  This is not going to be easy.

Second, whereas the Ministries should be in cooperation on such interrelated projects as road building and car import licence reforms, they are in competition, trying to outdo one another, not in performance but in currying favours from the President to gain better financial allocations for their projects.

Another instance of Myanmar’s ministerial discordance is reflected in the recent revival of the visa on arrival system.  It is highly unlikely that the influx of tourists enabled by the Ministry of Immigration and Population will be matched by the current capacity and management of the Ministry of Hotel and Tourism, which has committed to responsible tourism.

The formation of a national commission for planning, comprising all the cabinet ministers, the rest of the executive members of the government and local administrations, headed by the President, this June may be a move to mitigate the ministerial discordance.  However, observers who have seen similar centralised national commissions come and go under the former socialist and military regimes remain skeptical.  One may ask, if the ‘national commission for planning’ is lined up with literally all the executive members of the government, what is the government for in the first place?

Third, institutionalised red tape and incompetence mean that efficiency and transparency remain elusive and the authorities hardly ever deliver on their promises.  When they do, the Burmese usually have more than enough to complain or laugh about with the mediocre goods and services they receive.  Reforms may be fast-paced, but the country’s institutions are not keeping up; the lack of rule of law and corruption continue to block Myanmar’s road to progress.

Instead of turning into a socially more responsive and responsible entity, the state has withdrawn itself from social responsibility by transferring most of it to the private sector and to civil society.  The education, health care and energy sectors have been privatised.  It is likely that even water will be privatised in the near future.

Crony capitalism is not just going unchecked.  It is now openly being encouraged by the presidential economic advisor  Myint himself.  In a meeting in Yangon in May 2012,  Myint famously declaimed that cronies were also patriots and that they should be shepherded systemically.  “First and foremost, (about two dozens of extremely wealthy) cronies should prove their patriotism by paying the income tax regularly,” Han Tun, another economist quipped.

As the result of state failing in social responsibility, Burmese civil society has become increasingly instrumental in filling the holes of basic needs, public health and education for the needy.  The flipside is that Burmese civil society actors by and large, save the civic groups by former dissidents (88 Generation Students, for instance), do not challenge state policies lest they should lose their hard-earned operational space in the country.

What of the mainstream opposition?  Aung San Suu Kyi is a visionary, but we cannot expect her to change everything by herself.  Besides, the 67-year old icon has limited time on her hands.  The capacity gap between the opposition and the government was succinctly highlighted by dissident comedian Zarganar, who said “…in 1988, we used to scorn the Burmese army that the combined education of three soldiers did not make up to the tenth grade.  Now they (the government) are employing the PhDs while the capacity of most of the opposition members remains torpid.”

To be sure many reforms that do not entail much state responsibility, such as the easing of censorship, the state toleration of peaceful protests and reformation of guilds and re-unionisation of students and labour, have been enjoyed by Myanmar citizens.  Yet the presidential musing that Myanmar, one of the most corrupt and underdeveloped countries in the region, should catch up with Singapore may be too noble to be taken seriously.  For inspiration at this juncture, he should look no further than Vietnam, a war-torn low-income country that has emerged as a lower middle-income country over the past twenty years after it has normalised trade and diplomatic relations with its former foe, the United States.

Ko Ko Thett is a Burmese poet and a literary translator.  He studies and works at the Department of Development Studies, University of Vienna.  With James Byrne, he is the co-editor and translator of the forthcoming Bones will Crow: 15 Contemporary Burmese Poets (ARC, UK July 2012, and Northern Illinois University Press, April 2013). This commentary originally appeared on the New Mandala website at http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/

Link :: http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/7267-getting-real-about-burmas-development.html