Getting real about Burma’s development

Wednesday, 06 June 2012 12:41 Ko Ko Thett 

(Commentary) – In December 2011, President Thein Sein urged his government to rebuild the beaten-up former capital of Yangon (Rangoon), a city of an estimated population of seven million, into a modern city like Singapore.  When it comes to traffic congestion and squalid slums, Yangon has come to resemble Manila or Bangkok in recent years.

In response the Minister of Industry, Soe Thein, promised flyovers at four busy intersections in the city in four months.  Yangon would emulate Singapore’s infrastructure, from railway and road networks and mass transportation to sewage system and parking lots. 

He said that his government should apologise to the public if they cannot deliver the bridges in four months.  Four months on, in April 2012, the city officials were seen taking part in the ground-breaking ceremony for the first flyover at Hledan junction.

At the same time, the Ministry of Commerce has been trying to keep up with the Joneses in terms of vehicles per capita. 

There are 7 cars for every 1,000 Burmese citizens, compared to 270 for 1,000 Thais and 14 for 1,000 Vietnamese.  It is not only that the number of cars in the country must be increased — they must look new or, at least like good second-hand cars.  In September last year, the government introduced a scheme that required the owners of 20 to 40 years old vehicles to trade their cars in for newer models.

The speed of car import license reform has been almost breakneck — by early May 2012 ‘every citizen with a foreign bank account’ can now import cars.  The government’s decision to allow the import of over 300,000 this year is likely to make Myanmar, already one of the biggest dumping grounds for Chinese goods, the biggest dumping ground for used cars from Japan and Thailand.

This is quite telling on several counts.  First, just as they were in the old days, Burmese officials remain prepossessed with the appearance of development rather than actual development.  In the past they have been known to have whitewashed walls, fences, trees and their account books whenever there were inspections by higher authorities.  These days they want Myanmar’s image to be seen in a different light overnight, inasmuch as they want to leave the stench of their soldier socks behind.  This is not going to be easy.

Second, whereas the Ministries should be in cooperation on such interrelated projects as road building and car import licence reforms, they are in competition, trying to outdo one another, not in performance but in currying favours from the President to gain better financial allocations for their projects.

Another instance of Myanmar’s ministerial discordance is reflected in the recent revival of the visa on arrival system.  It is highly unlikely that the influx of tourists enabled by the Ministry of Immigration and Population will be matched by the current capacity and management of the Ministry of Hotel and Tourism, which has committed to responsible tourism.

The formation of a national commission for planning, comprising all the cabinet ministers, the rest of the executive members of the government and local administrations, headed by the President, this June may be a move to mitigate the ministerial discordance.  However, observers who have seen similar centralised national commissions come and go under the former socialist and military regimes remain skeptical.  One may ask, if the ‘national commission for planning’ is lined up with literally all the executive members of the government, what is the government for in the first place?

Third, institutionalised red tape and incompetence mean that efficiency and transparency remain elusive and the authorities hardly ever deliver on their promises.  When they do, the Burmese usually have more than enough to complain or laugh about with the mediocre goods and services they receive.  Reforms may be fast-paced, but the country’s institutions are not keeping up; the lack of rule of law and corruption continue to block Myanmar’s road to progress.

Instead of turning into a socially more responsive and responsible entity, the state has withdrawn itself from social responsibility by transferring most of it to the private sector and to civil society.  The education, health care and energy sectors have been privatised.  It is likely that even water will be privatised in the near future.

Crony capitalism is not just going unchecked.  It is now openly being encouraged by the presidential economic advisor  Myint himself.  In a meeting in Yangon in May 2012,  Myint famously declaimed that cronies were also patriots and that they should be shepherded systemically.  “First and foremost, (about two dozens of extremely wealthy) cronies should prove their patriotism by paying the income tax regularly,” Han Tun, another economist quipped.

As the result of state failing in social responsibility, Burmese civil society has become increasingly instrumental in filling the holes of basic needs, public health and education for the needy.  The flipside is that Burmese civil society actors by and large, save the civic groups by former dissidents (88 Generation Students, for instance), do not challenge state policies lest they should lose their hard-earned operational space in the country.

What of the mainstream opposition?  Aung San Suu Kyi is a visionary, but we cannot expect her to change everything by herself.  Besides, the 67-year old icon has limited time on her hands.  The capacity gap between the opposition and the government was succinctly highlighted by dissident comedian Zarganar, who said “…in 1988, we used to scorn the Burmese army that the combined education of three soldiers did not make up to the tenth grade.  Now they (the government) are employing the PhDs while the capacity of most of the opposition members remains torpid.”

To be sure many reforms that do not entail much state responsibility, such as the easing of censorship, the state toleration of peaceful protests and reformation of guilds and re-unionisation of students and labour, have been enjoyed by Myanmar citizens.  Yet the presidential musing that Myanmar, one of the most corrupt and underdeveloped countries in the region, should catch up with Singapore may be too noble to be taken seriously.  For inspiration at this juncture, he should look no further than Vietnam, a war-torn low-income country that has emerged as a lower middle-income country over the past twenty years after it has normalised trade and diplomatic relations with its former foe, the United States.

Ko Ko Thett is a Burmese poet and a literary translator.  He studies and works at the Department of Development Studies, University of Vienna.  With James Byrne, he is the co-editor and translator of the forthcoming Bones will Crow: 15 Contemporary Burmese Poets (ARC, UK July 2012, and Northern Illinois University Press, April 2013). This commentary originally appeared on the New Mandala website at http://asiapacific.anu.edu.au/newmandala/

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Federalism is misunderstood and misrepresented

Monday, 06 February 2012 12:03 Benedict Rogers

(Commentary) – Life is full of contrasts, contradictions and surprises, and nowhere is that more true than in Burma today. In the past fortnight, I travelled to meet internally displaced people in Kachin State along the China-Burma border, where I heard some of the worst stories of human rights violations that I have ever heard in almost 15 years of involvement in Burma.

The following week, I travelled to Rangoon, where I found an atmosphere of hope that I have never seen before, and an openness that was extraordinary.

It is 10 months since I was deported from the country, and yet I was able to return, on a valid visa, with no one even batting an eyelid at the airport and not a hint of anyone watching me during the week. I was able to meet people who for years have been out of reach, in prison or house arrest, or who, even during the times they were free, were just so sensitive that a meeting would be bound to attract the authorities’ attention. Yet I walked in and out of the offices of the National League for Democracy (NLD) and 88 Generation Student leaders’ homes without anyone appearing to notice.

It would be too simplistic to say that the fortnight was like a journey from darkness to light, because the crisis in Kachin State is not without hope and the political changes in Burma are just the beginning, with a very long way to go and many challenges ahead. But the contrasts illustrate the situation in Burma today, a country possibly on the brink of unexpected change but with many serious questions still to answer.

In his memoir Hitch 22, Christopher Hitchens quotes John Maynard Keynes’ famous words: “When the facts change, then my opinion changes: and you sir?” I am no Keynesian, and I do not believe Burma has yet changed enough to merit a total 360 degree shift in policy, but I left Burma with more hope than I have ever had for the country. The facts have not yet changed, but they are changing – and as a result, so is my analysis. The phrase on most lips is “cautious optimism,” and that sums up my views perfectly, with equal emphasis on both words. There is good reason to be optimistic now – but there are also plenty of reasons still to be cautious.

Why be optimistic? The change is largely atmospheric, but changing the atmosphere is an important first step. Allowing a foreigner who was deported less than a year before, and other foreigners who have been blacklisted for years, and exiled Burmese journalists with decades of opposition to the regime, to visit the country may be clever public relations, but it is nonetheless different from the past. In shops and street-stalls, T-shirts, calendars, posters, booklets and DVDs with pictures of Aung San Suu Kyi are on sale, and at the traffic lights young men tout copies of the movie, “The Lady.” A year ago such activities would have landed a person in jail.

From the atmospheric to the substantial, there are also significant reasons for hope. The process began last July, and within just six months Aung San Suu Kyi had met President Thein Sein, re-registered the NLD, and agreed to contest parliamentary by-elections in April. It is highly likely that two months from now, she and other NLD candidates will be elected members of Parliament. The international community has repeatedly told Thein Sein that for sanctions to be lifted, he needs to release all political prisoners, ensure the by-elections are free and fair, stop attacks on ethnic civilians, announce a nationwide cease-fire, and develop a dialogue process with Aung San Suu Kyi, the democracy movement and the ethnic nationalities. To his credit, he has undertaken a good number, though not yet all, of these steps. The release of large numbers of political prisoners, including prominent political activists such as Min Ko Naing, Ko Ko Gyi and other leaders of the 88 Generation Students, Khun Htun Oo, Zarganar and Su Su Nway, is significant and must be welcomed. A dialogue with Suu Kyi is underway, and the regime knows it is in its interests to ensure the by-elections will be fair. Even on the issue of a cease-fire with ethnic armed groups, significant progress has been made, although serious human rights violations continue and the conflict in Kachin State remains unresolved. It must be acknowledged, though, that even on the ethnic question, so crucial to the country’s future, there is some movement.

Almost everyone I met in Rangoon emphasised the changes taking place, and stressed how important it is to recognise this and encourage President Thein Sein and the reformers in the government. Within just six months, the focus has moved from bringing the generals to justice for the crimes against humanity they have committed, to encouraging and working with the reformers. That has implications for international policy.

It has long been my view that sanctions should be targeted, and should be imposed or lifted proportionately, in response to events on the ground. It is very clear now that Thein Sein has indeed taken some of the steps we have been urging, some sanctions should be lifted. It is vital that the United States, the European Union, Canada and Australia send a clear message: we will be true to our word and we will recognize progress. That has already started, with the US decision to send an ambassador and upgrade diplomatic relations, and with the EU suspending the visa ban on the president and other senior figures. I welcome these steps.

Yet just as it is important to be true to our word, and to recognise the reforms so far, it is equally important to maintain pressure for more. To lift all sanctions in one go would not just be premature, it would be strategically stupid and tactically tactless. Removing all the cards from the table in one go is never a wise move. Everyone I met agrees some sanctions should be lifted, but they all emphasised that it must be done step-by-step, in proportionate response to developments. Until there is a significant improvement in respect for human rights, institutional and legislative change to secure the reforms, and a genuine peace process, some sanctions should remain in place.

Visa bans seem to be the most obvious measures to relax. If we are serious about engaging with Thein Sein and his government, we should invite them to Europe and the United States. Exposing them to open, liberal democracies would surely be a good thing. Increasing contact at all levels is part of encouraging the process of reform. I just hope that too much exposure to the mind-numbing non-entities and mind-boggling red tape in the Brussels bureaucracy and the insomnia-curing proceedings of the European Parliament will not put them off democratisation.

Just as visa bans should go, targeted sanctions on key sectors such as oil and gas, mining and timber, and asset freezes, should stay – for now. Until there is truly irreversible change, it would be wrong to pour money into the generals’ coffers. Any forthcoming foreign investment should be directed at sectors that benefit the people and the economy as a whole.

As part of the “cautious optimism” equation, I have set out the reasons for optimism. Why caution?

First, as one experienced foreign observer told me, the process is still “fragile.” Much rests on the shoulders of two individuals: Thein Sein and Aung San Suu Kyi, as it did with FW de Klerk and Nelson Mandela in South Africa. If something happened to one of them, would the process continue? Are there enough reformers in the government to forge ahead in Thein Sein’s absence? Are there people in the democracy movement who command enough trust and respect to work with the government? Are there hardliners within the regime waiting to manoeuvre against Thein Sein? Is there a risk of an internal coup, bringing the “Burmese Spring” to an end? As one Burmese journalist told me last week, for the first time in 50 years Burma the people are praying for the president to survive, not to die. Thein Sein is known to have a heart condition. “We are all praying for his pacemaker to keep working,” I was told.

Second, although there is substance, such as the release of political prisoners, much of the change is atmospheric. There is still no institutional, constitutional or legislative change. Laws such as the State Protection Law 1975, which allows detention without charge or trial, the Unlawful Associations Act, banning contact with groups deemed to be ‘illegal’, the Emergency Provision Act, used to silence dissent, and the Electronic Transactions Law, used to stop the distribution of information the regime deems to be detrimental to its security, remain in place, and until these are repealed or amended, and the rule of law developed, political prisoners who have recently been released could be jailed again tomorrow.

Third, what will the NLD be able to do in Parliament? One sceptic believes Suu Kyi is falling into a trap, and will be exactly where the government wants her: within the system, unable to do much, and severed from her party and the people. A more optimistic view is that the NLD MPs would work with reform-minded MPs in other parties, including the majority Union Solidarity Development Party (USDP), to amend the constitution, drive forward institutional change and pursue a political solution for the ethnic nationalities. It remains to be seen who is proven right.

Finally, and most importantly, the situation in the ethnic states remains grave. During my week in Kachin State, across the border from China, I heard horrific stories of torture, rape, forced labour, attacks on villages, the destruction of houses, looting of churches and killing of civilians. I interviewed over 20 people who had fled their villages, and about 70 per cent of them had stories involving killings. They were civilians, not Kachin Independence Army (KIA) soldiers. They were farmers shot dead in their paddy field, or a mother shot dead in her home, witnessed by her 12 year-old son. I met a pastor who was repeatedly and savagely beaten and tortured for six hours. I met a man who had been shot and survived – he showed me the bullet and the wound.

The KIA has itself been accused of abuses, and such allegations should not be ignored. They should be discussed and investigated. But in terms of sheer scale and severity, the Burma Army’s violations are far more widespread and systematic, and as long as these continue, any optimism we have for Burma must inevitably be tempered by caution and deep concern.
I was with the leaders of the Kachin Independence Organisation (KIO) at the time when talks were taking place with the government in Ruili, China. I was deeply impressed by their commitment to seeking a genuine peace, making several points abundantly clear: they are for the Union of Burma, not secession (despite their name); they want to talk and they want peace; but they do not wish to go back to the cease-fire they had for 17 years, which was simply an absence of war rather than a real peace. They want a political solution that will ensure a meaningful peace. They submitted detailed proposals to the government for a political process to accompany a ceasefire – a political process that must involve all Burma’s ethnic nationalities.

The ethnic question will only be resolved when Burma’s government, and the democracy movement, agree with the ethnic nationalities on a political structure that guarantees them a degree of autonomy, recognises their ethnic identity, upholds equal rights and does away with Burman superiority and racial prejudice. For too long, ‘federalism’ – the desire of the ethnic nationalities – has been misunderstood and misrepresented as an idea that would lead to the fragmentation of the country. Yet the opposite is the case – federalism, as the examples of the United States and Germany show, is a structure that strengthens a country. Unity in diversity should be the principle for Burma. A national convention, in which the government, the democracy movement and the ethnic nationalities participate, should be held to establish Burma as a genuine federal democracy. International expertise in conflict-resolution, inter-ethnic identity and relations, and federal constitutions should be brought in to contribute advice and expertise to all sides. It is far less complex than some would have us think, and if this is done, Burma has a chance of a genuine and lasting peace and an end to more than 60 years of civil war.

Many will question the regime’s motives. Why the change, why now, and why so quickly? It is hard to believe the senior members of the regime, including Thein Sein, have had a road to Damascus experience and woken up one morning realizing that the past 50 years have been all wrong, and democracy is their heartfelt belief. Even if Thein Sein is genuine about reform, his motives are likely to be mixed. He wants sanctions lifted, he wants the Asean chairmanship, he wants international legitimacy, and he recognizes that the status quo is unsustainable. It is highly likely that the former strongman, Senior-General Than Shwe, has approved the process because his priority is to protect himself and his family, and he would prefer a gradual change in which his livelihood and wealth is secure, to a popular uprising as in the Arab Spring. He and Thein Sein saw what happened to Gaddafi and Mubarak, realized that their own days were numbered, and concluded that a slow transition was the only option.

Cynics will point to the fact that Thein Sein has been part of the system all these years, and that he has blood on his hands. No doubt – but it was ever thus. In any transition process, except where a popular uprising leads directly to a dictator’s downfall, reformers come from within the system and, by definition, they have mixed motives and bloody records. South Africa’s FW de Klerk, the Soviet Union’s Mikhail Gorbachev and Indonesia’s B.J. Habibie were hardly closet democrats all their lives, waiting for the moment when they could reach the top and unleash reform. They were complicit with their regimes’ crimes, but they recognized that, for their own survival, things had to change. In the Maldives, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom appointed reform-minded ministers in a cynical public relations exercise to appease growing international criticism. In the event, the reform-minded ministers proved to be more reformist than Gayoom intended, and the process led to free and fair elections which the opposition leader, Mohamed Nasheed, won. In 2006, I visited Nasheed when he was under house arrest; two years later, he was elected President. Could something similar occur in Burma? I would not discount it.

Saw Tamla Baw, president of the Karen National Union (KNU), said recently that the peace process still involves “thousands” more steps. He is absolutely right. There is still a very long way to go. But for the first time in more than 20 years, Burma has a chance of change. And as the Chinese philosopher Lao-tzu said, “a journey of a thousand miles begins with a single step.”

– Ben Rogers is the author of “Than Shwe – Unmasking Burma’s Tyrant.”
He works for Christian Solidarity Worldwide. 




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UK Must Not Abandon Burma’s Political Prisoners

Thursday, 29 March 2012 14:18 Mizzima News

(Commentary) – Burma Campaign UK on Thursday called on British Foreign Secretary William Hague to ensure the European Union maintains pressure on the military-backed government in Burma until all political prisoners are released and other key benchmarks are met.

Burmese prisoners walk out of Insein Prison in Rangoon under a presidential amnesty in October 2011. More than 6,000 prisoners were freed, including dozens of political prisoners. Photo: Mizzima

Burma Campaign UK is concerned that the Foreign Office is taking too soft a line within the European Union and is not fighting hard to maintain targeted economic sanctions that are helping to push the government of Burma to start making reforms.

Some EU governments, led by Germany, have long put business interests before human rights in Burma, and favoured lifting sanctions even before there had been any reforms. Following limited top-down reforms now taking place, some EU governments are pushing for a major relaxation of EU sanctions, despite none of the EU benchmarks for reform having been met. The British government has traditionally been one of strongest within the EU supporting targeted sanctions to promote reform. However, in recent months the British government appears to have softened its policy.

“The British government fought hard to get the EU to impose sanctions, and now, just as sanctions are being shown to have an impact, they are not doing enough to stop major sanctions being relaxed prematurely,” said Mark Farmaner, director of Burma Campaign UK. “There are still hundreds of political prisoners in jail, and if the British government lets the EU relax pressure prematurely, the chances of them all being released will be small.”

EU foreign ministers need to renew sanctions on Burma on 23rd April, but after by-elections due on April 1 could make an announcement as early as next week on which sanctions are lifted or suspended. The main EU sanctions include a visa ban for government officials and business associates, an asset freeze for people on the visa ban list, a ban on trade and investment in the gems, metals and timber industries, a ban on investment in some named state owned enterprises, withdrawal of GSP privileges, and an arms embargo. There are also restrictions on aid being delivered through the government.

EU members, including the UK, have raised three key issues as bench marks which need to be met before all sanctions are lifted. None have been met.

Political Prisoners

One is the unconditional release of all political prisoners. While hundreds of political prisoners have been released, most have been released conditionally. Hundreds remain in jail, while the government officially denies they even exist and refuses to allow independent monitors into Burma’s jails to assess how many prisoners remain. In Kachin State, northern Burma, innocent civilians, including farmers, are being jailed and tortured on suspicion of being supporters of the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO). No laws that enabled the jailing of political prisoners have been repealed.

Ending conflict

Cease-fires or provisional cease-fires have been signed with almost all the armed ethnic political parties in Burma. However, the Burmese Army has repeatedly broken these ceasefires, and is bringing in more soldiers and supplies into ethnic states where cease-fires have been signed. No ceasefire has been signed with the KIO in Kachin State, and the Burmese Army is continuing attacks against civilians. The Burmese Army is committing horrific abuses in Kachin state, including rape, torture, executions, beatings, burning villages, looting, and mortar bombing and burning civilian’s homes and villages. President Thein Sein is still refusing to allow the UN and other agencies to operate freely to help the 70,000 internally people forced to flee their homes. Thein Sein is also refusing to enter into genuine dialogue to address the root causes of the conflict, so the cease-fires are likely to be temporary.

Free and Fair By-Elections

Under Burma’s electoral law and many other security and censorship laws, it is impossible for any election in Burma to be free and fair. Small parties especially are marginalized by huge fees for registering candidates and numerous other restrictions. The National League for Democracy and other parties have also highlighted numerous cases of unfair practices, including problems with voter lists, banning of election rallies, censorship, voter intimidation and bribery. Censorship and security laws also remain in place that make it impossible for parties and candidates to operate freely. The Unlawful Associations Act also remains in place, which bans many political organizations from being legal parties, including many of the most widely supported ethnic political parties.

The Burmese government has already failed to reach the benchmark of free and fair by-elections before a single vote has even been cast.

Even if the elections were free and fair, it is only for a small number of seats in a Parliament which is constitutionally powerless to do anything without military approval.

None of the benchmarks set by the EU have been met. Even these benchmarks, while appearing strong, do not require the government of Burma to repeal a single law or make any constitutional change which reduces in any way the power of the government and military over the people.

“EU sanctions should be reduced gradually in response to concrete change,” said Mark Farmaner. “There have been some positive changes in Burma, but at the same time human rights abuses have increased in the past year, and no repressive laws have been repealed. EU governments appear to be willing to ignore the realities on the ground in the race for EU companies to grab Burma’s rich natural resources.”


– Burma Campaign UK is a nongovernmental agency that advocates for democracy and human rights in Burma.

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