Golden Triangle As Drug Source

The world's largest illicit OPIUM-growing area is the Golden Triangle region in Southeast Asia of some 150,000 square miles (388,500 sq km). The Golden Triangle extends from the Chin hills in the west of Myanmar (formerly Burma), north into China's Yunnan province, east into Laos and Thailand's northern provinces, and south into the Kayah state of Myanmar. It encompasses all the Shan state in Myanmar and supplied some 35 percent of the HEROIN used in the United States between the 1960s and early 1990s. Between 1990 and 1999, however, changes in heroin trafficking greatly reduced the importation of heroin from Southeast Asia. In 1990, Myanmar, Thailand, and Laos supplied about 56 percent of the heroin consumed in the United States. By 1999, Latin America supplied most of the heroin to the United States, accounting for 82 percent of the heroin seized in the U.S. The Southeast Asian opium crop, which was on the rise in the early 1990s, suffered a sharp decline due to adverse weather in the later 1990s.

The United States Government has supplied millions of dollars to Myanmar and Thailand in an effort to reduce OPIUM-POPPY (Papaver somniferum) cultivation and interdict heroin destined for the United States. As they have done for years, disenfranchised tribal people cultivate opium as a medicinal and cultural product, as a cash crop to buy food and supplies and improve living conditions, and as a means to procure weapons. Political events in Southeast Asia are complex and are changing constantly. The U.S. government has managed a limited success in helping to reduce opium cultivation in Laos and Thailand; it is anxious over the increased production in Myanmar and the increasing flow of heroin exiting that country via China to Hong Kong, through Rangoon toward Malaysia and Singapore, and through India and Bangladesh.

THE OPIUM SUPPLY

The Golden Triangle had favorable weather in the early 1990s, which resulted in record opium crops. By far the largest producer is Myanmar, which until 1988 had attempted to reduce illicit opium production, strike at illicit refineries, and interdict shipments of illicit drugs. In 1988, however, the military government shifted its police and military away from drug-control efforts, to suppress domestic political opponents. This policy did not shift during the 1990s, despite constant efforts by the United States to have Myanmar take more effective antidrug actions. Myanmar produces over 50 percent of the world's opium.

Laos, isolated and largely ignored by the West since 1975 when the Communist Pathet Lao seized power, cultivated opium in its nine northern provincesbout 20 percent of Myanmar's production. Partly because of the 1990 collapse of the Soviet Union, Laos's principal trading partner and ally, the Laotian government has entered into a number of cooperative agreements with Western nations. Opium production decreased by 16 percent from 1998 to 1999, due mostly to severe weather. However, Laos still accounted for 11 percent of the production in the region.

Thailand is more important as a TRANSIT COUNTRY for Myanmar's opium and heroin. Thailand's already marginal production dropped 38 per cent in 1999, accounting for less than one percent of Southeast Asia's potential production. A traditional producer of opium since the mid-1800s and a net importer of heroin, Thailand's opium is grown in the northern highlands by nomadic hill tribes who are not tied to Thailand culturally, religiously, or politically. Opium cultivation in Thailand remains illegal, so the government has sponsored both eradication and crop-substitution efforts in the north.

China has become a major narcotics transit point because of its open border with Myanmar, its location adjacent to the Golden Triangle, and its excellent transportation and communication links with the trade ports of Hong Kong and Macao. Much of the heroin processed from opium by the Kokang Chinese in the Golden Triangle transits through Yunnan, Guangxi, and Guangdong provinces by road to Hong Kong for overseas distribution.

CULTIVATION CONDITIONS

A number of factors have contributed to the thriving opium economy of the Golden Trianglend the complex politics surrounding and sustaining it. First, the topographical and climatic conditions are ideal for opium cultivation. The demographic conditions also provide a division of labor conducive to an economic system rooted in drug cultivation, processing, and trafficking. The area under cultivation is largely mountainous, ranging from about 5,000 feet (1,500 m) to more than 9,850 feet (3,000 m), with four major river systems supporting the transportation networks and any ongoing economic-development efforts. The remote harsh terrain has fostered great efforts to topple the central governments and to capitalize on the economic opportunities offered by the opium trade.

Second, the ethnography of the region is complex. The region is inhabited by a multitude of ethnic groups, possessing a diversity that defies simple classification. Burman, Shan, Kachin, Thai, and Yunnanese are broad categories that contain widely varied ethnic subgroups. At least twenty-five mutually unintelligible dialects are spoken among the Kachin people. Moreover, there are numerous other groups who do not belong to the larger ethnic divisionuch as Ahka, Hmong (Miao), Lisu, Lahu, Karenni, and Wa, to name a few. Most of these groups are nomadicot geographically localized; therefore, little basis exists for territorial political organization. Yet, national boundaries have paid little heed to this fact and have often cut apart ethnic groups, fueling insurgency as the dominant form of politics in the region.

Cultivating opium in the Golden Triangle has been a way of life since the mid-1800s and has represented an important source of income for impoverished, nomadic hill tribes.

(SEE ALSO: Crop Control Policies; Foreign Policy and Drugs; International Drug Supply Systems; Source Countries for Illicit Drugs; Transit Countries for Illicit Drugs)

BIBLIOGRAPHY

BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS MATTERS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (1990). International narcotics control strategy report (INCSR). Washington, DC: Author.

LINTNER, B. (1990). Land of jade: A journey through insurgent Burma. Edinburgh: Kiscadale White Lotus.

LINTNER, B. (1983). Alliances of convenience. Far Eastern Economic Review (April).

MCCOY, A. W. ET AL. (1990). The politics of heroin. New York: Harper & Row.

WALKER, W. O., III. (1991). Opium and foreign policy. Chapel Hill and London: The University of North Carolina Press.

WIANT, J. A. (1985). Narcotics in the Golden Triangle. The Washington Quarterly (Fall) 125-140.

WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF NATIONAL DRUG CONTROL POL-ICY. (2000). National Drug Control Strategy: 2000 Annual Report. Washington, D.C.

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE. (1999). International narcotics control strategy report, March 1999. Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office.

JAMES VAN WERT

REVISED BY FREDERICK K. GRITTNER

Source: Encyclopedia of Drugs, Alcohol, and Addictive Behavior, ©2001 Gale Cengage. All Rights Reserved. Full copyright.

Burma/Myanmar

In the last half-century the peoples of Burma have experienced six different political transformations.

Constitutional Democracy, 1948 to 1958

In 1947 a partially elected constituent assembly wrote a new constitution, a mixture of liberal democratic and socialist principles; organized the nation into a federation of unequal states, two with the right of secession; created a parliamentary system and an independent judiciary; and guaranteed rights, freedom, and equality to all. During its deliberations the nation's leader, Aung San, was assassinated; his successor, U Nu, finished the constitution. Although flawed, incomplete, and hastily written against a backdrop of political unrest and incipient revolution, the basic document was approved unanimously and Burma became independent on January 4, 1948.

With independence came internal war and invasion. The Burma Communist Party (BCP) revolted in March 1948, as did the Karen National Defense Organization at year's end. In 1949 Nationalist Chinese soldiers fled China, took refuge in Burma, refused to disarm, and joined the local wars. By 1950 the Burmese army gradually began to recover political control and, with international help, removed nearly half the Chinese.

Throughout the worst days of war the government upheld the constitution, parliament met without interruption, courts functioned, people and press were free, schools remained open, and the economy grew. Two national elections were held in the 1950s; the independence party, the Anti-Fascist Peoples' Freedom League (AFPFL), won both while a parliamentary opposition gradually emerged.

Caretaker Government, 1958 to 1960

In 1958 the AFPFL split. Unable to govern, Nu urged parliament to utilize a constitutional provision and elect a nonmember, General Ne Win, his successor. Ne Win formed a Caretaker Government (CG) of military and nonparty members. The general governed Burma's heartland strictly and harshly, but within the letter of the law. In the Shan state, martial law was declared in combating indigenous and Chinese forces; the army used violence against accused civilians, made arbitrary personnel and institutional changes in the government, and was not held accountable. Ne Win, with parliamentary approval, pressed the Shan and Karenni states' rulers to surrender hereditary power and forced state governments to agree to replace civilian administrations in contested and border areas with new military-controlled administrations. The CG ended in April 1960, following a national election in which the public voted overwhelmingly against the party pledged to continue Ne Win's policies and returned Nu to power.

Second Constitutional Democracy, 1960 to 1962

Nu's government restored the letter and spirit of the constitution, strengthened democracy and human rights, and sought to end internal wars through negotiations. However, divisions among his fellow leaders emerged and threatened to split the party. Angry because Nu had reversed many CG decisions and appeared to support Shan and Karenni secession, Ne Win and a cabal of officers overthrew the government, set the constitution aside, dismissed parliament, and arrested members of the government and ethnic leaders.

Military Dictatorship, 1962 to 1974

On March 2, 1962, Ne Win and sixteen military officers formed a Revolutionary Council (RC) that ruled by decree and proclamation. It replaced the federal structure with a unitary hierarchy, the military-led Security and Administration Councils; abolished the two highest courts; established a Chief Court of Burma; and unified the administration of justice. Judges upheld the new "laws," the military and police acted with little restraint in arresting scores without warrants, the courts conducted judicial procedures in secret and extended sentences without notice, and prisoners were beaten, brutalized, and killed while in custody. To maintain its hold on the public and control the dissemination of information, the RC replaced the free press with a single government publication, created huge mass and class organizations, and formed a single political party, the Burma Socialist Program Party (BSPP). In essence, a police state was createdne that involved regular surveillance and required all of its citizens to inform the authorities of their own and their neighbors' movements, the presence of houseguests, and any contacts with outsiders. By 1970 the government had closed Burma to tourists and journalists and severely curtailed its citizens' right to travel.

Religions continued, but under strict state control. Western-based religions had to sever all foreign connections, whereas Buddhist orders were required to register with the government, with monks forced to carry identity cards.

In 1963 the RC began transforming Burma into a socialist state. Without preparation and placing untrained and inexperienced military officers in charge, it seized private property and nationalized most of the urban economy. Trade and distribution quickly broke down, leading to shortages, hoarding, inflation, corruption, and black markets. Although the government used force to root out illegal markets, it eventually gave up in this regard as it was incapable of providing needed goods and services.

By holding talks with insurgent groups in 1963 and offering a national amnesty in 1981, the RC tried, but failed, to solve peacefully the problems of national unity.

Constitutional Dictatorship, 1974 to 1988

In 1971 the RC ordered the BSPP to write a new constitution. It was approved by 90 percent of the country's voters. On January 3, 1974, the constitution came into effect and the nation was renamed the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma. The new law created a unitary state with fourteen political divisions, a one-house legislature, and one recognized party. Two leadership bodies were formed, and judicial power rested with two councils. Three levels of government existed beneath the national level, and all four were governed under the principle of democratic centralism.

Rights were paired with duties and made conditional upon the completion of state goals. None were absolute. All citizens had to work toward the fulfillment of socialist objectives and surrender any right that interfered with them. Dissent was outlawed, and the military had no right to seize power and rule by decree.

Between 1974 and 1988 periods of serious social unrest developed, led by unemployed workers over rising prices and by students and monks over the internment of U Thant, former Secretary-General of the United Nations (UN). A coup by middle-grade officers to restore civilian rule and the 1947 constitution failed. In the early 1980s an improving economy proved short-lived. In 1987 new economic problems and social unrest contributed to Ne Win's acknowledgment of past mistakes, with his call for policy changes and his own resignation. The removal of currency from circulation without the substitution of a new form of currency provoked student demonstrations and national discontent.

On March 12, 1988, a riot between students and townspeople in a tea shop near the Rangoon Institute of Technology caused the death of one student and led to student clashes with the police that continued until September. The public largely supported the students, and some military units even marched with the demonstrators. On August 8, believing that the date, 8-8-88, had spiritual significance and would lead to the end of military rule, thousands of students and ordinary citizens gathered in Rangoon. Near midnight the military attacked, shooting anyone still on the streets. The crowds dispersed; no one, in fact, knows how many were killed, as the army seized and disposed of the bodies.

On September 18, 1988, the military struck again. General Saw Maung and senior officers seized all power, set the 1974 constitution aside, and established a new military dictatorship, the State Law and Order Restoration Council (SLORC)ater renamed the State Peace and Development Council (SPDC). Marching through the streets with rifles leveled, the soldiers fired at anyone in sight and the carnage lasted for three days. Again, the number murdered is unknown as the soldiers seized the bodies. Thousands were arrested and even more fled the country, seeking refuge in neighboring states.

Second Military Dictatorship since 1988

Since the SLORC was established, it has ruled with an iron hand. Arrest, imprisonment, execution, and long prison terms have intimidated and subjugated all peoples in Burma's heartland. Governing under martial law, the army expanded to over 400,000; it built hundreds of jails and filled them with political prisoners and ordinary criminals. It has remained in continuous conflict with the nation's minorities in its efforts to force an end to their actions against the state.

SLORC issued a new election law; 233 parties were formed, but only a few had national or regional support. Aung San Suu Kyi, daughter of Burma's first democratic leader, Aung San, helped form the National League for Democracy (NLD) and was named Secretary-General. Her party was committed to restoring democracy and freedom. In the May 27, 1990, national election the NLD won 60 percent of the vote and 392 of the 485 seats contested. It expected to form a new parliament and government, but on July 27 SLORC refused to step down, instead declaring (in Announcement 1/90) its intention to continue ruling under martial law, not bound by any constitution.

In 1992 General Than Shwe replaced Saw Maung as dictator. He announced that a National Convention (NC) of 702 delegates would be formed to write a new constitution. The NC was convened in January 1993 and met irregularly. In 1995 the NLD was expelled for its absence following criticism of Convention procedures and rules. Before the NC was suspended in 1996, it adopted 104 principles as the basis of a new constitution. Key provisions required that the military would hold one-fourth of parliamentary seats, the president must have long military experience, and in times of emergency, the Minister of Defense would take power.

In 1989 the BCP cadres revolted and created several nationalist ethnic organizations. The government quickly offered to end its war against themllowing them to keep their weapons, control their areas, and continue their business activities without interferencef

An elderly Burmese woman tosses bricks at a construction site in Rangoon, Burma. Human-rights groups and several Western governments have condemned Burma's labor practices. [AP/WIDE WORLD PHOTOS]

they halted their activities against the state and broke all contact with other ethnic groups at war with the government. Offering the same terms to others, seventeen groups accepted. As of 2004 the last two large groups, the Karens and the Karenni, are discussing an end to their conflicts with the government.

Human Rights

During the last half-century of internal wars, military governments, a rapacious army, and predatory insurgent groups have plundered the Burmese peoples. The UN, International Labor Organization (ILO), Human Rights Watch, and other international bodies have reported the abuses and violations of human rights suffered. The UN General Assembly has passed several resolutions condemning the behavior of military governments, and several individual nations have adopted measures to pressure dictators to change, but the rulers of Burma have ignored all such directives.

Forced labor, bordering on slavery, is used by the military in battle zones and the hinterland. When confronted by international organizations, military rulers deny human rights violations, or claim that they have stopped. Women are victimized in the frontier areas through seizure, abuse, and sexual violation by soldiers. Civilians, too, prey on rural women, promising good jobs but instead passing them on to brothels. Peasants are forced to grow crops and give food to the army, and if they refuse or fail in their efforts, their crops and animals are seized, their houses are burned, and they are forced to serve the soldiers.

Citizens accused of political crimes are arrested without warrants, tried in courts without legal representation where decisions are predetermined, given long sentences, and incarcerated far from their families. Without new trials sentences often are extended and prisoners are held for indeterminate periods of time. Inside prison they are ill treated, badly housed, poorly fed, and denied adequate health care. Despite international protests against these violations and others, the government responds in two ways: It will not tolerate interference in its internal affairs and it is studying the problem. In May 2003 the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights reported there were thirteen hundred political prisoners in Burma's jails.

In fighting internal wars, the military uses a "Four Cuts" policy. It seeks to isolate its enemies from supporters by cutting off food, funds, intelligence, and recruiting. Women, children, and the elderly who help insurgents or hide in contested areas are beaten, imprisoned, raped, and murdered. In urban areas civilians are seized on city streets and forced to work as porters and lead soldiers through mine fields. There are no avenues of appeal against such demands.

Captured noncombatants in contested areas such as the Chittagong Hill Tracts are driven from their homes and made dependent on the army for food and shelter. Those who can escape to neighboring states face inhospitable governments; they are rounded up and are either placed in camps without adequate food, shelter, and medical support or forced to return to their own country and face certain imprisonment or death.

Isolated and alone, without real internal or external help, and with the international community divided on how to deal with Burma, no real change is on the horizon.

Daw Aung San Suu Kyi and the Depayin Massacre

Suu Kyi remains the leader of peaceful resistance to military rule. Born in Burma, schooled in Burma and India, graduated from Oxford, and the widow of an Oxford University distinguished professor, she returned to Burma in 1988 to care for her ailing mother.

On August 26, following an address at Shwedagon Pagoda, Suu Kyi emerged as the leader of the democratic movement. Although she was her party's leader, SLORC prohibited her from contesting a seat in the 1990 election. Despite government harassment and threats, she addressed ever-growing crowds, criticized military rule, and called for political change. On July 20, 1990, the army arrested and placed Suu Kyi under house arrest; without being charged or tried, she remained a prisoner until 1995. In 1991, while imprisoned, she won the Nobel Peace Prize.

Upon her release Suu Kyi's freedom was limited. When, in 1996, she withdrew her party from the NC because of its lack of democracy and freedom of speech, she came under constant verbal and occasional physical attacks. As she worked to strengthen the NLD, harassment continued. In 2000 she was once more placed under house arrest; following her release in 2002, she resumed her political work, traveling, and public speaking. She drew ever-larger crowds.

On the night of May 30, 2003, while Suu Kyi and NLD party members were driving home from the state of Kachin, they were intercepted, with their passage blocked at Depayin, and attacked by truckloads of government-sponsored Union Solidarity and Development Association (USDA) members and hired thugs. Suu Kyi was assaulted and injured, her automobile was damaged. Her driver managed to steer their vehicle away from the confrontation but was stopped by the military, and the NLD leader was placed in "protective custody." Officially, the government said that four were killed and 50 injured; the NLD claimed the totals were 70 and 200, respectively. After two months of detention and no communication with the outside world, Suu Kyi was returned home and, again, she remains under house arrest in 2004.

The Depayin massacre signaled a nationwide attack on the NLD; party offices were closed and leaders arrested. Despite international demands no official inquiry into or full explanation of the affair was made. Meanwhile, government leaders sought to divert world attention by naming the head of intelligence, General Khin Nyunt, as prime minister. He quickly introduced a seven-step road map to democracy and initiated the process by declaring that the NC would reconvene and continue its work writing a new constitution. Although some nations applaud this action, most do not as they have no faith that the military will surrender power freely.

SEE ALSO Chittagong Hill Tract, Peoples of the; United Nations Commission on Human Rights

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Fink, Christina (2001). Living Silence: Burma under Military Rule. London: Zed Books.

Kyi, Aung San Suu (1995). Freedom from Fear and Other Writings, revised edition. London: Penguin Books.

Kyi, Aung San Suu (1997). The Voice of Hope. London: Penguin Books.

Lehman, F. K., ed. (1981). Military Rule in Burma since 1962. Singapore: Maruzen Asia.

Maung, Mya (1992). Totalitarianism in Burma: Prospects for Economic Development. New York: Paragon House.

Silverstein, Josef (1977). Burma: Military Rule and the Politics of Stagnation. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.

Silverstein, Josef (1980). Burmese Politics: The Dilemma of National Unity. New Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press.

Silverstein, Josef (1997). "Fifty Years of Failure in Burma." In Government Policies and Ethnic Relations in Asia and the Pacific, ed. Michael E. Brown and Sumit Ganguly. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Smith, Martin (1999). Burma: Insurgency and the Politics of Ethnicity, revised and updated. London: Zed Books.

Steinberg, David I. (2001). Burma: The State of Myanmar. Washington, D.C.: Georgetown University Press.

Josef Silverstein

Source: Genocide and Crimes Against Humanity, ©2005 Gale Cengage. All Rights Reserved. Full copyright.

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