- Is Burma transitioning to democracy?
- What can we learn from other transitions away from authoritarian rule? How do they compare to Burma?
- Has the Arab Spring impacted the developments in Burma?
- What will be the most difficult part of Burma’s transition?
- Is there reason to be hopeful about Burma’s future?
Wednesday, May 2, 2012
Is Burma Democratizing?
Myanmar in the Middle
The Key to the Region
The Splintering Politics
Friday, April 20, 2012
Myanmar opposition set to boycott parliament
- Published: 20/04/2012 at 03:48 PM
- Online news: Asia
Monday, April 9, 2012
Letting Burma Back In
An hour after landing in Burma this January, I sat on the floor of a tiny bamboo house in a suburb of Rangoon, sharing lunch with a half dozen women who had just walked out of prison following an amnesty of political prisoners. There was much I wanted to ask them: about their treatment (it got better over time, thanks, they all insisted, to international pressure), about their plans (get a good night's sleep, and then right back to political work), and their fears (chiefly, that with dissidents streaming out of prisons and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi heading into parliament, the West would declare Burma a success and move on). But there was one question to which I kept coming back: "Why are you free?"
I posed a variation of that question to everyone I met in Burma -- dissidents, government officials, journalists and academics. Why is the Burmese government promising now rights and freedoms that, for decades, it sent people to prison for demanding? Why is it so eager now to draw Aung San Suu Kyi into the country's political life, after so many years of trying to blot her out? Not everyone agreed on the precise reasons. But there was a common theme to their answers: After years of serving a military that was shunned, hated, or ridiculed for running Burma into the ground, "they" -- Burma's president, Thein Sein, and those behind him -- want "legitimacy and respect." They want to be on better terms with their people, and for Burma to be on better terms with the world.
It is plain that the Burmese people deserve most of the credit for their rulers' change of heart. For years, they faced unrelenting brutality from above, yet sustained a political movement dedicated to non-violence and national reconciliation. Time and again, they organized themselves in sophisticated and principled ways, not just to demand political freedom, but to respond to natural disasters, to deliver to themselves the basic services their government neglected, and to remain connected to the outside world. In Aung San Suu Kyi, they also had something that dissident movements in most dictatorships lack -- a leader clearly capable of unifying their country and leading its government. The military may have held all the power in Burma. But she and her movement held all the legitimacy.
Even in the years when Burma's democracy movement seemed silenced and defeated, pressure from below manifested itself in conversations in marketplaces and monasteries, in acts of passive resistance, in the flight of talented people from the country. Then, every so often, it would burst into the open, as it did in the 2007 Saffron Revolution. With brute force, the military survived that challenge (a reminder that the road to change in Burma has been far from peaceful). But many Burmese believe that some army officers felt shame about the violence they inflicted on the revered Buddhist monks who led that uprising, and about their government's deadly incompetence the following year when a cyclone ravaged the country. When Burma's long-serving dictator Than Shwe retired in 2010, the generation of officers that succeeded him undoubtedly included some men affected by Burma's traumas who wanted a way out of the morass it was in.
The more controversial question is whether pressure from outside, including Western sanctions, also contributed to these changes. I've hesitated to weigh in strongly on this debate, partly because it is hard to set aside one's own bias (those, like me, who supported sanctions naturally want to believe that they helped -- and vice versa), and partly because it's premature to argue about what caused Burma's transition to democracy when that transition is not remotely complete. Perhaps in twenty years, when archives are studied and the key players have told their stories, a consensus will emerge. And then someone will come along to disprove it.
At the same time, I have found it disconcerting to hear diplomats and other observers assert with certainty that sanctions had nothing to do with Burma's political opening. After all, the United States and other countries imposed sanctions to promote a particular objective in Burma, and now that objective seems on the verge of being achieved. It's as if we had turned a hose on a raging fire and, after seeing the flames subside, said: "How did that happen? It couldn't have been the water we sprayed." In neither case does correlation prove causality - a sanctioned state can change course for reasons unrelated to sanctions, just as a doused fire can burn out on its own. But it is strange not to consider that one's efforts had their intended effect.
One reason why the Burma sanctions are often discounted is that many officials who imposed them over the years themselves lacked faith in the strategy they were pursuing. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush pushed through sanctions mostly to express solidarity with Aung San Suu Kyi; others in the U.S. government saw them as a symbolic expression of America's disgust with the Burmese junta, or simply as a way of appeasing Congressional and public concerns on an issue that was not strategically important. Few of them actually expected that sanctions might work!
But some advocates of sanctions had a more reasoned theory of the case.
First, they believed that Western sanctions would create at least some objective difficulties for the Burmese government. The generals might not care at first about sanctions' impact on Burma's economy as a whole (which was always harmed more by their own mismanagement), and they might compensate for any harm to their personal finances by doing business with China. But the argument that sanctions would drive Burma into the arms of the Chinese turned out to be an argument for sanctions, not against them, since that was not a place where Burma's nationalistic military leaders wanted to be for long.
Second, sanctions proponents expected that eventually, Burma's leaders would want to develop their country's economy and to improve their standing in the world. To achieve those goals, they would need access to the very things that sanctions had denied them: Western investment, markets and banks, and better relations with the United States. At that point, as I argued in testimony to the Congress in 2004, the U.S. would say to the Burmese government: "You cannot make a separate peace with us. Reach a compromise with your opposition first." The idea was that sanctions would give the U.S. negotiating leverage, which it could transfer to Aung San Suu Kyi and the democratic opposition. The government would need their support to win relief from international pressure, and to get their support it would have to satisfy some of their basic demands, including the release of political prisoners, and ultimately to bring them into the political system.
Of course, no one had a clue when any of this might happen. After Burma's deeply flawed 2010 elections, I thought sanctions would likely have to be tightened further to produce the desired effect; I was wrongly dismissive of those who argued that a new generation of military officers with a new outlook might already be coming to the fore. Exactly how and why that happened will be for historians to answer. But once it did, the Obama administration reached out to them, and Burma's leaders acted as we had long hoped: they started talks with Aung San Suu Kyi, and engineered new elections designed to bring the democratic opposition into parliament. And they acknowledged that they were doing this in part because it was necessary to improve relations with the outside world, and to get sanctions lifted.
Everyone I spoke to in Burma, whether they had supported or opposed sanctions in the past, assumed that the reformist president Thein Sein was using the promise of relief from sanctions in his arguments with hard liners in the government. All argued that the international community must now find ways of rewarding Thein Sein to help him win those arguments. And they acknowledged that Western countries only have carrots to offer today because of the sticks they employed in the past -- every diplomatic and economic sanction they imposed created a card they can play now, as serious political negotiations finally get underway in Burma.
Burma's April 1st parliamentary by-elections are the next important milestone in that process, and should, if they go well, trigger additional rewards from the West. But the elections are not the next big test of reform. Both Burma's opposition and its president want Aung San Suu Kyi to win a seat -- they need her to champion their cause in the government, and he needs her to legitimize that government. And if her party wins, it will control only a tiny fraction of seats in the current parliament.
As remarkable as the changes in Burma have been -- with some political prisoners walking free, and real debate breaking out from the front pages of the country's newspapers to the hearing rooms of its parliament -- the big tests lie ahead. Laws that criminalize dissent are still on the books. Burma's military continues to commit war crimes against ethnic minority populations on the country's frontiers, and still does not answer to its president, parliament or judiciary. Burma's Constitution gives the military unchecked authority over all matters of internal security, the power to veto constitutional changes and even to dismiss the president.
The elections that really matter in Burma will not come until 2015, when most of the parliament will be up for election. If that vote is free and fair, the opposition will be in a strong position to win. Hundreds of former military officers who now serve as members of the pro-government party would then be swept aside. And Aung San Suu Kyi would be able to form a government of her own. It is far from clear yet if the military will allow that. This means that Western countries need to walk a fine line: rewarding the changes that have already taken place, but conserving some leverage, through 2015, to secure the harder changes hopefully still to come.
Another reason to move gradually is that absent deeper political and economic reform, lifting all sanctions might not even help Burma's economy, much less its hopes for democracy. If all restrictions on doing business with Burma were removed, for example, much of the money would likely flow to military-owned companies or conglomerates run by the rising class of oligarchs linked to the military, that control Burma's most lucrative export industries, such as natural gas, timber and gems. This kind of investment would only reinforce the military's failed development strategy of pulling natural resources out of the ground, converting them into cash, and storing that cash in off shore, off budget accounts for the benefit of the elite. Indeed, one of the salutary effects sanctions may have had during the years of dictatorship in Burma was to slow down, even if slightly, the process by which its natural wealth was plundered, laundered overseas, or put to uses (such as weapons purchases) that did nothing for its people.
A smarter way to lift sanctions, assuming political progress continues, would be to relax them first on those sectors of Burma's economy from which ordinary people are more likely to benefit (such as agriculture and manufacturing), while maintaining them for some time longer on those sectors from which only the military benefits.
Above all, we should set our sights high when we think of Burma's future. A few years ago, when soldiers were gunning down monks and students on the streets of Rangoon, many people might have been satisfied to see Burma evolve into a country as "free" as Vietnam or Cambodia. But Burma may now have leaders, in government and opposition, with the vision to take it so much further, if only they can overcome the resistance of those who still have a stake in the status quo. Western countries can help, if they ease sanctions more strategically, and less reflexively, than they put them into place.
Tom Malinowski is the Washington director of Human Rights Watch
Sunday, April 8, 2012
Still waiting for reform in Burma
By Yee Htun, The Ottawa CitizenApril 8, 2012 7:46 AM
A Burmese monk and his son feed the seagulls on a jetty along the Yangon river ahead of the parliamentary elections March 29. Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy, won a landslide victory, gaining 43 seats out of the 44 vacant seats in parliament.
Photograph by: Paula Bronstein, Getty Images , Ottawa Citizen
But even as images of jubilant celebrations across Burma stream in, I, a Burmese prodemocratic human rights activist living in exile in Canada, am not quick to believe the hype. For you see, during my lifetime, this is the second election in which Aung San Suu Kyi and her party the NLD, have run, with starkly different results.
The first elections took place in 1990, when I was a little girl living on the Thai-Burma border. My family and I spent the day transfixed next to the radio listening to the news as the election results trickled in. The day was memorable because it was my ninth birthday and our national hero, Aung San Suu Kyi, was poised to become the leader of our country. I will never forget the happiness we all felt as we heard about the NLD's landmark victory, winning 83 per cent of the seats in Parliament. Having lived under restrictive military rule since 1962, we had all hoped and prayed for true democracy to come to our country. And on that May day in 1990, it seemed possible.
Unfortunately, we were bitterly disappointed. The Burmese military regime never honoured the 1990 election results. Aung San Suu Kyi was placed under house arrest, and a majority of the NLD party members were incarcerated. Other pro-democratic activists, fearing persecution, fled the country.
Since that time, those of us in the Burmese exile community have looked to our country of birth, waiting for a sign. Any sign that indicated things inside Burma were improving or that we can finally go home and be united with relatives. I have spent most of my life waiting in exile. I have dedicated my adult life to advocating internationally for democracy in Burma. Sadly, I am certain that even with the by-elections results, true democratic reform has yet to arrive.
While it is empowering to see our moral leader, Aung San Suu Kyi, become a member of parliament, and to see my fellow Burmese vote her and her party in, the NLD holds only 43 seats out of 656 seats in parliament. The military regime's Union Solidarity and Development Party remains very much in control of the Parliament. And with 6.4 per cent of the seats, the NLD is not even the official opposition. That right belongs to the military Defence Services Personnel in parliament.
For those who are beguiled by the supposed changes in Burma following the by-elections results, the reality is that very little has changed. The military remains very much in control of the country. Even as it espoused peace and democratic reform internationally, the regime has not ceased its military offensive against ethnic minorities of Burma.
The military continues to use rape to humiliate women and their communities. Indeed, high incidents of rape and the systemic use of it as a weapon of war is one of the reasons why there is an international movement to refer Burma to the International Criminal Court for war crimes, genocide and crimes against humanity.
The regime vowed to release all political prisoners in August 2011 but, in fact, has not. Only 302 were released while 900 remain behind bars, including over 170 women. An extremely oppressive constitution enacted by the regime to entrench military rule and suppress civil liberties remains in place. The constitution ensures that Aung San Suu Kyi will never become its head of state as that position requires military experience. In fact, most women of Burma are effectively denied from ever holding any cabinet position for this same reason. Furthermore, the constitution contains an amnesty clause that protects military personnel from being held accountable for past and present human rights abuses.
I believe that true democratic reform will arrive in Burma only when:
? ? there is a genuine and nation-wide ceasefire in Burma;
? ? ethnic women of Burma are no longer being systemically raped by the military;
? ? all political prisoners of Burma are freed;
? ? rule of law is restored and a constitution that promotes freedom and civil liberties is enacted;
? ? and there is justice for past and present human rights abuses.
Only then can Burma heal and move from its bleak past towards a new dawn. The regime and the international community both have a crucial role to play in ensuring that democracy arrives in Burma. The people of Burma have done what they can under the restrictive circumstances by voting for Aung San Suu Kyi and her party. I urge Canadians to demand true democratic reform on behalf of the people of Burma and ensure that the international community maintains pressure on the regime. Any easing of sanctions must be conditional upon the regime enacting real reforms.
Without true democratic reform, my country of birth remains a place I cannot return to, and my fellow Burmese are deprived of all the fundamental rights and freedoms that we here in Canada are privileged to enjoy.
Yee Htun lives in Ottawa and immigrated to Canada as a government-sponsored UN Convention refugee. She has a Juris Doctor (JD) from Dalhousie University Schulich School of Law with a concentration in International Law and is the Coordinator for the International Campaign to Stop Rape & Gender Violence in Conflict.
Read more: http://www.ottawacitizen.com/news/Still+waiting+reform+Burma/6426784/story.html#ixzz1rSTE80c4
Tuesday, April 3, 2012
Fragile Freedoms in Myanmar
By SWE WIN
YANGON, Myanmar — Until just recently, I would have said that if you didn’t want to risk getting arrested in Myanmar, you should stay away from that red and gold insignia with the fighting peacock.
But these days, here and in many parts of the country, the symbol of the National League for Democracy Party headed by the pro-democracy leader Daw Aung San Suu Kyi is everywhere. It’s on stickers and T-shirts and flags. It’s on motorcycles and dashboards and front doors. It’s even painted on the cheeks of young girls.
I came back to Myanmar earlier this month after four years of self-imposed exile abroad. From 1998 to 2005, I was imprisoned for breaking the Emergency Provisions Act by participating in an antigovernment student protest. During a raid on my house in Yangon, I was caught red-handed with a stack of subversive pamphlets, but the authorities didn’t find the peacock flag I had hidden under a statue of Buddha. Seeing that peacock out on the streets today signals a new degree of freedom here.
Since the military junta handed over power to a nominally civilian government last year, Myanmar has undertaken surprising reforms. Media censorship has been relaxed. Laws allowing workers to form labor unions and to strike have been passed. And now the entire country is gearing up for parliamentary by-elections on April 1. The N.L.D. is running for the first time since 1990, when it won by a landslide but was prevented from taking office.
But don’t get too hopeful too soon. Aung San Suu Kyi herself warned recently that military dictatorship might yet return one day. Despite greater tolerance for the opposition, Myanmar has yet to embark on large-scale liberalization. The current Constitution still grants the military a dominant role in politics. Repressive laws have not been abolished.
Yes, we can now have political arguments at roadside tea shops and openly commemorate anniversaries of military crackdowns, including the 1988 uprising, without fear of arrest. And yes, it is symbolically powerful that Aung San Suu Kyi is being allowed to campaign nationwide. But as a friend of mine quipped recently, while freedom may have come for her, it has not for the rest of us yet.
There still is no freedom for the farmers whose lands have been forcibly confiscated by the regime’s business cronies, or for ethnic minorities at the border areas, particularly the Kachin in northern Myanmar, who continue to clash with the military. Strikes can be held, but only with advance permission, and the authorities can deny authorization on the vague pretense of protecting state security.
A law recently passed by Parliament and signed by President Thein Sein instructs local officials to monitor the activities of foreigners and requires all of us Burmese to report to the local authorities any overnight guest. This is as it was under military rule.
Even the freedom of Aung San Suu Kyi herself has limits. The government censored a speech of hers that in part deplored the continued absence of the rule of law before allowing it to be broadcast on state-run television on March 14. N.L.D. candidates campaigning in the new capital Naypyidaw have reported being physically harassed by members of the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party, which won a majority of seats in 2010 parliamentary elections widely criticized as fraudulent.
All of this points to one conclusion: the generals in civilian garb who lead Myanmar are following the Burmese proverb “htaung myin yar sont”: give away hundreds to get thousands in return.
The country’s rulers are calling for “disciplined democracy.” Emulating countries like Singapore, they want social and economic stability but not too vibrant an opposition. In exchange for foreign investment, an end to economic sanctions and improved relations with the outside world, they are willing to soften the organs of this police state. As long as the opposition’s activities don’t disrupt this nominally democratic system, all should be fine. But anyone who crosses that line quickly comes up against repressive laws that remain unchanged.
Earlier this month, a former political prisoner from Bogalay, a town in the Irrawaddy Delta near Yangon, took to the streets in a blue prison suit with iron shackles on his legs — he was protesting the continued detention of hundreds of political prisoners. He was promptly taken by the police to a mental hospital and detained for a week.
The fighting peacocks may be on view, but our freedoms are still fragile.
Swe Win is a journalist working for Irrawaddy Magazine under the pseudonym Ba Kaung.
Monday, April 2, 2012
As MP, Suu Kyi faces more humdrum role: Analysts
Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi
on its front-page a day after parliamentary
by-elections across the country, in Yangon
on Apr 2, 2012. -- PHOTO: AFP
BANGKOK (AFP) - The newly elected Aung San Suu Kyi now faces a huge weight of expectations, but analysts say the inspirational dissident may have to temper her grand political goals and deal with bread-and-butter issues.
After decades in the political wilderness, the Nobel laureate finds herself in the position of being co-opted to legitimise the reform agenda and political system of the new military-backed government.
The veteran activist will have to sit down with her former foes to find ways to help farmers, promote investment and develop a country struggling to emerge from five decades of economic mismanagement under the military.
'Whether a minister in charge of a portfolio or a frustrated backbencher, her room for political manoeuvring is smaller than as an unattached opponent,' said Hong Kong University assistant professor Renaud Egreteau.
Even if Ms Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) party wins all 44 seats it contested, it cannot challenge the huge legislative majority enjoyed by the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party (USDP).
In addition, one-quarter of the seats in parliament are reserved for unelected military officials.
But for the first time after Sunday's by-elections, the NLD leader will have a voice in the legislature, where lawmakers have for the past year been debating topics ranging from the national budget to healthcare and Chinese energy projects.
Myanmar expert Aung Naing Oo said Ms Suu Kyi would have to be pragmatic and buckle down to tackling everyday issues rather than the grander themes of democracy and constitutional change she championed in her campaign speeches.
'The current USDP parliament is quite energetic. They have done an amazing job in the past year but their agenda is day-to-day, much more bread-and-butter issues that are the concern of the general population,' said the analyst at the Vahu Development Institute, a think-tank in Thailand.
'Aung San Suu Kyi has to talk rhetoric during the election campaign but what she has said are not quite the day-to-day issues. The most important issue in our country is the economy and Aung San Suu Kyi doesn't have economic credentials,' he added.
One big question remains whether Ms Suu Kyi could take on some kind of government role.
In January, presidential adviser Nay Zin Latt told AFP there was 'a possibility she will be appointed to the government'.
But no other officials have since raised that possibility and Ms Suu Kyi on Friday said she had no plans to accept a position as minister if offered, because by law she would have to give up her seat in parliament.
She indicated, however, that she might be willing to take on some kind of other role, possibly to help resolve the country's ethnic conflicts.
Whatever she chooses, it is a long way from 2002-2003 when Ms Suu Kyi, in between periods of house arrest, favoured a more confrontational approach towards the junta, notably defying orders not to travel around the country.
Aung Naing Oo said Ms Suu Kyi would bring prestige and influence to whichever role she chose but her unyielding character could be an issue.
'She also brings her personality and her determination to the table. It would be like a double-edged sword for some of the people. She also can be problematic, so the key issue here is how well she can push her way in these uncharted waters either in parliament or in government,' he said.
Some have in the past criticised Ms Suu Kyi for what they saw as an intransigent approach to the junta, saying it resulted in a deadlock between the two sides.
But Senior General Than Shwe, the junta chief who regarded her as his personal enemy, stepped down a year ago and the new generation of leaders is better disposed towards her.
Experts say the 66-year-old opposition leader must now look beyond her own legacy.
'No democracy can really build around one person,' said Thitinan Pongsudhirak, a political scientist at Bangkok's Chulalongkorn University.
'Now there has to be a shift to broaden the focus not just to be on her but her supporters, her new lieutenants, her party and other democratic institutions in Myanmar, including the ruling party, the incumbent regime.'
Aung San Suu Kyi: Peaceful freedom fighter
April 2, 2012 -- Updated 0903 GMT (1703 HKT)
(CNN) -- The election of Aung San Suu Kyi to Myanmar's parliament caps a remarkable turn around for the pro-democracy campaigner, who was kept under house arrest for a total of 15 years by the country's military junta.
Suu Kyi was born in 1945, the daughter of Myanmar independence hero General Aung San -- a man almost universally respected in the country, including the top ranks of the omnipresent military.
She was only two-years old when her father was assassinated as the country, then known as Burma, prepared to transfer from British colonial rule. Her mother, Khin Kyi, became an active figure in the newly independent nation, eventually winning ambassadorial posts in India and Nepal.
Suu Kyi followed her mother to India and continued her education in New Delhi, which culminated in a degree in politics in 1964. She went on to Oxford University in England to study politics, economics and philosophy. It was here she met Michael Aris, whom she married in 1972 after stints working in the United States and Japan. The couple had two children, Alexander and Kim.
Near clean sweep for Suu Kyi's party
In 1988, Suu Kyi returned to Yangon, also known as Rangoon, to care for her sick mother. However she became involved in the massive pro-democracy demonstrations that erupted on August 8 that year, as thousands took to the streets to protest against the widespread oppression and economic mismanagement under the ruling military junta. This became known as the "8888 Uprising."
At one rally in front of Yangon's famous Shwedagon Pagoda, Suu Kyi told protesters she "could not, as my father's daughter remain indifferent to all that was going on." She became an icon of the country's reform movement and co-founded the National League for Democracy (NLD).
But the uprising came to a shuddering halt in September 1988, when the military restored control after a brutal crackdown and imposed martial law.
At the funeral of her mother in January, 1989, Suu Kyi vowed that as her father and mother had served the people of Burma, so too would she, even unto death. Despite continuous harassment from the military -- including a ban imposed on her standing for election -- she continued to campaign until she was placed under house arrest in July, 1989.
When the military government called national elections in 1990, huge numbers of people turned out to vote for Suu Kyi and the NLD.
The result, an 82% landslide in favor of the NLD, took the military rulers by surprise. Refusing to acknowledge defeat, they claimed foreigners and communists had rigged the election. In the subsequent weeks, hundreds of NLD members were rounded up and jailed, according to rights groups.
In 1991, Suu Kyi was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for what the Nobel committee described as "one of the most extraordinary examples of civil courage in Asia in recent decades." Suu Kyi's sons accepted the prize on their mother's behalf in Oslo, Norway -- she had rejected a release offer from the military in return for her agreement to leave Myanmar and withdraw from politics.
The NLD leader was eventually released in 1995 on the condition she could not leave Yangon.
Tragedy struck in 1999 when her husband died of prostrate cancer in London. The authorities in Myanmar had rejected his repeated requests to visit his wife, and instead encouraged Suu Kyi to visit her family abroad. Suu Kyi again rejected the offer to leave Myanmar, knowing she would never be able to return.
In 2000, she was placed under house arrest for a further two years, during which time she was conferred the Presidential Medal of Freedom -- America's highest civilian honor -- by U.S. President Bill Clinton.
But barely a year later, she was arrested after a clash between her supporters and a pro-government mob, resulting in a period of detention that would last until 2010.
One of the most bizarre episodes of her confinement came in 2009, shortly before she was scheduled for release, when American citizen John Yettaw snuck into her house -- reportedly by swimming across a lake -- and stayed for two days before being arrested. Yettaw told CNN he made the trip to save Suu Kyi from assassination.
The retired bus driver and Vietnam veteran from Missouri told his wife that he had a premonition he would become a political prisoner in Myanmar.
Hillary Clinton
He was convicted of violating immigration laws, municipal laws, and the conditions of Suu Kyi's house arrest and sentenced to seven years of hard labor, though he was freed shortly after. Suu Kyi was initially sentenced to three years in prison after a military court found her guilty of violating her house arrest, but the head of the junta later commuted it to 18 months of home confinement.
On November 13, 2010, the pro-democracy campaigner was released and reunited with her sons. Despite spending 15 of the previous 21 years under house arrest, she pledged to keep working toward restoring democracy and improving human rights in Myanmar.
Her release came too late for the national elections that year, which saw the military-backed Union Solidarity and Development Party led by President Thein Sein -- prime minister under the junta -- declare victory despite accusations of voting irregularities and voter intimidation. Suu Kyi and the widely-popular NLD boycotted the vote.
Despite widespread criticism of the electoral process, the vote marked a turning point as the new government embarked on a serious of political and economic reforms that the U.S. described as "encouraging." In the past 12 months, the country has pardoned hundreds of political prisoners, secured a ceasefire with Karen rebels and has agreed to negotiate with other ethnic rebel groups.
In December last year, Hilary Clinton became the first U.S. secretary of state to visit the country in 50 years, a trip that included a meeting with Suu Kyi. Clinton said the pro-democracy activist had been instrumental in helping to gauge the U.S. diplomatic approach to Myanmar.
"She is someone who we talk to and rely on about policy advice, and certainly we were very gratified that she encouraged us to engage, encouraged my trip," Clinton told reporters at the time.
The following month, Suu Kyi registered to run for a parliamentary seat in the April 1 by-election, while her party was formally given approval to enter the contest. She was greeted by huge crowds as she took her campaign across the country, and appealed for "freedom from fear" in her first televised campaign speech.
With the spotlight on the electoral process after the problems of 2010, Suu Kyi claimed that the April vote would not be "free and fair" but that she did not "at all regret having taken part" because the election campaign had raised political awareness among Myanmar's population.
Suu Kyi said she believed President Thein wished for democratic reform, but that she was uncertain how much support he had, notably from the military.
With results being still being counted at the time of writing, Suu Kyi claimed victory in the constituency where she ran -- Kawhmu, south of the former capital city of Yangon -- while her party was on course for victory in 43 of the 44 seats it contested.
Rule of Law is Our Priority: NLD
Burmese pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi waves to supporters as she leaves the NLD office in Rangoon. (Reuters)
Affirming the rule of law will be the first priority of the National League for Democracy (NLD) when its members join the Parliament, according to a party spokesman.
“The rule of law is vitally important to our country,” Nyan Win told The Irrawaddy on Monday. “Implementing it in Burma will be our party’s main focus.”
The NLD has vowed to take on three main challenges: the reform of the rule of law; amendment of the constitution; and building national reconciliation.
“We believe that our aims will be acceptable to the majority of people, and will benefit the country,” said Nyan Win.
Speaking in Rangoon on Monday morning, NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi said that the party welcomed working together with all the other political parties toward reforming the rule of law, toward amending the Constitution, and toward building national reconciliation.
Chan Tun, a former Burmese ambassador to China and North Korea, who now lives in Rangoon, said, “There will be more space and more freedom in Parliament to criticize and assess the situation in the country now that Suu Kyi has won a seat.
“But, it will be very difficult to implement her three-step road map as she is only one MP, not the entire government,” said Chan Tun. “However, there will be other elections when [the NLD] can become the government. Then, they can implement her road map.”
“I think this government wanted her [Suu Kyi] to be in Parliament because they wanted to show the people of Burma and the international community that they have cooperated with her,” said Aye Thar Aung, the chairman of the Arakan League for Democracy, who also sits as the general secretary of the Committee Representing the People’s Parliament. “Moreover, the government wanted the international community to lift sanctions and allow aid from the World Bank.”
Rule of Law is Our Priority: NLD
Burmese pro-democracy leader Aung San Suu Kyi waves to supporters as she leaves the NLD office in Rangoon. (Reuters)
Affirming the rule of law will be the first priority of the National League for Democracy (NLD) when its members join the Parliament, according to a party spokesman.
“The rule of law is vitally important to our country,” Nyan Win told The Irrawaddy on Monday. “Implementing it in Burma will be our party’s main focus.”
The NLD has vowed to take on three main challenges: the reform of the rule of law; amendment of the constitution; and building national reconciliation.
“We believe that our aims will be acceptable to the majority of people, and will benefit the country,” said Nyan Win.
Speaking in Rangoon on Monday morning, NLD leader Aung San Suu Kyi said that the party welcomed working together with all the other political parties toward reforming the rule of law, toward amending the Constitution, and toward building national reconciliation.
Chan Tun, a former Burmese ambassador to China and North Korea, who now lives in Rangoon, said, “There will be more space and more freedom in Parliament to criticize and assess the situation in the country now that Suu Kyi has won a seat.
“But, it will be very difficult to implement her three-step road map as she is only one MP, not the entire government,” said Chan Tun. “However, there will be other elections when [the NLD] can become the government. Then, they can implement her road map.”
“I think this government wanted her [Suu Kyi] to be in Parliament because they wanted to show the people of Burma and the international community that they have cooperated with her,” said Aye Thar Aung, the chairman of the Arakan League for Democracy, who also sits as the general secretary of the Committee Representing the People’s Parliament. “Moreover, the government wanted the international community to lift sanctions and allow aid from the World Bank.”
Saturday, March 31, 2012
Letting Burma Back In
Published in: Foreign Policy
March 31, 2012
Experts debate whether the role of sanctions was successful in opening up Burma. But with the up-coming by-elections and the release of political prisoners, the greater challenge may be how to lift them.
An hour after landing in Burma this January, I sat on the floor of a tiny bamboo house in a suburb of Rangoon, sharing lunch with a half dozen women who had just walked out of prison following an amnesty of political prisoners. There was much I wanted to ask them: about their treatment (it got better over time, thanks, they all insisted, to international pressure), about their plans (get a good night's sleep, and then right back to political work), and their fears (chiefly, that with dissidents streaming out of prisons and opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi heading into parliament, the West would declare Burma a success and move on). But there was one question to which I kept coming back: "Why are you free?"I posed a variation of that question to everyone I met in Burma -- dissidents, government officials, journalists and academics. Why is the Burmese government promising now rights and freedoms that, for decades, it sent people to prison for demanding? Why is it so eager now to draw Aung San Suu Kyi into the country's political life, after so many years of trying to blot her out? Not everyone agreed on the precise reasons. But there was a common theme to their answers: After years of serving a military that was shunned, hated, or ridiculed for running Burma into the ground, "they" -- Burma's president, Thein Sein, and those behind him -- want "legitimacy and respect." They want to be on better terms with their people, and for Burma to be on better terms with the world.
It is plain that the Burmese people deserve most of the credit for their rulers' change of heart. For years, they faced unrelenting brutality from above, yet sustained a political movement dedicated to non-violence and national reconciliation. Time and again, they organized themselves in sophisticated and principled ways, not just to demand political freedom, but to respond to natural disasters, to deliver to themselves the basic services their government neglected, and to remain connected to the outside world. In Aung San Suu Kyi, they also had something that dissident movements in most dictatorships lack -- a leader clearly capable of unifying their country and leading its government. The military may have held all the power in Burma. But she and her movement held all the legitimacy.
Even in the years when Burma's democracy movement seemed silenced and defeated, pressure from below manifested itself in conversations in marketplaces and monasteries, in acts of passive resistance, in the flight of talented people from the country. Then, every so often, it would burst into the open, as it did in the 2007 Saffron Revolution. With brute force, the military survived that challenge (a reminder that the road to change in Burma has been far from peaceful). But many Burmese believe that some army officers felt shame about the violence they inflicted on the revered Buddhist monks who led that uprising, and about their government's deadly incompetence the following year when a cyclone ravaged the country. When Burma's long-serving dictator Than Shwe retired in 2010, the generation of officers that succeeded him undoubtedly included some men affected by Burma's traumas who wanted a way out of the morass it was in.
The more controversial question is whether pressure from outside, including Western sanctions, also contributed to these changes. I've hesitated to weigh in strongly on this debate, partly because it is hard to set aside one's own bias (those, like me, who supported sanctions naturally want to believe that they helped -- and vice versa), and partly because it's premature to argue about what caused Burma's transition to democracy when that transition is not remotely complete. Perhaps in twenty years, when archives are studied and the key players have told their stories, a consensus will emerge. And then someone will come along to disprove it.
At the same time, I have found it disconcerting to hear diplomats and other observers assert with certainty that sanctions had nothing to do with Burma's political opening. After all, the United States and other countries imposed sanctions to promote a particular objective in Burma, and now that objective seems on the verge of being achieved. It's as if we had turned a hose on a raging fire and, after seeing the flames subside, said: "How did that happen? It couldn't have been the water we sprayed." In neither case does correlation prove causality - a sanctioned state can change course for reasons unrelated to sanctions, just as a doused fire can burn out on its own. But it is strange not to consider that one's efforts had their intended effect.
One reason why the Burma sanctions are often discounted is that many officials who imposed them over the years themselves lacked faith in the strategy they were pursuing. Bill Clinton and George W. Bush pushed through sanctions mostly to express solidarity with Aung San Suu Kyi; others in the U.S. government saw them as a symbolic expression of America's disgust with the Burmese junta, or simply as a way of appeasing Congressional and public concerns on an issue that was not strategically important. Few of them actually expected that sanctions might work!
But some advocates of sanctions had a more reasoned theory of the case.
First, they believed that Western sanctions would create at least some objective difficulties for the Burmese government. The generals might not care at first about sanctions' impact on Burma's economy as a whole (which was always harmed more by their own mismanagement), and they might compensate for any harm to their personal finances by doing business with China. But the argument that sanctions would drive Burma into the arms of the Chinese turned out to be an argument for sanctions, not against them, since that was not a place where Burma's nationalistic military leaders wanted to be for long.
Second, sanctions proponents expected that eventually, Burma's leaders would want to develop their country's economy and to improve their standing in the world. To achieve those goals, they would need access to the very things that sanctions had denied them: Western investment, markets and banks, and better relations with the United States. At that point, as I argued in testimony to the Congress in 2004, the U.S. would say to the Burmese government: "You cannot make a separate peace with us. Reach a compromise with your opposition first." The idea was that sanctions would give the U.S. negotiating leverage, which it could transfer to Aung San Suu Kyi and the democratic opposition. The government would need their support to win relief from international pressure, and to get their support it would have to satisfy some of their basic demands, including the release of political prisoners, and ultimately to bring them into the political system.
Of course, no one had a clue when any of this might happen. After Burma's deeply flawed 2010 elections, I thought sanctions would likely have to be tightened further to produce the desired effect; I was wrongly dismissive of those who argued that a new generation of military officers with a new outlook might already be coming to the fore. Exactly how and why that happened will be for historians to answer. But once it did, the Obama administration reached out to them, and Burma's leaders acted as we had long hoped: they started talks with Aung San Suu Kyi, and engineered new elections designed to bring the democratic opposition into parliament. And they acknowledged that they were doing this in part because it was necessary to improve relations with the outside world, and to get sanctions lifted.
Everyone I spoke to in Burma, whether they had supported or opposed sanctions in the past, assumed that the reformist president Thein Sein was using the promise of relief from sanctions in his arguments with hard liners in the government. All argued that the international community must now find ways of rewarding Thein Sein to help him win those arguments. And they acknowledged that Western countries only have carrots to offer today because of the sticks they employed in the past -- every diplomatic and economic sanction they imposed created a card they can play now, as serious political negotiations finally get underway in Burma.
Burma's April 1st parliamentary by-elections are the next important milestone in that process, and should, if they go well, trigger additional rewards from the West. But the elections are not the next big test of reform. Both Burma's opposition and its president want Aung San Suu Kyi to win a seat -- they need her to champion their cause in the government, and he needs her to legitimize that government. And if her party wins, it will control only a tiny fraction of seats in the current parliament.
As remarkable as the changes in Burma have been -- with some political prisoners walking free, and real debate breaking out from the front pages of the country's newspapers to the hearing rooms of its parliament -- the big tests lie ahead. Laws that criminalize dissent are still on the books. Burma's military continues to commit war crimes against ethnic minority populations on the country's frontiers, and still does not answer to its president, parliament or judiciary. Burma's Constitution gives the military unchecked authority over all matters of internal security, the power to veto constitutional changes and even to dismiss the president.
The elections that really matter in Burma will not come until 2015, when most of the parliament will be up for election. If that vote is free and fair, the opposition will be in a strong position to win. Hundreds of former military officers who now serve as members of the pro-government party would then be swept aside. And Aung San Suu Kyi would be able to form a government of her own. It is far from clear yet if the military will allow that. This means that Western countries need to walk a fine line: rewarding the changes that have already taken place, but conserving some leverage, through 2015, to secure the harder changes hopefully still to come.
Another reason to move gradually is that absent deeper political and economic reform, lifting all sanctions might not even help Burma's economy, much less its hopes for democracy. If all restrictions on doing business with Burma were removed, for example, much of the money would likely flow to military-owned companies or conglomerates run by the rising class of oligarchs linked to the military, that control Burma's most lucrative export industries, such as natural gas, timber and gems. This kind of investment would only reinforce the military's failed development strategy of pulling natural resources out of the ground, converting them into cash, and storing that cash in off shore, off budget accounts for the benefit of the elite. Indeed, one of the salutary effects sanctions may have had during the years of dictatorship in Burma was to slow down, even if slightly, the process by which its natural wealth was plundered, laundered overseas, or put to uses (such as weapons purchases) that did nothing for its people.
A smarter way to lift sanctions, assuming political progress continues, would be to relax them first on those sectors of Burma's economy from which ordinary people are more likely to benefit (such as agriculture and manufacturing), while maintaining them for some time longer on those sectors from which only the military benefits.
Above all, we should set our sights high when we think of Burma's future. A few years ago, when soldiers were gunning down monks and students on the streets of Rangoon, many people might have been satisfied to see Burma evolve into a country as "free" as Vietnam or Cambodia. But Burma may now have leaders, in government and opposition, with the vision to take it so much further, if only they can overcome the resistance of those who still have a stake in the status quo. Western countries can help, if they ease sanctions more strategically, and less reflexively, than they put them into place.
Friday, March 30, 2012
16 Ways to Fix Burma
On the eve of the country's historic elections, 16 experts give us their prescriptions for the future.
MARCH 30, 2012
On April 1, citizens of Burma will head to the polls to vote in a parliamentary by-election. Normally, this isn't the sort of thing that would attract a lot of headlines, since only a small number of seats in the National Assembly are actually at stake.
But these are no ordinary elections. President Thein Sein has actively invited the participation of the National League of Democracy, Burma's main opposition party -- the first time the NLD has participated in an election since the national vote in 1990 that it won in a landslide. (Burma's military dictatorship subsequently annulled the result.) Given her immense popularity, NLD leader and Nobel Peace Prize laureate Aung San Suu Kyi is almost certain to win a seat. That, in itself, will amount to a crucial watershed in Burma's recent history. For the first time in some 60 years, the opposition will have a chance to voice its views from within the government.
How this will work out in practice remains unclear. Skeptics are right to worry that the game is rigged against the NLD. Even if it wins all of the 47 seats it is contesting, that is far short of anything like the kind of majority that will be needed for meaningful change. Yet the prospect of a real parliamentary opposition, however small, is not to be dismissed. NLD lawmakers and their allies will have the power to call the government to public account.
Of course, that doesn't meant any of Burma's myriad problems will be easy to fix. So we here at Foreign Policy decided to make our own contribution to the debates that are to come, inviting a cohort of experts from within Burma and abroad to suggest some innovative solutions. These "Ideas for Burma" will, we hope, serve as useful benchmarks for discussion -- however utopian some of them might seem at first glance. For it is vital to acknowledge that the forces of the old regime -- the same generals and ex-generals who have, over the past 60 years, brutalized and impoverished their own people -- still reign over Burma's current political and economic system today. In any case, helping Burma to overcome its difficult past will be impossible without frank discussion of the challenges ahead. It is in that spirit that we offer the following suggestions.
Brian Joseph: Create a multi-ethnic state
Tom Kramer and Martin Jelsma: Tackle Burma's drugs problem
Christina Fink: End the civil war
Ronald Findlay: Export or die
Francis Wade: Invite investment -- but with protections
Muang Wuntha: Support press freedom
Myat Htoo Razak: Health is wealth
Timothy Ryan: Let workers unionize freely
Sean Turnell: Cut the bloated military budget
Soe Thinn: Train Burma's new diplomats
Dr. Thein Lwin: Teach the children well
Tin Muang Muan Than: Unleash grassroots entrepreneurship
Andreas Valentin: Come visit, sustainably
David Steinberg: Promote the rule of law
Hanna Hindstrom: Make extractive industries more transparent
Ko Tar: Let the monks lead the way
1) Brian Joseph: Create a multi-ethnic state
Burma's transition to democracy will be long and difficult. There is virtually no sector that doesn't require massive and essential investment. Yet, one priority trumps all others -- building a truly multi-ethnic state. For 50 years, the military has ensured the territorial integrity of the state through a combination of violence, repression, and political opportunism. As the military recedes from power and democracy begins to take hold, resolving the political divide between the ethnic nationality periphery and the ethnically Burman center will take on a new urgency.
Among their first priorities, the Burmese political leadership -- including the current government, the military, the National League for Democracy, and ethnic nationality leaders -- must address the structural and political issues that have eroded any sense of national unity or identity and which have led to a highly contested state. Failure to address the question of the fundamental nature of the state (is it a Burmese-speaking Buddhist country with a large minority population, or a multi-ethnic country with equal claims to what it means to be Burmese?) will not only lead to more human rights violations in the ethnic areas, but will undermine efforts to a lasting and just democratic state. As part of this effort, the Burmese must commit to a serious effort to rewrite its new constitution, which neither advances democracy nor protects ethnic rights. According to most constitutional experts, Burma should adopt a federal constitution that ensures equality and protects ethnic rights, among the most important of which are language and religion.
Although the challenge of redefining Burma as a multi-ethnic state is principally the prerogative of the Burmese themselves, the international community can play an important role in facilitating this transformation. Politically, the international community should ensure that not only do all parties understand the centrality and importance of the issue, but that it includes ethnic nationality leaders as equal partners in all of its deliberations. Diplomatically, it should tie increased engagement and closer cooperation with the Burmese government to concrete initiatives and measurable outcomes to address the ongoing violence in the ethnic areas, in Kachin and Shan State in particular. And, through development assistance, it should work with the ethnic political leadership and emerging civil society to identify priorities and begin to address the yawning gap between the ethnic nationalities and the majority Burman in education, health, infrastructure, and economic prosperity. Yet, it is a mistake to understand these development efforts, no matter how important, as a substitute for addressing the structural and political issues that led to the problems in the first place.
A part of the effort at rebuilding Burma as a multi-ethnic state will be dealing with the challenge of managing Burma's ample natural resources. Like other resource-rich countries, without careful and thoughtful planning, Burma's natural wealth can be more of a source of division than a catalyst for unity. This is particularly important in Burma where much of the country's wealth -- timber, gems, minerals, gas, etc. -- is located in the ethnic areas.
In short, 50 years of military rule have left the country poor, uneducated and divided. To support Burma's transition to democracy, Burma must begin the difficult task of building a truly multi-ethnic state, and this effort must begin by acknowledging that to be Burmese does not necessarily mean to be Burman, speak Burmese, or practice Buddhism.
Brian Joseph is the senior director of the Asia and Global Programs at the National Endowment for Democracy.
2) Tom Kramer and Martin Jelsma: Tackle Burma's Drugs Problem
Burma/Myanmar is the world's second largest producer of opium after Afghanistan. Following a decade of steady decline, opium cultivation in Burma has doubled again since 2006, from an estimated 21,500 hectares in 2006 to 43,600 hectares in 2011. It is mostly cultivated by marginalized farmers in isolated mountainous areas in the Shan and Kachin States of northern Burma. Most of them grow it as a cash crop to buy food, clothes, and access to health and education. The decades-old civil war in Burma, and the failure of the government to address ethnic conflict, has also greatly contributed to opium cultivation in the country. All conflict actors in drug-producing areas are to some extent involved in the drugs trade.
National and local authorities have aggressively implemented opium bans and eradicated opium fields in response to international political pressure. The main underlying reasons, however -- poverty and insecurity -- have not been properly addressed. Development interventions by international NGOs and U.N. agencies to provide farmers with sustainable, alternative livelihood options to offset the impact of opium bans have been grossly insufficient, and are merely emergency responses to prevent a humanitarian crisis. As well, the large-scale opium substitution program that China has initiated across its borders does not offer real solutions. The main beneficiaries of the subsidy scheme, tax waivers, and import quotas for agricultural concessions -- mostly rubber -- in former opium-growing regions, are Chinese businessmen and local authorities.
Experience elsewhere has shown that "alternative development" can address the needs of communities in opium-growing areas, while also contributing to a reduction in illicit cultivation under certain market conditions. Since the cultivation of opium often takes places in areas plagued by conflict, insecurity, and vulnerability, interventions should aim to enhance human rights protection, conflict resolution, poverty alleviation, and human security. They should also have a participatory approach and respect for traditional culture and values. Another lesson learned is the importance of proper sequencing: There should be no eradication or strict enforcement of opium bans unless viable and sustainable livelihoods are sufficiently in place. Aid should not be made conditional on reductions in opium cultivation. Instead, indicators for a successful policy should focus more on progress in human development.
Burma also confronts serious problems related to drug use. The number of drug users has grown dramatically, and consumption practices over time have changed from traditional opium use to smoking and injecting heroin. The increasing number of injecting drug users and the related expansion of the HIV/AIDS epidemic in Burma present one of the most serious health threats to the population in the country and the region at large. Infection rates among drug users in Burma are among the highest in the world. The problematic use of methamphetamine has also become associated with a range of communicable diseases such as HIV/AIDS, hepatitis B and C infections, and tuberculosis -- as well as mental health problems, in particular among vulnerable groups such as female sex workers. There is an urgent need to scale up quality prevention, treatment and harm reduction services for drug users and people living with HIV, who should be properly consulted in the decision-making.
Drug laws in Burma -- as in the region -- are harsh and penalties are disproportionately high. The main victims of these repressive drug control policies are the most vulnerable in the chain: opium farmers, micro-traders, and drug users. Meanwhile, law enforcement agencies, the justice system, and prisons are overburdened by the criminalization of people who instead need health care and social support. The overly punitive approach has even caused a dramatic scarcity of opiate medicines essential for pain relief, an absurd situation in a major opium producing country.
Legislative reforms, such as the decriminalization of possession for personal use and alternative sentences for low-level drug offences, would make drug policies more consistent with human rights principles. It would also relieve the burden on the criminal justice system and free up resources to scale up quality services. Authorities in the region are still pursuing the illusionary goal of a "drug free ASEAN by 2015." Instead, policy priorities should focus on how best to manage and reduce the many health and social harms associated with the reality of a persistent and ever changing drugs market.
Tom Kramer is a researcher and Martin Jelsma is program coordinator for Transnational Institute's Drugs & Democracy Program.
3) Christina Fink: End the civil war
The civil war in Burma has persisted for over 60 years. During that time, the national army has steadily gained ground, but the resistance has continued. Since ex-general Thein Sein became president last year, he has taken a new tack, setting out a roadmap for peace based on ceasefires, political talks, and potential amendments to the 2008 constitution.
Most of the ethnic groups that were at odds with the government (with the exception of the Kachin) have signed ceasefire agreements in recent months. Yet now the real challenge will be reconciliation. Some fundamental compromises regarding the devolution of power and the integration of the ethnic armed groups into the national army will have to be made, however hard such things might be to imagine. For trust to be restored, abuse of civilians by the army must stop as well.
As difficult as it will be to establish a durable peace, there is a greater sense of urgency now than ever before. Aung San Suu Kyi and other key leaders in the democracy movement have repeatedly called for a political settlement. To build the highways, railroads, and pipelines that can connect Burma to its neighbors and enable economic growth, peace must be restored. In order for U.S. sanctions to be fully lifted, there must be demonstrable progress towards a lasting peace in Burma.
What role can the United States and other countries play? They can help move the process forward through a combination of sustained positive pressure, financial assistance for peace-building initiatives, and technical advice. Through private meetings, public statements, and aid policies, the U.S. and other governments must make clear the importance that they place on genuine peace in areas populated by ethnic minorities.
The military, politicians from all of Burma's parties, civil society groups, and the public at large need to have a better understanding of ethnic grievances, peace-building processes, and options for devolving power to lower levels of government. For 50 years, federalism (the division of power between a national government and various regional governments) has been portrayed as a risk to the nation of Burma itself; thus it's not surprising many Burmese find it difficult to envision how devolution of power could work. Providing financial and technical support to enable Burmese journalists to write sensitively and knowledgeably about the issues and the options is one important way to facilitate informed discussions and potential solutions. Another is to provide grants for peace-related educational and awareness-raising initiatives run by Burmese civil society groups.
Assuming substantive political talks take place, all involved in the negotiations would benefit greatly from having access to specific technical assistance based on the experiences of other countries which have successfully transitioned from civil war to peace, such as Burundi and Mozambique. Understanding the various mechanisms that have been successfully employed to ease transitions, such as power sharing and third-party intervention, could also help allay fears and make the process seem more palatable. The U.S. and other countries could assist in identifying and supporting key advisors on reconciliation.
With sustained focus and support for the peace process both inside and outside the country, perhaps a breakthrough is possible.
Christina Fink is a professor at the Elliott School of International Affairs, George Washington University.
4) Ronald Findlay: Export or die
It is now exactly 50 years since the March 1962 coup d'etat led by General Ne Win brought the Burmese military to power. During this time, Burma has fallen increasingly behind the other Southeast Asian countries in all dimensions of economic and social progress. In 1940, colonial Burma was the world's leading rice exporter with over three million tons exported annually. By 1962 it was recovering rapidly from the devastation of being fought over twice in World War II, and considerable progress was being made in education and public health as well as agricultural and industrial production. All this changed when the Ne Win regime instituted a disastrous extension of state control over all sectors of the economy -- just at the same time as Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore were launching their spectacularly successful export-oriented development strategies, soon to be followed by Thailand, Malaysia, Indonesia, and the Philippines. The military attempted to change course during the 1990s with an apparent reduction in state control, but instead there was an actual rise in rent-seeking and "crony capitalism." Discovery of natural gas compensated somewhat for the failure of agricultural exports to expand sufficiently, but the regime became increasingly dependent upon Chinese support to maintain itself in the face of extensive sanctions imposed by the United States and Europe.
The new "civilian" regime of President Thein Sein and other former army officers has made encouraging moves towards national reconciliation with the ethnic minority insurgencies and with the democratic opposition led by Aung San Suu Kyi. In turn this has led to improved relations with the international community, raising the hope of a lifting of sanctions and normalizing economic and financial ties with the outside world as a whole, thus reducing dependency on China. It is not yet clear, however, exactly what sort of economic policy the government intends to follow.
It is imperative not only for the regime but for the nation as a whole to single-mindedly focus on the need to catch up, as rapidly as possible, with the achievements of its Southeast Asian neighbors. The key to this is an export-oriented development strategy. Thailand and Burma are closely comparable in geography, population size (around 60 million), Theravada Buddhist culture, and the historical experience of recent statehood. Yet Thailand exports about $25 worth of products for every $1 exported by Burma, only because of the economic opportunities Burma missed over the last 50 years as a result of its disastrous economic policies. A unified and realistic exchange rate for all exports is thus essential if the country is to take advantage of its low wages to restore competitiveness in rice and other agricultural products, as well as in the crucial area of labor-intensive manufactured exports, where almost nothing has been achieved despite considerable potential. Ironically, a major threat to the possibility of a successful export-oriented strategy is the appreciation of the unofficial exchange rate from about 1300 to 800 kyats to the U.S. dollar, as a result of the influx of capital induced by the optimism over prospects for a better economic future. Measures will need to be taken to contain this.
Two other important constrains on export expansion are lack of the right infrastructure, such as harbor facilities, and lack of "human capital" due to prolonged neglect in education. However, the extensive Burmese diasporas could alleviate the latter problem substantially, if given the opportunity and incentive to return in sufficient numbers. And, of course, lifting sanctions, in return for continued efforts at political liberalization, would be necessary for the export-oriented development strategy to succeed.
Ronald Findlay is a professor at Columbia University and an economist focusing on trade. He is originally from Burma.
5) Francis Wade: Invite investment -- but with protections
A new investment law is being considered by Burma's parliament, which aims to lure companies in with five-year tax holidays and other tantalizing perks. The revised regulations would turn around stringent rules surrounding foreign ownership of enterprises, and if passed by parliament, Burma will take a giant step towards joining world markets.
Suitors are already lining up at the door: banks, energy firms, and construction giants from North America and Europe want to set up shop in the country, having spent years sidelined by sanctions while companies from Thailand, Singapore, South Korea, and China were allowed almost unfettered access to its resources.
But amid the excitement over Burma's business future, there has been little pressure on the government to implement social and environmental accountability mechanisms to govern the influx of investment. The law contains scant mention of any binding agreements that would enable investment to spur human development in Burma. Nor does it suggest that the military will relinquish the clout it wields over the economy, particularly the military-owned companies known to net millions of dollars in gas revenue, which is then used to purchase weaponry.
Burma has a proven susceptibility to the "resource curse," and current legislation does little to negate this. Foreign businesses should be warned against investing in projects that support the army, and rules should be tightened to stem the human cost of Burma's drive towards a market-oriented nation. Proper governance of megaprojects, including rules that bar investment in areas cleansed of their inhabitants (mining, plantations, and hydropower projects have historically been accompanied by large-scale displacement, land theft, and militarization), would be a giant step towards realizing corporate responsibility.
Whether the government acknowledges this is questionable. A draft "land act" being debated does little to allay this issues of theft and corruption -- if enacted it will confer ownership of the millions of acres of farmland stolen by the army on powerful, often government or military-aligned, companies. With 70 percent of Burma's population dependent on agriculture as a primary source of income, confiscation of arable land often uproots families and becomes a major impediment to small-scale growth. Investors will be judged to have profited from displacement of civilians if they move in on this land.
Burma's war-torn border regions, where the government is pushing ethnic armies to sign ceasefires, will feel a weak regulatory environment most painfully. The prospect of an end to decades-long conflict is certainly alluring, but with many rebel groups occupying terrain close to sites of immense potential wealth, Naypyidaw's overtures are best seen as an effort to secure these regions for commercial exploitation. So while armed conflict may soon cease, the abuse of civilians could escalate as companies swoop in to mine the countryside.
The onus for human development in Burma is on both the government and investors, but as things stand, neither offer much hope. Campaigners want the progressive forces in parliament to ensure that rule of law, and not militarization, governs future project security. Moreover, officials must not be allowed to siphon funds generated from energy projects into offshore accounts, as they have been found to do.
Financial transparency will force the government to channel more money to the undernourished health and education sectors and away from the military. This will only happen when policymakers implement participatory planning and finally draw on the voices of the Burmese public.
Francis Wade is a freelance journalist and analyst covering Burma and Southeast Asia.
6) Maung Wuntha: Support press freedom
"We must respect the role of the media as a fourth estate," said Burmese President Thein Sein during his inaugural address to parliament on March 30, 2011. Modern democracies are described as having three estates, or branches: executive, legislative, and judicial. The fourth estate, of course, is the press -- the unofficial watchdog that ensures that the other three estates of government function with integrity. Burma used to have this fourth estate, and must have it again.
In the 1950s, under the rule of the elected civilian government, the Constitution of the Union of Burma (1947) guaranteed freedom of expression and liberty of thought. At the time, Burma had the freest media in Asia, publishing 30 daily newspapers in several languages, including: Myanmar, Chinese, English, and Indian languages.
After the military coup d'état by General Ne Win in 1962, the Printers and Publishers Registration Law was enacted. This law, still in existence, requires all printers and publishers to register and submit copies of their publications to the Press Scrutiny Board, a division of the Ministry of Information. In 1974, the Constitution and the laws on freedom of expression changed -- ensuring that opinions spoken or published were not contrary to the interests of socialism. That same year, the State Protection Law was issued, allowing authorities to imprison any persons suspected of being a threat to national peace. Many journalists and writers, including myself, have been arrested for infringement of this edict. This clamp down on press freedom has had a detrimental effect on the publishing industry -- so much so that Burma currently has no private daily papers because the Ministry of Information makes publishing extremely difficult through restricting licenses and censorship.
In his opening address at the Conference on Media Development in March 2012 (joint sponsored by the UNESCO and the Burmese government), Minister of Information Kyaw Hsan said that the government has been relaxing restrictions on the press, step by step. This is a hopeful sign. The relaxation of restrictions should pave the way for domestic periodicals to have increased freedom, as long as it is practiced with responsibility and accountability.
The minister also announced that the government is drafting a new media law. Burmese journalists are concerned -- they want a press law that would protect the rights of journalists and prevent threats to media personnel, particularly when it comes to publishing on sensitive issues, such as corruption by government cronies. Without protections like these, Burma will never have a robust fourth estate.
Soe Thein, better known under his pen name Maung Wuntha, is a veteran journalist and the chairman of the National Press Award Committee.
7) Myat Htoo Razak: Health is wealth
Imagine a family in a town in Shan State: Their four-year old child has had severe diarrhea and a high fever for two days. The parents are day laborers with three other children and they barely survive on the daily incomes of the two parents. If one parent takes time off to take the child to a clinic, they won't have enough money to buy food for the family that day. In fact, they won't even be able to afford the medicine if the clinic doesn't give it for free. How would Burma's new government help that family?
The health of its citizens is one of the most essential foundations of a country. While a good healthcare system may not solve every problem, it can greatly help families such as the one imagined above. Aung San Suu Kyi and the new leadership of Burma must make it their priority to improve the health, education, and social services accessible to regular families in both urban and rural areas.
They must take immediate action to improve health service delivery for the most common diseases, such as HIV/AIDS, tuberculosis, and malaria, as well as maternal and child health problems and other chronic non-communicable diseases. Local and national organizations can implement these services with participation from communities, private clinics, and international donors through re-structuring existing programs and increasing the current budget of the Ministry of Health. They must provide on-the-job training for healthcare workers that addresses the actual medical needs of the population. And finally, the new government must also strengthen long-term structural support, such as increasing healthcare financing, providing better education systems for healthcare workers, and providing health equity for all groups -- as well as guarantee timely distribution of safe, quality medical products, clean water, food, and sanitation.
It will take steady and unwavering support, energy, resources, expertise, and participation from everyone to improve the health system, neglected for many decades. International support is needed in all facets, though with a clear goal of supporting country ownership and equity of access to essential health services. There is no easy way to improve the health system overnight, but a simplified and collaborative approach will help lead Burma along a healthier path.
Dr. Myat Htoo Razak is a Burmese physician who provided clinical services to wounded protesters during 1988 democratic movements in Burma. He has worked with international health organizations on HIV/AIDS research, prevention and care, and capacity building of health workers in Asia and Africa. He now lives in the United States and works on strengthening global health.
8) Timothy Ryan: Let workers unionize freely
Aside from the elections in April, some of the highest-profile changes the Burmese government has introduced in the recent thaw have come in the labor sector. In October 2011, a new law allowing trade unions to organize and register was passed. March 2012 saw the passage in the legislature of implementing regulations to ostensibly implement this law and actually register unions.
The question today is whether the government will follow through.
The Labor Organization Law has many defects. As Earl Brown, the Solidarity Center's rule of law adviser and an expert on Burmese law, points out, "it allows for the complete suppression of strike activity for wages, hours and working conditions. It is poorly drafted and not harmonized with other Burmese laws or the new Burmese Constitution."
Nonetheless, the industrial workers, farmers, textile workers, and journalists I met with in Burma in January are eager to test the law. They've already organized independent unions and applied for registration, although none have yet gained recognition.
For two decades, the Federation of Trade Unions-Burma (FTUB) has been training labor activists both inside and outside the country, and these activists are forming unions to test the new law. One of the first things the government must do is allow for the registration of the FTUB under the new law and drop all the bogus charges of "terrorism" against U Maung Maung, the FTUB's general secretary.
Next, comprehensive legal reform of all labor and freedom of assembly laws to allow true freedom of association and collective bargaining must be enacted.
In addition, alternative dispute resolution mechanisms to address industrial conflicts between labor and management in a fair and timely manner should be established.
Finally, since the Burmese labor movement is starting almost from scratch, workers and their unions need the opportunity to learn and connect with their counterparts in the international labor movement from all over the world, including ASEAN countries, Europe, and the United States. Burmese authorities should encourage rather than limit the ability of labor unions around the world to connect with and help educate young Burmese workers about self-representation and democracy.
When I met with Aung San Suu Kyi in January, she told me what she thought a future Burma labor movement and economy should look like. Her vision of Burma is not a low-wage garment manufacturer like Bangladesh. She told me it was important for unions to be responsible and to work for their members, and that the new unions should not be tools or fronts for any political parties, including her own National League for Democracy. She argued that political parties and the government should not create unions and made clear that the NLD had no desire or intent to do so.
Ultimately, the way for Aung San Suu Kyi's vision of a vibrant labor movement to become a reality is for the government to just leave it alone -- and let workers have the freedom to develop their own organizations.
Timothy Ryan is the Asia director of the AFL-CIO's Solidarity Center.
9) Sean Turnell: Cut the bloated military budget
One of the dangers facing the Burmese government on its reform path comes from the contrast between rising expectations and the sad reality of the country's flagging economy. Fifty years of military rule in Burma have created the poorest country in Southeast Asia, so the need for economic reform is just as pressing as that which finally seems to be taking place politically.
So what are the economic reforms that Burma needs to make to turn things around?
First out of the block is the need to reduce spending on the military. Currently absorbing over a quarter of all government spending, Burma's military budget funds a vast standing army and a host of sophisticated hardware, much of it bought new from China and Russia. With no real military threats to Burma from abroad, this army has, of course, been configured primarily to fight internal dissent.
Reducing military spending should allow spending in areas of desperate need in Burma, such as health and education. Currently Burma spends less on these critical determinants of human capital than any comparable nation, and it is among a tiny cohort of countries that spends more on its military than these two items combined.
In recent years, Burma has emerged as a significant exporter of natural gas. The revenues from these exports should provide the funds necessary for genuine nation-building. Under the previous military regime, however, these revenues were siphoned-off into special accounts (some offshore) for the exclusive use of the military and the leadership. Accordingly, what Burma's new government needs to do is to ensure full transparency in all of its overseas earnings, amidst a general program of budgetary accountability.
Burma currently has in place an array of restrictions on routine economic activity that are a hangover from the years of military rule, and which need to be rescinded if the country is to progress. Some of these can be more or less immediately removed and thus constitute the "low-hanging fruit" in the reform process: include the range of licences and taxes that are imposed upon Burma's exporters, the prohibition against banks lending to farmers, the restrictions on telecommunications providers (which makes mobile phones in Burma amongst the most expensive in the world, despite the huge benefits these simple devices can yield in making for better living standards), and simplifying the byzantine (and corruption-provoking) procedures for registering a business. Meanwhile, allowing farmers to own the land they cultivate (presently the state owns all agricultural land), would do much to enhance agricultural productivity, while bringing a certain economic security that has long been lacking.
Burma's new government has made promising steps on the path of reform, but in the economic sphere, these are now badly lagging behind political developments. Putting in place some of the measures above, along with what must be a broad presumption of the primacy of the rule of law and sound property rights, might return Burma to the prosperity it once enjoyed, and can attain again.
Sean Turnell is associate professor of economics at Australia's Macquarie University.
10) Soe Thinn: Train Burma's new diplomats
In the 1970s, a Burmese cabinet minister paid an official visit to a Western country. There he met with the host country's prime minister, who asked what kind of assistance Burma wanted. The minister responded simply: "How much can you give?"
Such awkwardness is more common than you might think among Burmese diplomats. Yes, that was decades ago -- but one must understand that since the 1988 popular uprising, and the consequent rule by the military in the country, sanctions have prevented practically any kind of assistance being offered to Burma. Now that is changing. Positive signals from the government, including the return to the political scene of Aung San Suu Kyi, are prompting donor countries and international organizations to consider how they might assist Burma's development. Such opportunities must not go untapped.
In the past, Burmese diplomats have embraced "reactive" or "defensive" diplomacy when defending their government in international forums from allegations by the international community for violating human rights, using forced labor, and recruiting child soldiers. Today, Burmese diplomats are looking out on a new diplomatic landscape. Their job will now consist primarily of interacting with foreign counterparts, so that badly needed development assistance for Burma may be acquired from external donors. This challenge calls for a more "proactive" or "offensive" diplomacy.
Burmese diplomats must develop skills and acumen to exploit this unprecedented chance to help in developing the country. This effort should include grasping the fundamentals of development economics, properly assessing Burma's own resources to maximize the impact of foreign support, learning the mechanics of how development assistance is processed by donor countries, and, last but not least, gaining a familiarity with the specific kinds of development aid each country or international institution can provide. No doubt this will be a considerable endeavor for a country whose diplomats are rarely comfortable with speaking foreign languages. This needs to change, and the sooner, the better. Burma should be in a position to make the most of opportunities when they present themselves.
Soe Thinn, an ex-director of the Burmese Service of Radio Free Asia, worked for Burma's Ministry of Foreign Affairs from 1969 to 1988.
11) Dr. Thein Lwin: Teach the children well
A system of "decentralized education" should be instituted in Burma. Since 1962, teachers have not been in a position to determine how they teach children but, rather, have been required by the government to deliver prescribed texts to their students. Education reform should reach the areas of higher education, vocational education, non-formal education and teacher education. And universal, compulsory nine-year education (of children, age 5 to 14) must be launched throughout Burma.
It is often said that schools should focus on child-centered education rather than teacher-centered. However, for decades, the Burmese education system has not encouraged either a teacher-centered or a child-centered approach, rather parroting government-approved readers in preparation for strict examinations. The current system of pass-fail examinations, plus the selection of science and art routes by 8th grade (student age 14) and university entrance by 10th grade (student age 16), affects students' autonomy, competence, and attitudes to learning. As part of education reform in Burma, the examination system should be changed in favor of a "formative assessment" system that encourages continuous assessment for learning. University entrance should be based on student's aptitude and ability -- rather than 10th grade examination marks. Students should have to meet the requirements of the university course that they wish to study.
Burma is a geographically, as well as an ethnically, diverse nation. Decentralization of education could guarantee a space for ethnic nationality states to run their own schools, allowing each state enough room to create a curriculum incorporating their own priorities and values within a nationally agreed minimum standard. There may be different theoretical orientations to curriculum considerations, but the task before us is to draw upon all curriculum traditions -- serving the interests of students and meeting the needs of society.
Multilingual education must be considered based on the linguistic diversity that exists in Burma. This diversity is a positive characteristic of the country, and safeguarding it is an important task for its citizens. The major ethnic nationality languages (Burmese, Chin, Kachin, Karen, Karenni, Mon, Rakhaing, and Shan) should be recognized as the official languages in their respective states, with Burmese as the national language. Many other countries have chosen more than one official language: India has 19 official languages; South Africa has 11.
Decentralized education would see universal education to the age of 14 and remove government-prescribed texts for students. The examination system should be revamped to allow for more autonomous study through a process of continuous assessment, rather than pass/fail exams. Decentralized education will also allow ethnic nationality states to run their own schools in their own languages. A "learning-centered approach" is the way forward. This approach guarantees a role for the teacher to provide guidance and enables students to become independent, life-long learners.
Dr. Thein Lwin is the director of Thinking Classroom Foundation based in Chiang Mai, Thailand, which provides teacher trainings for Burmese teachers.
12) Tin Maung Maung Than: Unleash grassroots entrepreneurship
No sooner was it sworn in, just under one year ago, than the current government in Burma vowed to transform the country into a modern developed state through industrialization. Special economic zones and industrial zones are part of the government's plan to boost industrial production. The assumption seems to be that state-sponsored mega-projects will stand at the forefront of this effort. On the other hand, the parliament has been exercising its newfound power to throttle back large-scale, state-funded projects by cutting budget allocations. "Enhancing private sector participation," "developing public-private partnership," and "plugging into the international supply chain" all appear to be new buzzwords in the economic reform agenda.
Such buzzwords, however, are alien to most of the small and medium-size industrial enterprises (SME) that represent the bulk of the country's industrial production and employment. The current debate over the environmental and economic impact of industrial projects has overshadowed the role and importance of SMEs. These private sector businesses barely survived the deprivations of the socialist era (1964-1988), and now they are struggling to make the transition towards a "market" economy. The number of companies registered with the Ministry of Industry -- almost all of them SMEs -- rose from less than 24,000 in 1991, to over 43,000 in 2004. Since then, their growth appears to have reached a plateau. These numbers apparently do not include other industrial SMEs under the supervision of other ministries, such as businesses processing agriculture and marine products. It is likely that the number of unregistered SMEs is much larger than the official figure.
The list of constraints faced by most SMEs is long. Lack of credit prevents new entries to the market and starves existing companies of capital. State-owned enterprises, which enjoy many unfair advantages, tend to crowd out private ones. Small companies also face problems when it comes to buying or leasing buildings and land. Deficient and unreliable infrastructure, bureaucratic red tape, and a lack of human capital are additional challenges. Of all of these problems, high transaction costs and the credit crunch seem to be the most significant constraints holding back the development of SMEs.
Yet possible remedies to these problems are clear. A bank dedicated to financing small firms should be established. Regulation and registration procedures can be streamlined into a one-stop process. Technology transfer and human resources must be improved. The development of rural SMEs can be integrated into a larger poverty alleviation strategy. This last item is especially important: Creating a more prosperous countryside through rural industrialization can promote growth of the industrial sector, and greater prosperity throughout the country as a whole.
Tin Maung Maung Than is a visiting senior research fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore.
13) Andrea Valentin: Come visit, sustainably
Imagine the good if Burma could learn from its neighbors' tourism development mistakes, leapfrog these errors, and develop sustainable tourism. Imagine the government adapts multi-stakeholder destination-planning procedures, develops sustainable tourism policies, writes a legislative framework from which sustainable tourism can occur, and collaborates with poor communities to ensure they benefit from tourism.
Given the massive impact that tourism has on the world's poor, the development of Burma's tourist industry could have a massive impact on the country's future - if it's done right. Burma's Ministry of Hotels and Tourism has repeatedly stated its commitment to uphold the principles of responsible tourism. They know sustainable tourism will not happen by itself, and are acutely aware that many people are watching their actions closely.
The scope for changing tourism policy to enhance livelihood benefits for the poor is immense. Pro-poor tourism, which generates net benefits for the poor, can stimulate Burma's economic development, helping marginal areas that have few other exports and diversification options.
The success of pro-poor tourism depends on whether the government will explicitly focus on expanding the benefits for the poor in the reformed tourism law, or whether they will just assume the poor will benefit from tourism through the trickle-down effect.
Interventions could be taken at three levels. At the destination level, partnerships can be developed between operators, residents, NGOs, and local authorities. At the national policy level, policy reforms are needed on a wide range of tourism and non-tourism issues, and at the international level, responsible consumer and business behavior should be encouraged.
The government and the private sector can take several steps to strengthen the pro-poor benefits of tourism. Companies can develop stronger economic linkages with the poor by adapting their supply chain. The government can boost opportunities for participation by the poor. They could offer stipends to develop tourism and hospitality skills, provide small business support schemes, and build basic infrastructure for tourist services in poor areas. By reforming Burma's licensing and concession policies, the government could create incentives for companies to invest and operate in pro-poor ways.
As a form of poverty intervention, pro-poor tourism does not compare with development methods such as investments in health, education, and agriculture. But as a strategy to promote broad-based growth, pro-poor tourism can do a lot of good. Donors have recognized that compared with other sectors, tourism has higher potential for linkage, is labor intensive, and provides many jobs for women and youth.
The long-term success for tourism depends on whether the government can develop civil society. Through pro-poor tourism, the government can show that the people of Burma are at the center of the development agenda, not the economic elite.
Dr. Andrea Valentin is the founder of Tourism Transparency, which campaigns to create a responsible and accountable tourism industry in Burma.
14)David Steinberg: Promote the rule of law
The core problem facing all each successive Burmese government -- from the Union of Burma in 1948 to the Republic of the Union of Myanmar in 2011 -- is the deft management of majority-minority relations. No government has resolved this issue. The center fears dissolution of the union; the minorities fear cultural and economic domination. The just distribution of power and resources among the majority Burmans and the disparate minority groups will determine the future of that state. Cease-fires with some warring groups are a first step toward resolution, but they mark a beginning that must overcome generations of mistrust and discrimination. Provincial parliaments in minority and majority areas are welcome developments, but must be followed by greater local authority. Avenues of social mobility for all groups need opening and encouragement -- they are presently restricted and militarily controlled. Local cultures, languages, customs, and religions need respect and freedom in actuality -- beyond the fine hortative rhetoric of all the constitutions, including that of 2008, which have remained unimplemented.
In a state in which power has been highly personalized, the implementation of an independent judiciary is essential for progress in all fields. The talented and well-trained judiciary was destroyed by the military in 1962, and needs to be restored. The 2008 Constitution has called for such an autonomous governmental branch, President Thein Sein has established an organization directly under his authority to foster this change, and the opposition has pushed for the rule of law. Progress will be difficult after a half-century of authoritarian judicial control, but it is essential for the future of the country.
David Steinberg is distinguished professor of Asian studies at Georgetown University.
15) Hanna Hindstrom: Make extractive industries more transparent
Despite abundant natural resource wealth, Burma is the poorest country in Southeast Asia. Exports of natural gas alone are expected to reach $4.1 billion annually by 2013, but the International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that less than 1 percent of these revenues ever enter the national budget. Instead, they are pumped into off-shore bank accounts owned by the military and its cronies.
Limited progress has been made on revenue transparency since Thein Sein became president. Although the budget was debated in parliament for the first time and the dual exchange rate has finally been abolished, revenue streams remain shielded in opacity. The military retains a tight grip on the country's economy, with only state or military-run enterprises permitted to partner with foreign firms on natural resource projects.
Research by the campaign group Arakan Oil Watch suggests that Burma's "resource curse" is set to worsen as new investors pour in. U.N. human rights expert Tomas Quintana also warned that we may see an increase in abuses, such as land-grabbing and forced labor, in ethnic minority areas as a consequence of Burma's reform program. Disputes over hydropower dams in Karen state are already threatening to unravel the fragile peace-process. Similarly, the ongoing conflict in Kachin state, which has displaced 75,000 people, re-opened in June of last year over a disputed area near a Chinese-backed mega dam.
Indeed, sustainable natural resource management will be a critical test for the new government, which now has an unprecedented opportunity to take action. A commitment to implement the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) -- the world's leading anti-corruption drive -- would be a significant step in this direction. It would require a public pledge to work with companies and communities to promote transparency and accountability in the natural resource sectors.
There is growing grassroots support for EITI in Burma, which is premised on the idea that governments publish payments received by companies, and companies report payments made. More importantly, it engages civil society from the start. In a country like Burma, it has the potential to stimulate a public dialogue on a subject that until recently was completely taboo.
On his February visit to Burma, leading economist Joseph Stiglitz threw his support behind the initiative. "It's very important [for Burma] to subscribe to EITI," he said. "It sets the framework for transparency and can make sure revenues that belong to the people, go to the people."
There even seems to be some nascent support within the military-backed government, notably the Resources and Environmental Conservation Committee, where local groups have been able to promote transparency concepts. References to accountability in the natural resource sector can also be found in Burma's 2009 national sustainable development strategy. Indeed, it would fit in nicely with the government's professed reformist approach.
The time seems ripe for rhetoric to be put into action. If Burma truly hopes to embrace democracy, let alone become the "next economic frontier of Asia," transparency must be placed at the heart of its agenda. The EITI both can, and must, form part of that process.
Hanna Hindstrom is a journalist with the Democratic Voice of Burma based in Thailand.
16)Ko Tar: Let the monks lead the way
Burma has about 500,000 monks, equal to the number of soldiers. The traditional role of the Buddhist monks (Sangha) has been 1) to provide a higher purpose and meaning to human life, one that transcends limited self-interest; and 2) to provide a moral structure in which human beings act ethically.
But that is not enough for the socially engaged Buddhists. The role of the Sangha should also be to protect "the little ones" who are marginalized and oppressed within the established power schemes.
Historically, monks have always played a major role in society. They led the first anti-colonial activities in Burma, when the nation was still a colony in the British empire. In 1988 and again in 1990, monks helped lead the democracy movement.
In late September 2007, the world's eye turned toward Burma, toward tens of thousands of monks chanting "The Sutra of Loving Kindness" as they marched on rain-swept streets, turning their minds and prayers toward democracy and the nonviolent transformation of the military regime that had ruled the country for 45 years. The peaceful protest led by the monks was triggered by sudden and dramatic increases in fuel prices, which drastically affected people's ability to get to work or afford even basic foods. In Burma, where monks and nuns are deeply trained in meditation, scholarship, and in peaceful acceptance of life's sufferings, their protest was an extraordinary event, a true display of Ernest Hemingway's words that "courage is grace under pressure."
Burmese monastics live in a close relationship with the wider community. Their response to Burma's extreme economic hardship is, in a sense, logical. If the people cannot eat, monks and nuns cannot eat.
Engaged Buddhism seeks to apply the Buddhist ideals of wisdom and compassion to present-day social, political, and environmental issues. They have earned a space in society which cannot even be encroached upon by the regime. In the last six years, I collaborated with monks to embrace a number of poor village children who never enrolled in school. Over the years, we will prevent these youth -- almost one third of Burmese children -- from falling into illiteracy. Through this monks' "free" space, a collaborative movement between engaged monks and laity is unfolding, and introducing developmental innovations such as microcredit unions, sustainable agriculture, community forestry, and high energy stoves. We are hopeful. There is a possibility in the air that we can improve our conditions.
Ko Tar is a medical doctor, editor and publisher of the literary magazine Chindwin, and the author of over 20 books. He is also an engaged Buddhist and environmental activist in Burma.