Myanmar Military Re-nominates New Representatives To Parliament

April 23, 2012 13:44 PM

YANGON, April 23 (Bernama) -- The Myanmar military has re-nominated some 59 new representatives to parliament to substitute part of the old ones, the Union Election Commission announced Monday.

Of the 59 new military representatives of higher ranks, who are non-elected, 39 are to the House of Representatives (Lower House) and 20 to the House of Nationalities (Upper House), Xinhua news agency reported.

The new substitution nomination came hours before Myanmar parliament's third session is to resume in Nay Pyi Taw on Monday after being adjourned for a month to continue discussions on some law amendment bills that remained to be dealt with.

The parliament session is also the first after the April 1 by-elections.

The parliament members representing the military in both houses account for over 100 or 25 percent of the total which amounts to over 600, of which elected members take nearly 500 -- over 300 with the House of Representatives and over 100 with the House of Nationalities.

Of the total parliamentary seats, the ruling Union Solidarity and Development Party hold nearly 60 percent.

In the April 1 by-elections, the National League for Democracy led by Aung San Suu Kyi won 43 seats of the 45 open seats for contest at the three-level parliament -- 37 with the House of Representatives, 4 with the House of Nationalities and 2 with the region or state parliament.

-- BERNAMA

Myanmar's exiled media starting to head home

Kavi Chongkittavorn
The Nation
Publication Date : 23-04-2012

News of Myanmar's exiled media returning home has excited the community of dissidents and media activists around the world.

With the Arab Spring and increasing democratisation in various parts of the world, journalists who fled many other countries for an extended period of time are also returning home. However, they all face different challenges during these transitional periods, depending on how media-friendly the government in power is. Having operated without interference, these media outlets and journalists are fiercely independent and highly professional, with a hard-earned creditability.

It is only in recent years that stories from exiled media began to emerge on how they contributed to the dramatic political changes on their home fronts. Once they were the official targets of attacks. Now they have gained respect even from those who previously tried to oppress them. Returning media exiles share one common important trait: they all have promised to serve as faithful watchdogs in their societies — something they have done from thousands of kilometres away in different time zones. Truth be told, nowhere have the changes been as radical and impressive as in Myanmar.

Myanmar's case is intriguing because the government decided to invite exiled media early on during its reform process to return and contribute to nation-building and media professionalism inside the country. There are many exiled Burmese journalists of varying quality and experience working for a dozen news organisations, including ethnic minority news outlets, or blogging. The New Delhi-based Mizzima News has made a successful transition into Burma with a local printing licence. The Norway-based Democratic Voice of Burma is negotiating with the Nay Pyi Taw authorities for a broadcasting licence in the future.

Currently, the government is focusing on print media. Burmese News International, an umbrella for small ethnic media groups based in Thailand, hopes to set up offices in minority areas.

Other groups including the Chiang Mai-based Irrawaddy have made similar moves, but are being more cautious. Interestingly, each exiled media organisation planning to return to Burma has also worked out a contingency plan by maintaining overseas offices in case of a reversal in the reforms.

Burmese journalists are highly trained and professional. For decades, they had to operate overseas, sometimes far away from their own country, gathering and then dispatching news back to the country, to which they had no direct access. They are among the most innovative groups among worldwide exiled media today through the use of satellites and every kind of media technology. For instance over the past two decades, the DVB developed a sophisticated network of reporters and secretive ways of delivering their news reports on a day-to-day basis. Relying on groups of clandestine journalists, including the well-known underground video journalists, inside the country, they informed the Burmese at home about what was really going on in their backyards.

Recently, DVB also filed a report on the thank-you party given by opposition party leader Aung San Suu Kyi, filmed by one of its journalists. It was the only media outlet that reported on the reception, which was rather controversial as only 19 journalists were invited.

Among journalists, debates continue as to whether it was a faux pas on the part of the National League for Democracy to express appreciation to journalists or media outlets that reported positively on Suu Kyi and the party's activities. Indeed, it is no secret that she has been the subject of positive news reports since her release. Before and during the by-election campaign in March, almost all printed media, barring the government-run media, filled their front pages with her photos and quotes. Indeed, editors and reporters at home are now facing a dilemma on how to cover her stories and activities without putting too positive a spin on it. In this case, DVB shows the unique character of exiled media.

Unlike other closed societies, the Burmese authorities realise the urgency and benefits of rallying exiled media to their side. They have taken concrete steps to attract them, with the goal of integrating the exiled media into the wider society as soon as possible.

In recent months, censorship has been partly eased, pending the new media law, which is due by the end of this year. Within Asean, especially among the members with restrictive media, this trend is quite disturbing because the Burmese media scene is receiving positive international media coverage. For decades, Burma's media freedom ranked among the world's worst in various global media indexes. But this will change with the new evaluation next year.

That helps explain why the exiled journalists visiting Burma to hold talks with the authorities were asked to impart their experience and professionalism obtained overseas to their local colleagues. Some were even asked privately to help train officials dealing with spokespeople for various ministries to improve media communication.

Burma aside, it is hard to know the exact number of exiled media organisations around the world. It is estimated that there are around 50 outlets covering at least 20 locations including Sri Lanka, Vietnam, Belarus, Yemen, Iran, Zimbabwe, China, Cuba, Bhutan, Tibet, Sudan and Eritrea. Every day, hundreds of journalists-in-exile, some of them political activists, work from their homes or offices to inform their own people and the rest of the world of the "real news", using their own limited resources and outside funding.

All around the world, undemocratic governments, especially dictatorial ones that have made an about-face, understand media operations and their weaknesses and strengths. Their leaders know and can play along with the journalists' ethos and pledge to respect media independence and integrity, but when push comes to shove, the authorities immediately put them down. That helps explain why there is still so much suspicion of the changes taking place in Burma and elsewhere.

It remains to be seen how Burma's exiled media come to terms with their new turf. Their hard-headed investigative skills and other media talents will certainly be useful in monitoring and checking the authorities' performance to ensure that they genuinely work for democracy and the wellbeing of the people.

Link : http://www.asianewsnet.net/home/news.php?id=29872&sec=3

Myanmar opposition set to boycott parliament

• Published: 20/04/2012 at 03:48 PM
• Online news: Asia

Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and other newly elected members of her party plan to boycott parliament next week over a row about the constitutional oath, a party spokesman said Friday.

Myanmar opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi attends a meeting of elected National League for Democracy (NLD) officials at their party headquarters in Yangon on April 19, 2012. Suu Kyi and other newly elected members of her party plan to boycott parliament next week over a row about the constitutional oath, a party spokesman said Friday.

It is the first sign of serious discord between Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy (NLD) and the reformist regime since April 1 by-elections that gave the former political prisoner her first-ever seat in parliament.

The NLD's announcement came after the authorities rejected its appeal to change the wording of the swearing-in oath from "safeguard" to "respect" the constitution, which was drawn up by the country's former military rulers.

The NLD will write to the presidential office to ask the authorities to reconsider, but a resolution to the row is unlikely in time for the opening of parliament on Monday, said party spokesman Nyan Win.

"As today is the 20th, I don't see any possibility to go in time," he told reporters at the party headquarters.

President Thein Sein is currently on a visit to Japan.

Myanmar, which languished for decades under a repressive junta, has announced a series of reforms since a controversial 2010 election brought a civilian government to power -- albeit one with close links to the military.

The regime has freed hundreds of political prisoners, welcomed Suu Kyi's party back into mainstream politics and signed tentative peace deals with a number of rebel groups, although fighting still rages in the far north.

Suu Kyi, who spent much of the past two decades locked up by the former junta, has been invited along with the other parliamentarians to take up her seat in the lower house on Monday after her party's decisive by-election win.

Observers say the regime needs Suu Kyi in parliament to bolster the legitimacy of its political system and spur an easing of Western sanctions.

The Nobel Peace Prize winner has said one of her priorities will be to push for an amendment of the 2008 constitution, under which one quarter of the seats in parliament are reserved for unelected military officials.

The NLD secured 43 of the 44 seats it contested in this month's elections, becoming the main opposition force in a national parliament that remains dominated by the military and its political allies.

The vote was largely praised as a step towards democracy by the international community, and Western nations are beginning to lift or suspend sanctions on Myanmar to encourage reforms.

European Union diplomats told AFP Thursday that the 27-nation bloc had reached an agreement in principle to suspend all sanctions against the country formerly known as Burma, except for an arms embargo, for a year.

The announcement came days after Suu Kyi and British Prime Minister David Cameron issued a joint call for the suspension of the measures after landmark talks in Rangoon.

On Wednesday the NLD said Suu Kyi planned to visit Britain and Norway as part of her first trip outside Myanmar in 24 years.

Link: http://www.bangkokpost.com/news/asia/289654/myanmar-opposition-set-to-boycott-parliament

UN Security Council must address war crimes in Burma

Wednesday, 11 April 2012 13:52 Mizzima News 

(Commentary) – As the United Nations Security Council will soon meet to discuss developments in Burma, Burma Campaign UK calls on Council members to address attacks against ethnic minority civilians by the Burmese Army, which have escalated in the past year.

The United Nations General Assembly hall at its headquarters in New York Photo: flickr

There have been significant changes and welcome reforms in Burma, including the recent by-elections which, although not free and fair, saw Aung San Suu Kyi and her party, the National League for Democracy win 43 seats. It is right that these changes are acknowledged and encouraged.

However, this should not be at the cost of turning a blind eye to serious violations of international law which are being perpetrated against ethnic minorities.

In his last report the UN Special Rapporteur listed a series of human rights abuses, all committed in Burma in recent months, which could constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity.  They include: ‘…grave violations of international human rights and humanitarian law, including attacks against the civilian population, extrajudicial killings, internal displacement, the use of human shields and forced labour, confiscation and destruction of property, and conflict-related sexual violence...’

Burma Campaign UK recently visited the conflict zone in Kachin State, Burma, and documented cases of rape, extrajudicial killings, abductions, torture, deliberate targeting of civilians with mortar and machine gun fire, looting, beatings, forced labour and use of child soldiers by the Burmese Army.  Around 70,000 people have been forced to flee attacks and abuses by the Burmese Army, and President Thein Sein is not allowing aid agencies proper access to deliver essential aid.

“Encouraging further reforms while also addressing serious human rights abuses are not incompatible, and are in fact essential if lasting peace and democratic change are to be secured,” said Mark Farmaner, Director of Burma Campaign UK.  “The UN Security Council has a legal duty to address the increase in violations of international law which have taken place in Burma in the past year.”

LINK : http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/6936-un-security-council-must-address-war-crimes-in-burma.html

Lift sanctions that infringe on human rights

Thursday, 05 April 2012 14:36 Derek Tonkin 

(Commentary) – The very positive welcome from Asian and Western leaders to the orderly conduct of the recent by-elections in Burma has encouraged discussion on how best the West should respond to this further indication of political reform in the country.

To date, no Western government has felt able to ease a single economic or financial sanction against Burma, despite the widely recognized progress which has been made since the civilian government took power in March 2011 and despite all the formal promises over the years that there would be a positive response to reform.

No doubt Western hesitancy has been strongly influenced by Aung San Suu Kyi's continued support for sanctions. A full year has passed, but apart from important gestures of goodwill such as visits by several Western foreign ministers, the only positive action by way of recognition has been to suspend the travel ban, but not the asset freeze, on the top 87 officials in the new government and their families. It is particularly unfortunate that the announced suspension of asset freezes for 24 of the 87 officials already removed from the travel ban in 2011 has now been rescinded unannounced.

The spotlight has now focused on those elements in the confusing array of Western sanctions that might be eased as a response, already long overdue, to the reforms that have already taken place.

Network Myanmar advocates a simple solution to this dilemma, which is to rescind at once all those sanctions that have human rights implications.

Whatever the original intention, there are many sanctions which primarily and some exclusively affect the population. The worst offenders are the United States, whose sanctions regime, in four Congressional Acts and five Presidential Executive Orders, never pretended to be "smart," but were designed to maximize the damage to the Burmese economy in the promotion of regime change and included general bans on trade and investment, restrictive mandates for U.N. agencies and the blocking of development assistance from international financial institutions. Canada is proud that it has the toughest sanctions in the West, but overlooks the human rights implications of its actions.

U.N. Special Rapporteur Tomás Ojea Quintana has already stressed the importance of a detailed analysis of Western sanctions to ascertain the extent to which they infringe human rights.

E.U. sanctions too have human rights implications. For example, the sectorial ban on the import of timber and timber products has hit furniture manufacturers hard. As a result many carpenters and furniture-makers have been compelled to seek employment in neighbouring Thailand, where they may well find themselves working on imported Burmese timber and suffering exploitation. The E.U. should not be complicit in human rights abuses. EU sanctions do of course list the names of hundreds of targeted individuals and companies, but they are almost entirely persons and entities that have never had a trading relationship with Europe, have never used Western banking facilities and have never held assets in the E.U.

U.S., Canadian and E.U. sanctions are the very antithesis of modern sanctions philosophy and practice, which strongly reject generalized sanctions precisely because of their human rights implications.

As regards the E.U., there is considerable variation in practice with respect to trade, investment and tourism not subject to statutory controls. The UK continues to discourage such engagement, intervening at its discretion to dissuade UK companies publicly from involvement. Other E.U. countries however are already organizing trade missions to Burma, or providing official support. There is clearly a very important need for the E.U. to harmonize their policy in this context as a matter of urgency. Norway, not a member of the E.U., has already set the pace by announcing that it now positively encourages trade, investment and tourism, though it will continue to respect E.U. statutory restrictions.

No doubt in the light of her victory in the by-elections Aung San Suu Kyi is reconsidering her support for sanctions, though the NLD has never acknowledged the damage which they cause to the economy generally. The West should be guided in its decisions primarily by the reality on the ground.

Now that a government is in power that has set poverty eradication, rural development and social welfare as important priorities, there can be no excuse for Western governments seeking to compel further reform through the use of sanctions targeting the population. These sanctions should not be part of the Western arsenal of restrictive measures."

– Network Myanmar is a charitable association that supports informed policies that promotes political rights and liberties for the people of Burma.

LINK : http://www.mizzima.com/edop/commentary/6908-lift-sanctions-that-infringe-on-human-rights.html

Resolving Ethnic Conflicts in Burma—Ceasefires to Sustainable Peace

ByASHLEY SOUTH| March 12, 2012 |

The transition currently underway in Burma presents the best opportunity in over two decades to address conflicts between the government and ethnic communities. However, to achieve lasting peace, ceasefires agreed between the government and armed ethnic groups must be extended to include participation from a range of stakeholders, and substantial discussion of issues which have structured half-a-century of armed conflict. Without a political settlement, the current round of ceasefires are unlikely to be sustainable.

National Political Context—How Resilient is Reform Process?

Since the Thein Sein government assumed power in late March last year, there have been many positive developments—for example, the functioning of parliaments; release of most (but not all) political prisoners; understandings reached with opposition groups; government responses to social action (e.g. suspension of the Myitsone dam); relaxations on censorship and freedom of expression and association. However, the question remains whether the pace and scope of reform is sustainable.

So far, centrally directed reforms have not had much impact on ordinary people’s lives, especially in the conflict-affected countryside. Expectations of real change in Burma could quickly become frustrated, once it becomes apparent that many of the changes required will take years, or decades, to achieve.

It is when authoritarian regimes seek to reform that they are most vulnerable. Many individuals and communities in Burma are damaged and traumatized by decades of military rule and abuses. The relaxation of political restrictions is like taking the lid off the pressure cooker—ethnic and other grievances (e.g. land rights) could explode.

Perhaps the biggest constraint on rapid and sustainable change is limited government capacities. There is a need for policy reform in many areas. However, state officials have limited skills, and authoritarian political cultures make change difficult. Also, elements of the previous regime are unhappy with the pace and scope of recent reforms. Powerful actors are biding their time, waiting to move against the reform process.

The Ethnic Dimension

These concerns are particularly relevant in relation to ethnic issues. For more than half-a-century, various armed ethnic groups have been fighting for greater autonomy from a militarized government dominated by the Burman majority. After decades of “low intensity” armed conflict, most armed ethnic groups are greatly weakened. Nevertheless, they still enjoy varying degrees of credibility among the communities they seek to represent.

Burma’s ethnic communities constitute over 30 percent of the population. Until their grievances and aspirations are addressed, national-level political reforms cannot be consolidated. Although complex and seemingly difficult to resolve, addressing the “ethnic question” is essential to sustained social and political reform.

Peace must be understood as a national issue affecting all sectors society—not just something concerning ethnic political and military elites and the government and Burmese Army. Reconciliation must include trust building. But peace is about more than ceasefires.

Peace-Making and Peace-Building

Resolving conflicts between armed ethnic groups and the government is necessary, but not sufficient, to achieve peace. Lasting peace must also address the underlying social-economic and political grievances and aspirations of ethnic communities. These are potentially divisive issues, which require working with individuals and communities on identities and interests. Such long-term work must be owned and driven by Burmese citizens.

Armed ethnic groups are key stakeholders, whose members are motivated by genuine grievances, and long-held aspirations for self-determination; some individuals are also motivated by private economic agendas (“greed factors”).

Particularly along the Thailand border, some armed ethnic groups have been supported through aid agencies working in refugee camps and cross-border in the conflict zones. This has had the effect of legitimizing some actors, while marginalizing others.

Other key ethnic actors include political parties, several of which did well in the 2010 elections. Ethnic nationality political parties are key stakeholders, which should be brought into peace processes. Another important sector is civil society actors. This includes NGOs and community-based organizations (CBOs) working cross-border from China and Thailand, and those operating “inside” the country—both traditional and modern associations, faith-based and secular groups.

The most important set of stakeholders are communities. Civilian populations in conflict areas have the most to gain, or loose, in peace processes. It is essential that communities and their representatives are included in peace initiatives, as well as ethnic diaspora in neighboring countries and beyond.

Comprehensive and sustainable peace-building in Burma requires engagement with a broad range of stakeholders. This is particularly important for those communities who do not feel themselves well-represented by armed opposition groups and affiliated organizations. For example, many Karen communities (particularly Buddhists and Pwo-speakers) feel unrepresented by armed groups dominated by Sgaw-speaking Christians.

Government Initiative

In his speech to the joint Hlutaw Union Parliament on March 2, the president called for an “an all-inclusive political process for all stakeholders,” stating that “there must be mutual assurances and pledges to end all hostilities.” This historical opportunity for peace should be seized. However, there is a danger that hastily agreed ceasefire agreements could unravel later.

At present, the government’s approach to ceasefires is implemented by two sets of rival actors: Aung Thaung and Thein Zaw, and the Railways Minister Aung Min (the president’s personal envoy). This dual-track approach has created some confusion among ethnic groups. There are also questions regarding the extent to which the Burmese Army buys into recent ceasefire agreements. Burmese military field commanders have proved adept at manipulating conflicts. Will they acquiesce in civilian government-led peace initiatives?

Recent Ceasefires

Over the past few months, preliminary ceasefires have been agreed between the government and armed non-state groups representing the Chin (Chin National Front or CNF), Wa (United Wa State Army or UWSA), Mongla (National Democratic Alliance Army or NDAA), Shan (Shan State Army-North and South or SSA-North and SSA-South), Karen (Karen National Union or KNU, Democratic Karen Buddhist Army or DKBA, and KNU/Karen National Liberation Army Peace Council) and Mon (New Mon State Party or NMSP). Talks have just taken place with Karenni/Kayah (Kareni National Progressive Party or KNPP), and are on-going with the Kachin (Kachin Independence Organization or KIO).

For many of these communities, there is a profound lack of trust in the government, and particularly the Burmese Army. Also, in the case of several groups, there are internal differences of opinion and strategy. For example, some KNU leaders are seeking to move forward with an exploratory peace process, following an historic January 12 meeting with government representatives in the Karen State capital of Pa’an, where a preliminary ceasefire was agreed. Others in the KNU leadership have proposed introducing new conditions, before engaging in further talks with the government. Questions remain whether the KNU will be able to maintain a coherent and consistent position.

The situation in Kachin State is particularly dangerous. The resumption of armed conflict after a 17-year ceasefire must be understood in the context of the perceived failures of the 1994 KIO truce, and pressures on ceasefire groups to become Burmese Army-controlled Border Guard Forces—plus the government’s refusal to allow a Kachin political party to contest the 2010 elections (after promising to do so). Fighting in Kachin areas has forced some 60,000 civilians to flee. Although the KIO and government have had several rounds of talks, these have yet to result in a peace deal.

What Next?

There is a need for consistency of approach and representatives on the government side. It is important to build on political momentum, but at the same time, undue haste may lead to ceasefire agreements which cannot be sustained.

Without a clear “roadmap” leading to political negotiations, the current round of ceasefires may stall. The president’s initiative calls for the completion of initial ceasefire agreements, followed by Union level political talks, and discussion of key issues in Parliament.

The third stage of his plan envisions a grand Hlutaw, along the lines of a “New Panglong Agreement” which many ethnic nationality politicians have been calling for. It is important that participation in national level political talks includes civil society and political stakeholders, as well as armed groups.

Re-negotiating the relationship between state and society in Burma risks provoking a backlash from Burmese military hardliners. A pretext for the 1962 coup was that (then Prime Minister) U Nu was on the point of selling-out to secessionists. Might “hardliners” use the prospect of a new Panglong-type conference to precipitate a crackdown?

Another historical precedent is the ceasefires of the 1990s, when some two dozen armed ethnic groups agreed truces with the military government. It is important to avoid the missed opportunities of this period. Ceasefires between the government and armed ethnic groups in the 1990s “froze,” rather than resolved, conflicts—i.e. did not move from peace-making towards genuine peace-building. Nevertheless, these truces did allow for the (re-)emergence of civil society networks within and between ethnic groups. Also, the earlier ceasefires saw a marked decrease in war-related deaths and injuries and other acute human rights abuses associated with counter-insurgency.

Another lesson from history—international agencies failed to support the 1990s ceasefires. This was largely due to political conditions, and the reluctance of governments and donors to engage with a military regime which was an international pariah. It is important that such mistakes are avoided this time round. Donors should explore ways to get behind the ceasefires, and where possible provide early peace dividends.

From Armed Truces to Sustainable Ceasefires

With the important exception of the KIO, Burma’s major armed ethnic groups have agreed preliminary ceasefires with the government. The question now is how to consolidate these ceasefires and produce benefits for communities affected by fighting and human rights abuses. One way forward could be to reach agreement regarding “ground rules” for (ex-) combatants, specifying how soldiers should behave towards civilian populations. This will require agreeing codes of conduct for armed personnel—both government forces and non-state armed groups.

A key issue is how compliance with such codes of conduct—and thus ceasefires—can be monitored. One solution may be a tripartite monitoring mechanism, with roles for the government and Myanmar Army, armed ethnic groups, and community representatives. This mechanism could resolve some issues locally, while others would be passed up the chain of command, for resolution at the State/Region level and if necessary Union level.

Other issues still to be resolved include:

• The rehabilitation (and return, where appropriate) of refugees and internally displaced persons, and other communities affected by conflicts;

• Supporting livelihoods, including providing alternatives for young people to engaging in criminality and armed conflict;

• Land rights, including issues of return and/or restitution for displaced people;

• Landmines (Burma is one of the most landmine-infested countries in the world);

• Release of ethnic and other political prisoners.

Foreign Aid and Economic Agendas

In the context of political transition in Burma, foreign donors are preparing to increase their assistance. More foreign aid is welcome, given the scale of needs. Assistance to conflict-affected areas should focus on confidence-building measures, delivering concrete and symbolic peace dividends.

However, international organizations currently lack access to many armed conflict-affected areas, while local communities and CBOs are already active on the ground. An influx of foreign aid risks distorting local priorities, overwhelming limited local capacities, and marginalizing local agencies.

It is therefore important that foreign donors and aid agencies engage with communities and CBOs in ways which support and empower local agencies, and build capacities. Multi-donor trust funds and other mechanisms should be flexible and creative enough to engage constructively with local agencies.

Notwithstanding the importance of humanitarian and development assistance, it is important to recognise that current levels of foreign aid to Burma are less than one percent of foreign investment. In or nearby many armed conflict-affected areas, huge infrastructure and industrial development projects are in the planning or implementation stages.

These include hydropower projects (e.g. On the Salween); the Shwe Gas and associated projects (in Arakan State); Special Economic Zones (e.g. On the outskirts of Pa’an); and the Dawei (Tavoy) deep-sea port project (with an initial budget of US $8 billion, and total projected spend of some $100 billion).

Such projects were planned and agreed by the previous military government, without implementing social or environmental impact assessments, and could cause enormous environmental and social damage. However, since many of these projects are still in the planning or early implementation stages, there are opportunities to engage with economic and political power-holders, in order to mitigate the worst impacts, and advocate for the best results for affected communities.

Entry points for engagement include the promotion of environmental regulation, and best practice in the field of corporate social responsibility. Like the peace issues discussed above, it is essential that communities participate in decisions about projects which will affect their lives.

The opinions expressed in this guest commentary are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of  The Irrawaddy.

LINK : http://www.irrawaddy.org/archives/740

An interview with Burma’s democracy activist Aung San Suu Kyi

The Washington Post | Aung San Suu Kyi

Aung San Suu Kyi sat in the living room of the home where she lived under house arrest for so many years and talked about the future. She is now a free citizen, meeting with high-level foreign delegations; she’s a political star in her country and possibly a future president. In an interview with Washington Post senior associate editor Lally Weymouth on Wednesday — the same day Suu Kyi registered as a candidate for Burma’s parliamentary elections — she talked about her country’s president, U.S. economic sanctions and her political plans. Excerpts:

In the United States, people are asking if President Thein Sein’s reform process is real. Do you think the reforms are real? And how did your meeting with the president go?

My meeting with the president went well, and I believe he sincerely wants reform. But he is not the only one in government. Our present constitution gives the military far too much power. Although the president is the head of state, he is not necessarily the highest power in the land. The commander in chief can take over all powers of government at any time he feels it to be necessary. That must be very difficult if you are in the position in which our president is. I don’t know how much support he has within the army. He himself is an army man, so I assume there must be considerable support for him in military circles. But that is just an assumption.

I think the president is genuine about reform. I think there are those who support him in the government. Whether all people support him, I can’t answer.

Do you worry that there could be a reversal of this reform process?

I don’t worry overmuch, but I am aware that there is a possibility of reversal. I think we have to work very hard to diminish this possibility. I do appreciate what the United States is doing to encourage this process. I think we here inside Burma have to do the major part of the work.

Should the United States lift sanctions and engage?

Engage and lift sanctions when they think the time is right. The U.S. has laid out very clearly what the conditions are for the removal of sanctions. If this government wants sanctions to be removed, they will have to try and meet those conditions.

One condition was the prisoner releases, and the president did release quite a few recently.

Yes, but not all of them yet. All the major political prisoners have been released.

Do you feel you could you play a role in bringing about peace and reconciliation between the ethnic groups and the government?

I could play a role only if both sides are willing to have me play a role. I can’t just go in because one side has asked me to take part. The ethnics have indicated they want me to be part of it.

I asked the president if he would consider giving you a cabinet post. He said it was up to parliament.

Quite right. Even if we win all the seats we are contesting, that will be only 48 out of 600 seats. The reason we want to get into parliament is not because we expect to do all our work in parliament. We want to extend our activities into the parliament.

Going back to the U.S. demands — what other conditions must be met?

There should be an end to all hostilities in the ethnic areas. There has been a cease-fire with the KNU [Karen National Union] but not yet with the KIA [Kachin Independence Army]. That is a big problem for the country.

Senior U.S. officials look to you for guidance in regard to lifting the sanctions.

What they have in me is someone to give an honest assessment of the situation. The situation in the Kachin [state] is a major problem. If we are to have a genuinely peaceful nation, we will have to resolve these problems politically, not militarily.

The government reportedly has been brutal in the ethnic areas.

Yes, there have been human rights violations, and that’s why it’s necessary to allow third-party access to those areas to find out what’s really happening.

Sen. Richard Lugar (R-Ind.) has said that Burma is developing a nuclear weapon with the help of North Korea.

I don’t know that they are developing a nuclear weapon. They certainly have reestablished diplomatic relations with North Korea. That cannot be denied.

Is it true they picked Naypyidaw as the new capital because of an astrologer?

I understand that the previous government was guided by astrologers.

Do you think Thein Sein is sort of a Gorbachev?

No, because Gorbachev came into power gradually through the ranks, and he had his grip on power quite firmly before he started going towards reform. Thein Sein is in a rather different situation. I think very few people expected him to become head of state. He was not the highest-ranking member in the military government under Gen. [Than] Shwe.

You referred to the fact that the army could overthrow this president. What is his relationship with the army?

He is respected in the army, that we know. He is one of the few members of the previous regime who is considered by all to be clean. Not only he, but his family as well, and that is unusual.

This is the house you lived in when you were under house arrest. How many years did that go on?

All together, 15 years.

How did you keep going?

I had enough to do to keep this house from toppling down. I could listen to the radio, and I had access to books from time to time. Not all the time.

Your family was in England?

Yes, in some ways that was good because I didn’t have to worry about them. At least I knew that they were safe. The first six years I was kept totally alone. The last six years I had two people staying in the house. The first six years really trained me very well.

Do you want to be president one day?

I don’t want to be president, but I want to be free to decide whether or not I want to be president of this country.

If you win a majority of the parliamentary seats in 2015, as you did in 1990, do you think they would let you assume power?

What we want is to make sure that by 2015, this should not be a question at all. By 2015, we should be certain that whichever party wins the majority in parliament should decide how the government is going to be organized. We have said quite clearly that one of the aims of the NLD [National League for Democracy] is the necessary amendments to the constitution.

We have reregistered our party. I went to register myself as a candidate this morning. We have started campaigning around the country. People have been very enthusiastic. It is very encouraging — all these years, and they are still standing solidly behind us.

What about a free press?

There is no real freedom of the press yet. When I was released last year, I think we didn’t have half the number of journalists and publications that we have now. Within the last year, the number of publications have proliferated.

But they have to submit their stories to a censor.

Yes. The censorship laws have been relaxed considerably. When I was released, I couldn’t publish anything under my name.

Do you have ideas as to how to improve the living standards of the people of this country?

We need to empower the people. One way to empower them is to make them stronger economically. That’s where we would like our friends to help: foreign aid in the right way; development aid that is not frittered away to those who are administering the funds.

Do you favor privatizing the economy?

Yes, but we need sound laws with regard to the economy. We need sound banking and sound investment laws. Only a small minority of our people have anything to do with banks.

What is your view of the Arab Spring? Do you think the government in Naypyidaw was influenced by it?

The situation in the Middle East is considerably different. I was heartened that people everywhere want certain basic freedoms, even if they live in a totally different cultural environment.

I understand that when you met with President Thein Sein last summer, he had your father’s picture prominently displayed.

When the military regime first took over, my father’s face was on the currency. It was gradually removed and replaced by the symbol of the USDP [Union Solidarity and Development Party]. All the photos of my father were taken down from schools and government offices. You were not allowed to put photos of my father in journals or magazines. The meeting without the picture would have meant less.

Were you surprised when you walked in?

I was, yes. I had not expected it. My father’s picture was in the center.

Did you and the president decide you could work together?

I felt I could work with him, and I hope he felt he could work with me.

Did Secretary Hillary Rodham Clinton invite you to Washington when she was here in December?

Yes, I would love to go to Washington as soon as possible. Has it changed much in the last 40 years?

Recently you have had many foreign visitors. Hasn’t your life changed drastically in the past year?

It doesn’t seem all that different, except much busier. I don’t have enough time to read.

Do you know how to use a computer?

I do. I learned to work on a computer years before I was placed under house arrest. Fortunately I had two laptops when I was under house arrest — one an Apple and one a different operating system. I was very proud of that because I know how to use both systems. I had no contact with the outside world. But I learned how to use different programs — I would make little invitation cards for myself just for fun. Just to learn how to use it.

What do you worry about the most?

I worry that even those who want to reform are not quite sure how to go about it. There is so much to be done — this is why I am keen on an assessment by the World Bank as a first step towards finding out what we need to do.

Some say the regime undertook the recent reforms because they believe that China is gaining too much influence here and they want the United States and the international community as a counterbalance. What is your view?

It’s not necessarily connected with our relations with China. A lot of officers in the Burmese army have always wanted to have good relations with the U.S. Previously we have had good relations with the U.S., and some of the generals were trained in the U.S. The minister of labor had a stint at Fort Benning.

I heard he is the president’s liaison to you. Is that so?

That is right. He has been the liaison between me and the government for several years — since 2007. A few times a year, we had a meeting at a government guest house.

What did you think of him?

He is intelligent, which is a plus. He has goodwill. He wants the right kind of changes. Before 2004, they had a designated liaison officer. But he was removed. My first liaison officer was a major, and he rose through the ranks. At the end he was a brigadier. I knew some of the army quite well. I was the responsibility of the military intelligence.

You have some familiarity with army thinking?

Of course. And you must not forget that I come from an army family.

Right now, you hope for what?

I hope to win all the seats in the elections, which are very few. They aren’t giving it to us. They [the ruling USDP party] are going to contest this election themselves.

Did President Obama ask your opinion about sending Clinton to Burma?

He asked if I thought it was a good idea, and I said yes.

And you got along?

Yes, she is very nice and very intelligent. I like intelligent people.

LINK : www.almendron.com/tribuna/39800/an-interview-with-burmas-democracy-activist-aung-san-suu-kyi/

Myanmar Facts the last Uodated by AFP in April 1, 2012

Myanmar is holding closely watched by-elections on Sunday in which Nobel laureate Aung San Suu Kyi is standing for a seat in parliament for the first time.

Following are some facts about the country:

Geography: The Republic of the Union of Myanmar,

related stories

• Suu Kyi set for landmark win as Myanmar votes

formerly known as Burma, is in Southeast Asia and borders Bangladesh and India to the west, China to the north and Laos and Thailand to the east.

Area: 676,552 square kilometres (270,620 square miles).

Population: 57.5 million (2008, official estimate), 62.4 million (2011, IMF estimate).

Ethnic groups: Burman (68%), several minorities including the Shan (9% in the east, the Karen (7%) in the southeast, the Mon in the south and the Kachin in the northeast.

Capital: The junta in 2005 moved to an administrative capital at Naypyidaw in the centre of the country, about 400 kilometres (250 miles) north of the former capital, Yangon.

Religion: Buddhist (89%), Christian (5%), Muslim (4%, Rohingya -- a Bengali minority), Hindu, animist (2%).

History: Following three Anglo-Burmese wars (1824-26, 1852 and 1885), Britain annexed Burma and made it a province of British India in 1886. Burma became a separate colony in 1937 but this ended with invasion by Japan in 1942.

After Japan's World War II defeat, the Union of Burma gained independence on January 4, 1948.

Government: Following a controversial 2010 election, Myanmar has a nominally civilian government but its ranks are filled with ex-generals including President Thein Sein, a former junta premier.

Economy: Despite rich natural resources (oil, gas, gold, rubies, teak, copper), almost one-third of the population lives below the poverty line, according to the World Bank.

Myanmar is also the world's second-largest producer of illicit opium, after Afghanistan.

The IMF predicts the economy will grow by about 5.5 percent in the fiscal year to March 2012, and 6.0 percent the following year, driven by commodity exports and higher investment.

GDP per capita: Estimated at $804 (IMF, 2011)

Total external debt: 8.2 billion dollars (2009, World Bank)

Currency: Kyat. Myanmar has announced plans to overhaul its complex exchange rate system to allow a managed flotation of its currency from April 1.

Armed forces: Up to about 400,000 personnel, according to Jane's Sentinel.

Rebels: The country has been plagued by insurgency in ethnic areas since independence. The new government has signed a series of tentative peace pacts with a number of rebel groups but continues to battle ethnic Kachin in the far north, with tens of thousands of civilians displaced by the conflict.

LINK : http://www.hindustantimes.com/world-news/Myanmar/Facts-about-Myanmar/Article1-833768.aspx

Social media to play big role in Myanmar vote

STILL CENSORED:The print media are busy testing the limits of how far the regime will let them go in covering Suu Kyi’s activity amid today’s elections
AFP, YANGON, MYANMAR

Myanmar’s journalists will take to Twitter and Facebook in their battle to beat press restrictions and deliver breaking news of today’s by-elections that for many will be the biggest story of their careers.

The vote — the first contested by opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and likely to propel her into parliament — is set to pose a host of challenges for news editors from the country’s long-censored media.

All private news publications are weekly, after the previous military rulers nationalized dailies half a century ago and “everybody wants to be a Monday paper this week,” said Thiha Saw, editor of Open News, one of a number of papers to have applied for permission to print a day after the by-elections.

Those newspapers not shifting their print runs will rely on their burgeoning social media pages to provide readers with up to date coverage.

“Our paper will be [published] after the election, so we will post on Facebook and our Twitter account, so we will update all the news every hour after the polling stations open,” said Nyein Nyein Naing, executive editor of 7Day News, one of the country’s biggest weeklies with an estimated readership of 1.5 million.

Until last year, prominent coverage of Aung San Suu Kyi — known in Myanmar as “The Lady” — was almost unheard of and people who spoke to reporters were taking a real risk.

Front page pictures of the Nobel prize-winning opposition leader are now commonplace, while coverage of some other previously taboo subjects is also allowed after a new regime loosened censorship as part of wide-ranging reforms that have taken observers by surprise.

Weeklies are still subject to pre-publication scrutiny that is described by media rights organizations as among the world’s most draconian, but Nyein Nyein Naing said newspapers were increasingly deciding not to send sensitive stories to the censors.

“We are just trying to push our boundaries a little bit. We do something one week and nothing happens, so we do more the next week,” she said, indicating the latest edition of the paper, which carried a front page story about the controversial decision by authorities to postpone voting in three constituencies in Kachin State due to ongoing ethnic unrest in the northern region.

She said when it comes to breaking news online, editors publish what they want.

“For the Facebook and Twitter, we don’t think about censorship at all, we just put everything that we have got.”

She said 7Day News had become increasingly reliant on Facebook to reach its readership.

A story posted on the 7Day page of the social media Web site about electricity blackouts, an increasing problem during the summer months, had more than a hundred comments and 165 shares in just two hours — no mean feat in a country where only a fraction of the population has access to the Internet.

However, while censors might not stop papers covering the election in real time — the Internet itself could pose a challenge in a country beset by outages during sensitive periods.

“We all are worried about the Internet connection. Not only me but other journalists who are running their stories through the Internet,” said Nyein Nyein Naing.

She added that her reporter could not send pictures during a recent Aung San Suu Kyi trip to the far north because the connection was down.

“I don’t think that would be coincidentally,” she said when asked if the authorities were behind the outage.

Burma journalists use social media to report on elections

KELLY MACNAMARA  RANGOON, BURMA - Mar 31 2012 09:41

Burma's journalists will take to Twitter and Facebook in their battle to beat press restrictions and deliver breaking news of Sunday's by-elections that for many will be the biggest story of their careers.

The vote -- the first contested by opposition leader Aung San Suu Kyi and likely to propel her into parliament -- is set to pose a host of challenges for news editors from the country's long-censored media.

All private news publications are weekly, after the previous military rulers nationalised dailies half a century ago and "everybody wants to be a Monday paper this week", said Thiha Saw, editor of Open News, one of a number of papers to have applied for permission to print a day after the by-elections.

Those newspapers not shifting their print runs will rely on their burgeoning social media pages to provide readers with up to date coverage.

"Our paper will be (published) after the election, so we will post on Facebook and our Twitter account, so we will update all the news every hour after the polling stations open," said Nyein Nyein Naing, executive editor of 7Day News, one of the country's biggest weeklies with an estimated readership of 1.5-million.

The Lady
Until last year, prominent coverage of Suu Kyi -- known here as "The Lady" -- was almost unheard of and people who spoke to reporters were taking a real risk.

Front page pictures of the Nobel prize-winning opposition leader are now commonplace, while coverage of some other previously taboo subjects is also allowed after a new regime loosened censorship as part of wide-ranging reforms that have taken observers by surprise.

Weeklies are still subject to pre-publication scrutiny that is described by media rights organisations as among the world's most draconian, but Nyein Nyein Naing told AFP newspapers were increasingly deciding not to send sensitive stories to the censors.

"We are just trying to push our boundaries a little bit. We do something one week and nothing happens, so we do more the next week," she said, indicating the latest edition of the paper, which carried a front page story about the controversial decision by authorities to postpone voting in three constituencies in Kachin state due to ongoing ethnic unrest in the northern region.

CONTINUES BELOW

She said when it comes to breaking news online, editors publish what they want.

Readership and Facebook
"For the Facebook and Twitter, we don't think about censorship at all, we just put everything that we have got."

She said 7Day News had become increasingly reliant on Facebook to reach its readership.

A story posted on the 7Day page of the social media website about electricity blackouts, an increasing problem during the summer months, had more than a hundred comments and 165 shares in just two hours -- no mean feat in a country where only a fraction of the population has access to the Internet.

But while censors might not stop papers covering the election in real time -- the Internet itself could pose a challenge in a country beset by outages during sensitive periods.

"We all are worried about the Internet connection. Not only me but other journalists who are running their stories through the Internet," said Nyein Nyein Naing, adding that her reporter could not send pictures during a recent Suu Kyi trip to the far north because the connection was down.

Outages
"I don't think that would be coincidentally," she said when asked if the authorities were behind the outage.

Wai Phyo, editor in chief of Eleven Media, said he was also concerned about the Internet connection but the organisation will also use its text service to send news to subscribers' mobile phones on election night.

"We will use all possible ways to send out our information," he said.

"The main thing is the Internet connection on that day. We have many difficulties. I want the Internet to be good."

But he said journalists' ability to report on the vote would be a test of the poll.

Expected result
"The world is watching. I think our press freedom to cover the by-election will decide whether it is free and fair," he said.

Thiha Saw, who will be busy compiling early results on Sunday night in the run up to his midnight print deadline, said he had already written the Open News election supplement cover.

"There will be the picture of the Lady -- we have got hundreds of them -- and the title will be 'The Lady wins'!" he said with obvious relish. -- Sapa-AFP

Link : http://mg.co.za/article/2012-03-31-myanmar-journalists-use-social-media-top-report-on-elections

Burma: Role of freedom of expression in democratisation processes

Agnes Callamard, 29 Mar 2012 

Presentation to the Conference on Media Development in Myanmar, Organised by the Ministry of Information and UNESCO Rangoon, Myanmar, March 19-20, 2012 

I am deeply honoured to be here today – in a Myanmar in dialogue and open exchange.

I am very honoured and very surprised - I don’t think I ever expected to be here today – yet time and time again world events and sheer human courage teach us that change is not to be predicted.

This is the story of the last 14 months.  From January 2011 many of us, human rights activists, have been riding the roller coaster of human rights change, beginning with Tunisia and taking us right through to today in Myanmar.

Together we have witnessed the changes of these last months with some amazement and, of course, a degree of scepticism – greeting them with cautious optimism.

What is certain is that these changes that have spread across the Middle East and which are taking place in Myanmar must make us think again.  For all of us, all who never imagined change would come in that way at this time, we have much to be humble about and much to reassess. Few of us saw this change coming and for those who did, very few, if any, thought they would bring democratisation.

The reality is that for all our expertise, even with all our data and despite all our reporting and careful analysis, it seems that still we under estimated a number of things.  What those aspects are precisely remains for us to determine together.  But what is clear already is that a main lesson that Myanmar teaches us all and experts in particular, is humility. 

So today we are here in Yangon – present to offer our congratulations for the important steps already taken, to highlight our concerns over what has not yet been done, and, most importantly, to speak together about the challenges that lie ahead.

In this session, I will be focusing on the place of freedom of expression / media laws and legal reforms in the process you have undertaken.

I - Why does freedom of expression and freedom of the media matter?

Before focusing on the importance and role of a proper legal framework, we may need to reiterate a few things about why freedom of expression, freedom of the media matter.

Human rights are the foundation of human dignity, freedom, justice and peace. The 1948 Universal Declaration on Human Rights laid out equal rights for all people and three fundamental principles governing human rights: rights are universal, meaning that rights apply to everyone whoever or wherever that person is; inalienable, in that they precede state authority and are based on peoples’ humanity; and indivisible in that all rights are of equal importance. 

The UDHR was also intended to provide a common framework and understanding across nations for preventing the religious, racial, political and sectarian strife which plagued humanity throughout its history, culminating in the Second World War.  This idea is forcefully expressed in the preamble of the UDHR, which explicitly mentions freedom of speech and beliefs together as the highest aspirations of the common people.

Expression and Information are two sides of the same coin.   

At its very first session, in 1946, the UN General Assembly adopted Resolution 59(I) which states: “Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and ... the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the United Nations is consecrated.”

ARTICLE 19 considers freedom of expression as a cornerstone right - one that enables other rights to be protected and exercised.  The full enjoyment of the right to freedom of expression is central to achieving individual freedoms and developing democracy and plays a critical role in tackling the underlying causes of poverty[1].

It makes electoral democracy meaningful and builds public trust in administration. Access to information strengthens mechanisms to hold governments accountable for their promises, obligations and actions.  It not only increases the knowledge base and participation within a society but can also secure external checks on state accountability, and thus prevent corruption that thrives on secrecy and closed environments.

Freedom of expression and freedom of information are crucial to democracy and the enjoyment of other rights.  The importance of freedom of expression was particularly emphasised by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights which stated:

Freedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which the very existence of a democratic society rests.  It is indispensable for the formation of public opinion. It is also a conditio sine qua non for the development of political parties, trade union, scientific and cultural societies and, in general, those who wish to influence the public. It represents, in short, the means that enable the community, when exercising its opinions, to be sufficiently informed. Consequently, it can be said that a society that is not well informed is not a society that is truly free.[2]   

If people are not free to say what they want, to disseminate information and expression their opinion on matters of political interest, and to receive information and ideas from a variety of sources, then they will not be able to case an informed vote or to participate in governance in other ways.  The right to freedom of expression and freedom of information are also key in any system for protecting and promoting the enjoyment of all other human rights – whether civil or political rights, or economic, social and cultural rights.

The guarantee of freedom of expression applies with particular force to the media. The European Court has consistently emphasised the “pre-eminent role of the press in a State governed by the rule of law” and has stated: “Freedom of the press affords the public one of the best means of discovering and forming an opinion of the ideas and attitudes of their political leaders. In particular, it gives politicians the opportunity to reflect and comment on the preoccupations of public opinion; it thus enables everyone to participate in the free political debate which is at the very core of the concept of a democratic society.[3]

II - Freedom of expression and Media legislation: why do laws matter?

The rule of law is to a stable sustainable society what the skeleton is to the human body.  Without a strong, stable, unbroken and nourished skeletal underpinning the human body falls, fails, simply cannot function in any reliable manner.  With a sound skeletal framework in place, the human body can absorb the stresses of it movements and its ambitions: we can sit, stand, run, create, defend, protect, assert.  

For human society, it is law that is the essential skeleton on which all stable and sustainable functioning relies.  Sustainable society – which requires right-full and responsible citizens, a stable basis for sound economic enterprise, open space for scientific innovation and artistic creativity – cannot stand unless it is underpinned by a vigorous rule of law supported an independent judiciary. 

Establishing, maintaining and abiding by this system of law are the principal functions of government.   Under the doctrine of the separation of powers there is a tripartite of complementary roles to be fulfilled: those who have the formal power to create legislation – the legislators; the judicial branch which has the formal power to interpret legislation and the executive branch which can act only within the powers and limits set by the law. 

Not all law are good laws.  Indeed, there is no equality amongst laws. There are laws that meet what the international community has determined to be good standards.

And there are laws that don’t.

Inequality, repression, discrimination, corruption can be embedded by, through and in law.  Racism was entrenched in law by the apartheid regime of South Africa.  Colonial power was entrenched in a multitude of laws.  Nazi Germany’s obsession with legislation and regulation enabled the mass extermination of millions of Jews and thousands of others.  History has shown us that systematic repression, mass scale suppression and grave human rights violations have often been formally justified, if not entrenched, in law – in bad law.

These examples and many others prompted the international community to work together to define, determine, agree on standards for good law; prompted governments to establish the United Nations to set those standards, agree a multitude of conventions and treaties, and establish international courts.

III - International standards on freedom of expression 

So for the laws to play their role as far as freedom of expression and freedom of the Media are concerned, they must meet a set of international agreed standards. And in the best case scenario, they should also seek to meet existing best practices within the international community.

There is no space or time here to present all international or regional standards related to freedom of expression, freedom of information or freedom of the media.

One excellent point of departure for an overview is a recent interpretation by the Human Rights Committee of article 19 of the ICCPR.  General Comment 34 provides an authoritative interpretation of international standards regarding freedom of expression, including freedom of the media and freedom of information.

For the purpose of this presentation, I will highlight a few broad elements pertaining to the internationally agreed interpretation of freedom of expression.

First, the right to freedom of expression and freedom of information are protected by a number of international human rights instruments that bind states.  Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) guarantees the right to freedom of expression in the following terms:

Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes the right to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.[4]

The UDHR, as a UN General Assembly Resolution, is not directly binding on states. However, parts of it, including Article 19, are regarded as having acquired legal force as customary international law.[5] 

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) elaborates upon and gives legal force to many of the rights articulated in the UDHR.   

It is a pity that Myanmar has not yet ratified the ICCPR and indeed my first recommendation will be that it does so as a matter of urgency and priority.  In his speech this morning, the honourable Minister of Information made reference to articles 19 and 20 of the ICCPR and to article 10 of the European Convention. I take these references as indicating the Minster’s and the Union’s understanding of the importance of such international benchmarks.

As of 20 January 2012, the ICCPR has 167 states party to respect its provisions and implement its framework at the national level.[6]

Article 19 of the ICCPR guarantees freedom of expression and freedom of information as follows:  

1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.

2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.

3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and are necessary:

(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;

(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or morals.

Second, international law protects the right to hold opinions as well as expression generally.  

The right to hold opinions is an absolute right under international law, in recognition of the illegitimacy of the state trying to either prohibit certain opinions or to force individuals to adopt certain opinions.  Article 19 of the ICCPR protects all forms of opinion. General Comment No 34 of the Human Rights Committee states: 

9. This is a right to which the Covenant permits no exception or restriction.  Freedom of opinion extends to the right to change an opinion whenever and for whatever reason a person so freely chooses.  No person may be subject to the impairment of any rights under the Covenant on the basis of his or her actual, perceived or supposed opinions.  All forms of opinion are protected, including opinions of a political, scientific, historic, moral or religious nature.  It is incompatible with paragraph 1 to criminalize the holding of an opinion.  The harassment, intimidation or stigmatization of a person, including arrest, detention, trial or impairment of the opinions they may hold, constitutes a violation of article 19, paragraph 1

10. Any form of effort to coerce the holding or not holding of any opinion is prohibited.  Freedom to express one’s opinion necessarily includes freedom not to express one’s opinion.

Third, international law defines the modes of expression covered by freedom of expression and freedom of information broadly. Article 19 covers “freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice” (emphasis added). 

The Human Rights Committee has recently affirmed that these words require a very broad interpretation.  It has stated:

11.  Paragraph 2 requires States parties to guarantee the right to freedom of expression, including the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds regardless of frontiers. This right includes the expression and receipt of communications of every form of idea and opinion capable of transmission to others, subject to the provisions in article 19, paragraph 3, and article 20. It includes political discourse, commentary on one’s own and on public affairs, canvassing, discussion of human rights, journalism, cultural and artistic expression, teaching, and religious discourse. It may also include commercial advertising. The scope of paragraph 2 embraces even expression that may be regarded as deeply offensive, although such expression may be restricted in accordance with the provisions of article 19, paragraph 3 and article 20.

12.  Paragraph 2 protects all forms of expression and the means of their dissemination. Such forms include spoken, written and sign language and such non-verbal expression as images and objects of art. Means of expression include books, newspapers, pamphlets, posters, banners, dress and legal submissions. They include all forms of audio-visual as well as electronic and internet-based modes of expression.

Fourthly, freedom of expression includes freedom of information, including the right to access government-held information.  As recently expressly confirmed by the Human Rights Committee, Article 19(2) embraces a right of access to information held by public bodies.[7]  In the ASEAN region, Indonesia has adopted a freedom of information legislation while in China, a number of large cities, states and municipalities have done the same. Cambodia is currently considering an access to information law.

Fourth, freedom of expression standards also includes Media freedom. The issue has been the object of a vast number of interpretations and jurisprudence around the world. For the purpose of this presentation, I will highlight what I think are some of the key elements of media freedom under international human rights law. 

a)    Pluralism: Governments are under a duty, indeed a positive obligation to promote pluralism within, and ensure equal access of all to, the media, that is to ensure that citizens have access to diverse and reliable sources of information on topics of interest to them.

b)    Independence: In order to promote pluralism and protect the right to freedom of expression, it is imperative that the media be permitted to operate independently of government control. This ensures that the media plays its role as public watchdog and that the public has access to a wide range of opinions, especially on matters of public interest. This has important implications for media regulatory models. 

c)    In terms of regulation, for the print media, there is overall agreement that self-regulation is the best system for promoting high standards in the media.

d)    With regard to the broadcast media, it may be more strictly regulated than print media in order to manage the limited available spectrum, but this regulation should follow strict principles:

• No State monopoly over broadcasting
• No prior censorship
• Three kinds of broadcasting should be able to co-exist and access the airwaves: public, private and community
• A regulatory body, fully independent from political and economic interest, shall be responsible for issuing broadcasting licences and for ensuring observance of licence conditions 

The limits to freedom of expression, including freedom of the Media: the three part test

Yet, the right is freedom of expression, under international human rights law, may be restricted in order to protect a legitimate aim, amongst others, the rights of others, and public order, if it is done by law and if it is "necessary in a democratic society" to do so.

To be legitimate, a restriction to freedom of expression must meet a three part test:

• First, it must be prescribed by law;
• Second, it must pursue a legitimate aim, such as respect of the rights or reputations of others, protection of national security, public order, public health or morals; and
• Third, the restriction should be necessary to secure the legitimate aim and meet the test of proportionality.[8]  

To keep with the focus of this presentation, I will elaborate on the first part of this test and what constitutes an appropriate law.

The following points were developed in a recent brief drafted by ARTICLE 19 to assist with constitutional reform in Tunisia[9].

• “To be characterised as a law, a norm must be formulated with sufficient precision to enable an individual to regulate his or her conduct accordingly.[10]

• Ambiguous, vague or overly broad restrictions on freedom of expression or freedom of information which fail to set the exact scope of their application are therefore impermissible under Article 19(3). 

• General Comment No 34 further provides that for the purpose of Article 19(3) a law may not confer unfettered discretion for restricting freedom of expression on those charged with executing that law.[11] 

• Laws must provide sufficient guidance to those charged with their execution to enable them to ascertain what sorts of expression are properly restricted and what sorts are not.  This is a particularly important requirement in countries, such as Myanmar where a myriad of laws have been developed. 

• The requirement that the law be sufficiently precise for this purpose is closely related to the requirements of necessity and proportionality (the third part of the test above mentioned). It ensures that restrictions on freedom of expression are only employed for legitimate protective objectives and limits the opportunity to manipulate those restrictions for other purposes”[12]. 

IV - The legislative framework for freedom of expression in Myanmar

I think it is fair to say that many laws in Myanmar today do not meet the standards I have presented so far. 

A number were inherited from the colonial era and have not been revised even though they were established to defend a state of affair that is no longer recognised as legitimate.

A large number of current laws imposes restrictions which simply put do not meet any internationally recognised standards of legitimate restrictions. 

To cite just a few[13]:

Section 122 of the Penal Code of Burma 1957 prohibits any criticism of the government or the State (criminal defamation).

Printers and Publishers Registration Act 1962 establishes the government’s Press Scrutiny and Registration Division and broadcasting censorship board, that approve all press, television, radio and cinema content before they can publish

The Official Secrets Act 1923, Emergency Provisions Act 1950, Electronic Transactions Act 2004 prohibit the collection, possession or dissemination of information or “false news” which is “detrimental to national interests”, and provide for 14 year terms of imprisonment or the death penalty 

The Burma Wireless Telegraphy Act 1933, as amended in 1995 and 1996, Computer Science Development Act 1996, Television and Video Act 1996 aim to stop people from privately disseminating or receiving information, prohibiting the possession or use of radios, fax machines, mobile phones, modems, VCRs, or computers without a licence from the government and provide for up to 15 years imprisonment.

In addition to the problematic legislative framework for the protection of the right to freedom of expression, the judicial system lacks independence and does not yet operate as a safeguard against arbitrariness and to protect the rule of law.

A first positive step: The 2008 Constitution

Chapter 8 of the Constitution is titled ‘Citizen, Fundamental Rights and Duties of the Citizens’ and contains the right to freedom of expression under Article 354:

“Every citizen shall be at liberty in the exercise of the following rights, if not contrary to the laws, enacted for Union security, prevalence of law and order, community peace and tranquillity or public order and morality: a) to express and publish freely their convictions and opinions;...”

This is a good start. Unfortunately, the fundamental rights in Chapter 8 are undermined by the supremacy of the “Defence Services”. The Defence Services are permitted to participate in the State’s executive function (Article 6), revoke any of the fundamental rights to maintain “peace” (Article 382), and are – rather than the judiciary – responsible for safeguarding the Constitution (Article 20(e)).

In spite of its shortcomings, the 2008 Constitution laid the ground for the democratisation reform which we have been witnessing for the last 12 months.

A second step: the June 2011 reform

As highlighted in the IMS Report of January 2012, the June 2011 reform initiated by the Government relaxed the provisions of the 1962 Publications Act for a selected group of journals and magazines (health, children, technology and sports sector publications) which are no longer required to submit their publications for advance approval. Unfortunately, there are a number of so-called Category II journals and magazines (politics, religion, business, education and crime) which are still the object of prior review and prior censorship. 

Further, according to the IMS report, “almost half the 358 publications that are non-news, non-current affairs and less sensitive have been declared exempt from pre-publication censorship, but they are governed through a pre-deposited fine system in the event of publishing an ‘unhealthy’ story. Thus, an environment of self-censorship has been created while exempting publications from pre-scrutiny.. Under the new guidelines of June 2011, a Complaint Commission has been established that will conduct post-publication review of published content for any transgression of the Four National Objectives that may adversely affect national solidarity and harmony or defame anyone...[14]”

Still, the change initiated in June 2001, and the subsequent release of all journalists and a number of political prisoners, did signal a profound change and move towards democratic reforms. 

V - RECOMMENDATIONS

Clearly Myanmar has adopted an incremental, highly controlled, step by step approach to the change and democratisation process.  This approach was highlighted by the Minister in his speech this morning.

The first step consisted in easing the restrictions of the 1962 Publications law as part of the June 2011 reform. The country is currently engaged in the second step, the development of a new media law.

In view of the above presentation on “good legislation”, what kind of recommendations can we make in the context of an incremental approach? 

Ratify the ICCPR: this must be an essential step as the international framework should guide the democratization process. It is what will give the reforms its international and national legitimacy and it is what will give assurance that this is a genuine process of reforms.

Transparency: The text of the draft laws or new policies must be made available to the people of Myanmar. Right now, the rumours regarding new media laws and the absence of transparency over their content are contrary to the objectives of the process and are not effective. Constructive engagement with these texts from a variety of actors can only strengthen the text itself and most importantly their legitimacy. There is a high degree of anxiety within the media sector in Myanmar which is particularly detrimental to the twin objectives of trust and responsibility which were identified by the Minister of Information as key to the reform process.

Repeal existing restrictive laws: the adoption of new laws is probably an effective and efficient approach to the reform agenda, given the myriad of older laws that are currently unduly restricting freedom of expression, amounting to a maze of restrictions and slowing down the reform process. 

At the same time, it is vital that these older laws be repealed (or superseded by new ones where relevant) for otherwise they will create great legal uncertainty, and  remain threatening. 

A new Press Law?: It is generally accepted that “while the broadcast media may necessitate state regulation, only to prevent chaos on the airwaves, such a necessity does not extend to the print media. For this reason, most democracies have moved to abolish their press laws and regulate the print media through laws of general application. Indeed, the experience of transitioning democracies in Eastern Europe after the fall of communism show that even young democracies with an immature free media do not need a press law.”[15] 

ARTICLE 19 always tends to approach specific press laws with caution. Our experience is that such laws are unnecessary, as they tend to be used by governments as an instrument to excessively restrict the right to freedom of expression and information.

This said, we engage constructively and with open mind with many governments around the world. Most recently, the government of Tunisia has adopted a new press law. ARTICLE 19 has provided a number of confidential legal reviews of various drafts.

I will suggest that the Government of Myanmar consider the press law adopted by Tunisia. It presents shortcomings but a number of positive aspects which could be emulated. I am citing this example given the fact that Tunisia has initiated a similar process of reform and democratization a year ago.

Regulation of the Broadcasting sector: The broadcasting sector needs to be reformed as well to ensure for a diverse and pluralistic broadcasting sector.  I have identified above some of the key characteristics of a “good” broadcasting law.  In ARTICLE 19’s experience, a first step towards ensuring an appropriate regulation of the broadcasting sector could be the establishment of a fully independent regulatory body.  There are many examples around the world of laws establishing such bodies which could be helpful in this process. 

Multi-stakeholder / participatory approach: As suggested by ARTICLE 19 in its suggestions to the Tunisian government regarding the constitutional reform process, the Government of Myanmar also “needs to “bring human rights home” into the domestic legal order and establish and embed a “human rights culture” in society so that rights are not alien, but familiar entitlements for its individual members.  This requires human rights education for the public as well as state administration.”[16]  In particular, the Myanmar judiciary should be trained in the judicial practice and implementation of human rights law, including Myanmar’s current and future international human rights obligations. Importantly, NGOs, intergovernmental organisations and the media should be able to monitor the compliance of Myanmar’s state organs and public bodies with the new laws and commitments.

Support is on offer:  People, governments and non-governmental organisations around the world are keen to see that the Myanmar democratic reform is a success story.  No one is interested in seeing it collapse or getting sidetracked or shying away from its true mission. It means that support is on offer. ARTICLE 19 and many others are offering their expertise and support to the Government of Myanmar, the Media and civil society in its important journey towards strengthening human rights protection and the rule of law in the country, and establishing independent media. 

CONCLUSION

At the outset I emphasised that law is the essential business of government and noted the critical part to be played by the tripartite system of law making, law enacting and law protection.  The legislators, executive and judiciary fulfil critical functions without which the rule of law fails and the fabric of sustainable society falls. 

To set solid foundations for sustainable society, there are important laws, which should be drafted according to international standard and enacted accordingly.  Critical are those that protect and uphold the rights to freedoms of expression, assembly and information and freedom of the press.  They are a stable society’s backbone and shoulder blades.

Robust legal frameworks for freedoms of expression, information and the media are critical and irrevocable human rights in their own right.  They are also powerful social goods in that they enable government to fulfil its tri-partite functions, to maintain its responsibilities to the law and to uphold the best practices of good governance.  The transparency provided by freedom of information, the scrutiny provided by freedom of the press and the critique provided by freedom of expression create the environment in which high quality accountability government can flourish and deepen. 

In other words if law is the skeletal framework on which stands and falls the strength and sustainability of a society, then the rights to freedoms of expression, information and the press is also a government’s personal trainer!  A challenge, a goal, an encouragement and a motivator:  without which no government can perform to the highest standard or achieve the best possible for those who give governments its raison d’etre: the people.

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[1] Catherine Pitt, Bridging the Human Rights and Development discourses: Is the Right to Freedom of Expression of use to Development?, dissertation, MSc in the faculty of Economics, LSE, London, 2005.

[2] Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed by Law for the Practice of Journalism (Arts 13 and 29 American Convention on Human Rights) Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, November 13, 1985, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (Ser. A) No 5 (1985).

[3] Castells v. Spain, 24 April 1992, Application No. 11798/85, para. 43.

[4] UN General Assembly Resolution 217A(III), adopted 10 December 1948.

[5] Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F. 2d 876 (1980) (US Circuit Court of Appeals, 2^nd circuit).

[6] Article 2 of the ICCPR, GA res. 2200A (XXI), 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966); 999 UNTS 171; 6 ILM 368 (1967).

[7] Human Rights Committee, General Comment No 34, Freedoms of Opinion and Expression (Article 19), CCPR/C/GC/34, 12 September 2011, See paras 18-19.

[8] See Communication No 1022/2001, Velichin v Belarus, Views adopted on 20 October 2005.

[9] ARTICLE 19, Tunisia Constitution Brief, March 2011, forthcoming

[10] Leonardus J.M. de Groot v The Netherlands, No. 578/1994, CCPR/C/54/D/578/1994 (1995).

[11] Ibid.

[12] ARTICLE 19, Tunisia Constitution Brief, March 2011, forthcoming

[13] The following section is based on a report produced by ARTICLE 19 for the UPR process of March 2011.

[14] IMS Report, January 2012

[15] ARTICLE 19, Tunisia Press Law, Legal Analysis, 2011

[16] ARTICLE 19, Tunisia Constitution Brief, March 2012



Link : http://www.article19.org/resources.php/resource/3006/en/burma:-role-of-freedom-of-expression-in-democratisation-processes